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As the Japanese economy has grown more powerful over the
last two decades, there has been an increasing number of influen-
tial Americans who have voiced the fear that sharp economic compe-
tition from Japan is beginning to threaten the health of the US
economy. There is a wide-spread perception that Japan is a "neo-
mercantilist" nation which engages in predatory and unfair trade
practices. Japan-bashers maintain that the Japanese believe that
there is little distinction between economic security and national
security and that their mercantilist approach to doing business
threatens American national security by weakening critical elements
of the US economy. By examining the extent and the nature of the
Japanese economic presence in the world marketplace, this thesis
will show that this Japanese economic challenge poses no real
danger to American economic interests except in one critical
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States' bilateral relations with Japan are
becoming increasingly strained as the asymmetrical nature of
Japanese economic competition continues to help cause large
dislocations in the American economy. As the Japanese economy
has grown more powerful over the last two decades, there has
been a growing number of influential Americans who have voiced
the fear that sharp economic competition from Japan is begin-
ning to threaten the very health of the US economy. There is
a widespread perception among many of them that Japan is a
"neo-mercantilist" nation which consciously engages in preda-
tory and unfair trade practices. These "Japan-bashers," as
they are colloquially called, maintain that the Japanese
firmly believe that there is little distinction between
economic security and national security, and that their
mercantilist approach to doing business threatens American
national security by weakening and destroying critical
elements of the US economy.
This groundswell of animosity towards Japan threatens to
endanger a long-standing alliance between two of the world's
most powerful nations. It is an alliance to which the United
States initially committed itself in 1951, and then later
revised within the revamped framework of the U.S. -Japan Mutual
Security Treaty of 1960. It is also a strategic relationship
which came into being as a handmaiden to the Cold War in Asia,
and as such, it has generally served American global interests
for almost four decades. But, whereas today "...the majority
of the American public continues to support the use of troops
in a crisis situation in Europe, less than half of the public
favors the use of troops to defend against an attack on
Japan. "* This growing reluctance among the American people to
defend Japan, despite the US treaty obligation, is a direct
result of Japan's astounding success in the world market-
place. Public opinion polls conducted in the US have consis-
tently shown over the last few years, that "by substantial
margins, both the public and leaders believe the economic
power of Japan will be a more critical threat to American
vital interests in the next few years than will Soviet
military power." In fact, "as America's historic fears of a
Soviet Communist threat recede, new fears of a Japan bent on
world economic domination are coming to the fore." Yet, even
though it is clear that American views of Japan have changed
*John E. Rielly, "Public Opinion: The Pulse of the '90s," Foreign Policy
82, (Spring 1991) : 80.
j
Ibid., 80. Rielly gives specific numbers on page 86, where he states that
"...60% of the public and 63% of leaders believe the economic power of Japan will
be a 'critical threat'." These surveys were conducted when the Soviet military
threat was still believed to be both substantial and credible. This perception
about Japan, however, is only likely to sharpen as the Soviet military threat
continues to recede.
\ . .
Yoshi Tsurumi, "U.S. -Japanese Relations: From Brinkmanship To Stateman-
ship," World Policy Journal VII, (Winter 1989-90): 1.
significantly for the worse over the course of the last two
decades, US policy-makers still continue to view this trans-
Pacific alliance as critical to American national security.
For instance, in the 1990 edition of National Security
Strategy of the United States , the White House declared quite
straightforwardly that:
Our alliance with Japan remains a centerpeice of our secur-
ity policy and an important anchor of stability. Japan's
importance is now global. Our relationship is one of the
most important bilateral relationships in the world and it
is in our strategic interest to preserve it.
Japan's global significance is due primarily to its grow-
ing economic dominance in many areas of industry and finance.
That fact alone makes the US-Japanese bilateral relationship
of vast strategic importance, because the two nations are by
far the most important players in the world's financial and
commercial markets. For instance, the two nations possess the
world's two most powerful economies; and, together, Japan and
the United States have combined gross national products (GNP)
that account for about 40 percent of total global GNP.
Perhaps even more striking is the fact that:
With just 7 percent of the world's population, the two
economies produce 30 percent of the world's goods and
control a similarly disproportionate percentage of global
trade. Together the two countries account for nearly
The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States , March
1990, 12.
'Huntington Hardisty, "Statement of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific
Command" before the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, 1 March 1990, 4.
three-quarters of world stock and bond market value and
half of all bank lending. They issue 80 percent of the
money used by other nations as reserve currencies.
Looking at these impressive statistics, it should be no
surprise to find out that the two countries are also the
world's largest foreign aid donors and play commanding roles
in influencial financial organizations like the World Bank,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian Develop-
ment Bank. The economic interrelationship between the United
States and Japan is also extremely significant, for the two
countries are not only each other's largest overseas trading
partners, they are also tightly bound together by mutual
direct investments of many billions of dol* \rs.
How these two countries conduct their bilateral trade
relations is therefore of great importance, and there exists
a real danger that strident American complaints about Japanese
competition could obscure some of the real reasons behind
America's economic problems, and lead to harsh protectionist
actions in the United States
—
protectionist actions which
could be specifically directed against Japan, and which would
then serve to create not only a disasterous cleavage between
the two economies, but also a swift and acrimonious breakdown
of the alliance between the two nations. Any serious economic
"Daniel Burstein, Yen! Japan's New Financial Empire And Its Threat to
America (New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1988), 22.
department of State, "U.S. -Japan Relations," Gist , June 1990, 1.
dispute between the two of them would result in severe
tremblings all over the the globe and threaten a return to the
protectionist nationalism that prevailed in the 1930s. For
this reason alone, the United States must come to understand
the differences between the two economic systems so that it
can better negotiate mutually-advantageous trade relations. As
the Commission on US-Japan Relations for the Twenty First
Century warns:
The United States and Japan are bound together in a rela-
tionship vital to both nations, and to the world. But
goodwill between the two nations is eroding, sparked by
disputes over a stubborn trade imbalance. Recriminations
threatens to emphasize negatives here and in Japan. At risk
is the capcity for cooperation between the two democracies--
the key to stability and prosperity in the Pacific. At risk,
too, is the ability to meet the worldwide challenges of the
next century.
If it is in our strategic interests to preserve this long-
standing alliance, it then becomes imperative that US policy-
makers and the American public better understand both the
nature and the extent of the economic relationship between the
two nations. How the two countries interreact is a critical
element in determining not only the health of their respective
economies, but also the continued viability of the interna-
tional economic system itself; consequently, clarifying these
facets of the economic relationship becomes an undertaking of
Francis J. McNeil, "Reassessing the U.S. -Japan Security Relationship in
the Post-Cold War Context," A report prepared for the Commission on US-Japan
Relations for the Twenty First Century, (Washington, D.C., May 1991), ii.
vast importance for both Japanese and US policy-makers.
Without this growing clarification, it will be difficult for
any American administration to properly assess the true
nature, or extent, of any (potential) Japanese threat to
American economic interests--dif f iculties which could then
frustrate attempts to balance American strategic concerns in
the Pacific.
In an attempt to further that understanding, this thesis
will examine:
1. the changing nature of American national security
policy, by examining the shift from the traditional Cold
War paradigm of "anti-communism/containment," to a new
policy framework which emphasizes "economic strength"
over "military power" as the critical element of
national security;
2. the changing US perception of how the Japanese economy
has fit into American postwar national strategy—showing
Japan's emerging shift from Cold War ally to "unfair"
economic competitor;
3. how the capitalist systems in the United States and
Japan differ, with a close examination of the nature of
Japan's industrial policy and the structure of its
keiretsu and kaisha ;
4. the extent of the Japanese challenge, along with a look
at American complaints about it;
5. relative American strengths and Japanese weaknesses,
with a critical reappraisal of the seriousness of
Japanese economic competition to American national
security;
6. the real "war" between the US and Japan: the battle for
control of high-technology, and its possible implica-
tions for American national security; and
7. possible macro-approaches to strengthening the American
response to this Japanese challenge.
For many Americans "the extent of the relationship [with
Japan] is far wider than most imagine," 9 and there is little
understanding of how the Japanese economic system actually
works. While many of the complaints which are voiced by the
"Japan-bashers" are clearly warranted, the problem is that
these complaints often either overstate the extent of Japanese
economic competition, or underestimate the ability of American
industry to respond to it. This thesis will attempt to show,
by examining these areas, that Japanese economic competition,
poses no more significant danger to American national security
than that of any other determined competitor, except in one
potentially critical area--the development and control of high
technology.
Trank Gibney, Japan: The Fragile Superpower (New York: Meridian, 1986),
3.
II. THE CHANGING NATURE OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY
The world has changed, and if the United States is to
survive and prosper in George Bush's rather ill-defined "New
World Order" , it must begin to adapt itself to the new
realities of an international environment which is going to be
markedly different from that of the last forty-five years.
Today, few American strategists would deny the critical impor-
tance of possessing a technologically-advanced industrial base
which is capable of creating and sustaining not only powerful
military forces but other elements of geopolitical power as
well. This recognition of the critical interrelationship
12between economics and the ability to exert world influence, 16
See in Charles Krauthammer, "Breaking the old rules," San Jose
Mercury News , May 20, 1991, 7B, where the author says that this New World
Order has been only vaguely defined by the President until just recently.
One version of the NWO "...was offered on April 13 [1991] when, in a
speech at Maxwell Air Force Base, Bush finally outlined its principal ele-
ments: "Peaceful settlements of disputes, solidarity against aggression,
reduced and controlled arsenals, and just treatment of all peoples.""
See in "The Unipolar Moment," p. 24, where Krauthammer says that
"the notion that economic power inevitably translates into geopolitical
influence is a materialist illusion. Economic power is [though] a
necessary condition for great power status." See too in Bill Emmott's The
Sun Also Sets: The Limits To Japan's Economic Power (New York: Random
House, 1989), p. 17, where Emmott maintains that "economic strength is
always the foundation of power, whether within a world that is multipolar
or one that is bipolar."
12See for instance in Karen Elliott House, "The '90s & Beyond: For
All Its Difficulties, U.S. Stands to Retain Its Global Leadership," Wall
Street Journal , 23 January 1989, sec. Al, p. 6, where Admiral William J.
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should then lead American policy-makers to the inevitable
conclusion that a powerful economy must become the linchpin
around which hinges future American success in the world.
This is certainly not a new policy idea, because American
success abroad has always been tied very closely to its
economic success at home. However, in its single-minded
pursuit of "containment" of the Soviet Union during the
postwar era, the United States has allowed itself to forget
this basic truth at times. Throughout the Cold War, the United
States used its open markets as a method of strengthening the
economies of the Free World, and economic rivalries among the
allies, no matter how potentially explosive, were not allowed
to seriously endanger the foundations of the Western Alliance.
As the economic leader of the Free World, the US was forced to
make timely trade concessions and sacrifice certain economic
interests of its own in order to resolve commercial conflicts
with allies who were themselves much more concerned with trade
than with the Soviet "threat.
"
1J The United States seemed
Crowe, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, comments about the
fact that nearly all of the Soviet Union's economic indicators have
steadily declined over the past few years, and, that "if they aren't
successful [economically], then the Soviet Union just plain isn't going to
be as powerful in the future as they are today."
^For instance, see in Friedman and Lebard, The Coming War With
Japan
, p. 171, where they say that while the United States worried about
commun-ist subversion and Soviet penetration everywhere, Japan was much
less concerned; in fact, "the truth was that the Japanese did not take the
Communist threat particularly seriously. They did not believe that Japan
would be invaded by the Soviet Union "
9
willing to make whatever economic sacrifices were necessary in
order to maintain the cordon it had built around the Soviet
Union--and economic competitors like the Europeans and the
Japanese knew it.
These economic concessions, many critics say, gradually
caused not only a decrease in America's absolute economic
power in the world, but also began to chip away at American
security interests as certain industries began to be sacri-
ficed in the interests of "containment" and "free trade." 1
The United States began to find itself spending billions of
dol-lars defending nations which were engaged, for all practi-
cal purposes, in a form of economic warfare against the United
States itself. Thus, the US had to contend with not only the
See in Pat Choate, Agents of Influence: How Japan's Lobbyists in
the United States Manipulate America's Political and Economic System (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1990), p. 23, where Choate cites a 1988
American Enter-prise Institute study of US-Japan relations which quotes
Kanji Nishio's obser-vation that America's obsession with the Cold War had
allowed Japan to "conduct a diplomacy that exploited and totally used the
U.S. Even if Japan was asked to take some responsibility, we could get
away with avoiding it and simply pursue our own economic interests."
15For instance, the American shipbuilding industry has almost
disappeared, causing US military planners to have to unduly rely upon
foreign-built ships to provide the sealift capability which would be
necessary for military victory in any major conflict the US would have to
fight.
See in Donald C. Hellmann, "The Imperatives for Reciprocity and
Symmetry in U.S. -Japanese Economic and Defense Relations," in Sharing
World Leadership?: A New Era for America & Japan
, p. 243, where Hellmann
addresses this part of the problem very clearly, at least in regard to
Japan: "What is clear is that the present pattern of U.S. -Japanese
relations cannot easily be extended far into the future. It defies both
history and common sense for the world's largest debtor nation effectively
10
military threat of thousands of Soviet tanks poised along the
Fulda Gap, but also sharp Japanese economic competition which
was weakening American industry and, in some very important
ways, threatening the technological lead it needed to counter
the massive Soviet military machine.
The perception that this economic challenge from Japan is
a danger to national security developed slowly but is now
growing rapidly. In 1987, for example, James Fallows expressed
a new fear that was beginning to lurk in the back of many
American minds, when he said that "America doesn't have a
chance to stop declining if it must keep competing with both
17the Russians and the Japanese." 1 Japan-bashers contend that
this dual-tracked competition has at times cost the United
States dearly, for it has only been recently, they say, that
the US has understood some of the implications of having an
ally whose pursuit of profit and technological dominance
sometimes endangers the military foundation of the alliance
itself. John H. Makin addresses this particular problem when
he observes that:
The combination of Japan's increased economic power in the
1980s, growing and highly visible Japanese direct investment
to underwrite the security of the world's largest creditor and for the
political and economic costs of defense to be decoupled from economic
foreign policy. Even a cursory overview of bilateral ties shows how their
extra-ordinary character makes inevitable the unraveling of the alliance
in the long run."
17James Fallows, "The White Peril," Atlantic Monthly , May 1987, 20.
11
in the United States, and the 1987 dispute over Toshiba
Machine Company ' s illegal diversion of submarine-quieting
technology to the Soviet Union [italics mine] has suggested
to some that Japan's economic power is a threat to the
United States. The late Theodore White vividly expressed
that idea in 1985: "The Japanese are on the move again in
one of history's most brilliant commercial offenses as they
go about dismantling American industry."
If Theodore White was correct and the Japanese have been
intent upon dismantling American industry, then opening the
American market to Japanese competition in the name of "free
trade," without eventually receiving a economic quid pro quo
10
on their part, has undoubtedly enhanced the Japanese econ-
omic position at the expense of American industry. Many domes-
tic critics argue that because of the trade asymmetry that the
United States has allowed to exist between itself and its
allies, the US economy now suffers from a crumbling industrial
base, large budget deficits, an eroding technological edge,
and a growing sense that American firms can no longer compete
with powerful economic rivals like Japan.
A. THE POSTWAR NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
The bipolar world of superpower confrontation between the
United States and the Soviet Union is rapidly drawing to a
10
John H. Makin and Donald C. Hellmann, eds., Sharing World Leader-
ship?: A New Era for America & Japan (Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute, 1989), xxi.
10
,
A term currently in use for this expected arrangement is "fair
trade" rather than "free trade."
12
close— there is serious doubt, in fact, about whether or not
there will even be a Soviet Union in the near future, espe-
cially in light of the fast-moving events which have followed
the failed coup in August by entrenched communist hardliners.
As has happened so many times in the past, the world has
quickly and unexpectedly arrived at a watershed of history;
and today, announcements of dramatic changes in the world
order seem almost commonplace as the difficult and confusing
transition to a new era of international relations begins to
take place.
These are both thrilling and difficult times for Ameri-
cans—thrilling because the Cold War is coming rapidly to a
end, and difficult because that startling fact suddenly seems
to make the very foundation of American national security
policy passS. This notion that the foundation of US policy has
become obsolete with the end of the Cold War is, of course,
simply an illusion, because the national interests remain
fundamentally the same as they have always been— it is only
the policy framework used to further those interests that has
been largely overcome by events. The transition to another
strategic paradigm, however, will be tough for many American
policy-makers, who have been steeped for decades in the
rhetoric of the Cold War and are still responding to world
events with the same Weltanschauung. For those born since
1945, revolutionary events in the Soviet Union today are
13
undermining the very bedrock of their entire national experi-
ence, for the Cold War has been a harsh, enduring fact of life
that seems to have existed forever. For many of those Ameri-
cans, it is hard to understand that US national security in
the modern world, defined as it has been by this narrow
ideological confrontation with Communism and the Soviet Union,
actually has a relatively short history. A quick glance into
the past shows just how different the American concept of
security was before the cataclysmic events of the Second World
War. Political historian Stephen E. Ambrose recalls that as
late as 1939:
...the United States had an Army of 185,000 men with an
annual budget of less than $500 million. America had no
military alliances and no American troops were stationed
in any foreign country. The domestic political mood was
isolationism. America's physical security, the sine qua non
of foreign policy, seemed assured, not because of American
alliances or military strength but because of the distance
between America and any potential enemy.
The Second World War and its aftermath changed all of that, as
the "new world order" that Roosevelt had worked so hard to
establish during the war, collapsed—and then polarized--in
the early postwar period because of increasing tensions
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The hostility
of the Russians after 1945, along with their rapid acquisition
90
'"Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy
Since 1938 (New York: Viking Penguin Inc., 1971), xiii.
14
of the atomic bomb, meant that:
Forty-five years later the United States had a huge stand-
ing Army, Air Force and Navy. The budget of the Department
of Defense was over $300 billion. The United States had
military alliances with fifty nations, 1.5 million soldiers,
airmen, and sailors stationed in 117 countries, and an
offensive capability sufficient to destroy the world many
times over.... But despite all the money spent on armaments
and no matter how far outward America extended her power,
the technological revolution had overcome distance, and with
the loss of her protective insulation, America's national
security was constantly in jeopardy.
What caused this fundamental change in the American
approach to national security? Primarily, two things: the
advent of nuclear weapons (along with the development of
intercontinental bombers and ballistic missiles capable of
carrying those nuclear weapons into the territory of the
United States itself), and, the emergence after the war of a
militarily powerful and hostile nation which possessed those
terribly destructive weapons. Both of these factors developed
within a few short years of each other, and the American
policy response to this radically changed security environment
pushed the United States into a long and costly battle against
communism and the Soviet Union. As John Lewis Gaddis points
out, in referring to George Kennan ' s 1948 argument about the
conduct of American foreign policy: "The United States could
coexist with, even benefit from, diversity; what was dangerous
was the combination of hostility with the ability to do some-
21 Ibid., xiii.
15
thing about it," and, as a direct result of the Russians
acquiring nuclear weapons, "the only nation that met Kennan's
test of combining hostility with capability was, of course,
the Soviet Union." 22
During the Second World War, Americans had been "...taught
to assume that in Russian-American postwar collaboration lay
the only assurance of future peace...," but, as Soviet actions
after the war continued to mitigate against such collabora-
tion, American postwar disillusionment grew, and US policy
towards the Soviet Union "...inevitably conduced to visions of
o\ ..
war." George Kennan describes why American perceptions of
its wartime ally shifted so forcefully after 1945:
Event after event: the behavior of the Soviet forces in the
half of Europe they overran; the growing evidence that the
Soviet authorities had no intention of permitting the free
play of democratic forces in the countries of that region;
their cynical reluctance to collaborate in the restoration
of economic life and stability in areas they did not con-
trol; the continued secretiveness and inscrutability of
Soviet policymaking and political action; the failure to
enter upon any extensive demobilization of the Soviet armed
forces; the narrow, suspicious, and yet greedy behavior of
Soviet representatives in the new international organiza-
tions—all these things fell heavily upon a[n] [American]
public in no way prepared for them....
JO
"John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal
of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1982), 31-33.
"George F. Kennan, Nuclear Delusion: Soviet-American Relations In
The Atomic Age (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), 30.
24Ibid., 29-30.
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Yet, despite these e^rly postwar events, there were some
prominent Americans who felt that the possibility still
existed for cooperation with the Russians, for "as well in-
formed an observer as Averell Harriman believed, as he once
testified to Congress, that Soviet policy in 1945 was ambiva-
lent, either that it could have become more moderate within a
framework of security and understanding with the West, or that
it could have become hard-line and totalitarian, within the
framework of insecurity and conflict. Harriman, though puzzled
by the Russian decision in favor of the iron-fisted policy,
clearly saw that Soviet expansion was neither inexorable nor
inevitable." 5 Most Americans, however, were swayed in the
other direction, and believed, like George Kennan, that Soviet
behavior "...moves inexorably along the prescribed path, like
a persistent toy automobile wound up and headed in a given
direction, stopping only when it meets with some unanswerable
force." 26
Kennan ' s famous "X" article, "The Sources of Soviet Con-
duct," published in Foreign Affairs in 1947, recommended that
"the main element of any United States policy toward the
Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and
2 Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima & Potsdam (New York:





..The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs XXV, (July
17
vigilant containment of Russian expansionist tendencies. '
It was a seminal article in influencing the development of US
postwar policy, and as William Appleman Williams has written:
George F. Kennan's 1946-47 explanation of Soviet behavior
established the framework and set the tone for... the
American discussion of Russian action. His analysis, and
the more extreme interpretations derived from it, concluded
that continued pressure could and would accelerate an inevi-
table process of dissolution. The thesis held that Soviet
behavior resulted primarily (if not exclusively) from the
necessity of Marxian revolutionaries having to resort to
force to maintain the domination of an alien and evil ide-
ology over Russian traditions and history. It asserted that
the prime mover in Soviet action was a drive to maintain
centralized power in the face of fundamental and persistent
hostility. 28
The Russians though, were actually only the latest
manifestation of a recurring strategic problem, for as Kennan
himself believed, and often stated, "...the fundamental
American interest throughout the twentieth century. .
.
[has]
been to keep key centers of military-industrial capability
from falling under hostile control. It [has] been for that
reason that the United States [has] twice gone to war to
prevent German domination of Europe; after 1945 the same
interest required ensuring the defense of Western Europe and
Japan against an ambitious but nervously insecure Soviet
27 Ibid., 574.
28William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1959), 278-79.
18
00
Union."' 7 Truman recognized that totalitarian forces (like the
Soviet Union) undermined "...the foundations of international
peace and hence the security of the United States....," and,
therefore, had to be checked in their expansion. In pursuit
of that goal, "patience and firmness" were used to block
Russian ambitions immediately after the war, but as the
aggressive behavior of the Soviets along the periphery of
their sphere of influence became even more pronounced, the
American response to Russian actions hardened, and the Truman
Doctrine—as a new expression of American policy—announced
"...what appeared to be a world-wide commitment to resist
Soviet expansionism wherever it appeared.
"
J1 This commitment
put the United States on a tortuous policy path which eventu-
ally led American soldiers to the battlegrounds of Korea and
Vietnam, and which finally, only today, is winding its way to
an end. As Gaddis says about the importance of this doctrine
to the conduct of American affairs:
Truman's March 12, 1947, proclamation that "it must be the
policy of the United States to support free people who are
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or out-
side pressures" has traditionally been taken as having
"Terry L. Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., Containment: Concept
and Policy , Vol. 1, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press,
1986), 5.
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S.
Truman, 1947 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963),
pages 177-178, as cited in Gaddis, Strategies of Containment , 66.
31Gaddis, Strategies of Containment , 22.
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marked a fundamental point of departure for American foreign
policy in the Cold War. 32
In order to conceptualize this new direction in American
foreign policy, NSC-68 was carefully drafted in an attempt to
address what Paul Nitze has called "...the fundamental ques-
tion of national security: How do we get from where we are to
where we want to be without being struck by disaster along the
way?" 33 As Nitze briefly outlines the essence of that seminal
report:
NSC-68 began by defining the basic U.S. purpose, quoting
from the Preamble of the Constitution, and then discussed
the nature of the Soviet threat. Here we drew a clear dis-
tinction between the aims of the United States, which were
to protect and preserve the institutions of a free society,
and those of the Soviet Union, which centered on preserving
the Soviet Communist party and its base, the USSR, but also
on extending the Kremlin's domination outward as far as
practicable. What we found most distrubing was not that the
Soviet Union would espouse such objectives, but that it had
developed a political, economic, and military structure de-
signed specifically for their eventual realization. It fol-
lowed that if the United States were to deal effectively
with this threat, it had no choice other than to take the
lead in initiating "a substantial and rapid building-up of
strength in the free world... to support a firm policy inten-
ded to check and roll back the Kremlin's drive for world
domination. " 3 *
This "firm policy" towards the Soviet Union, which ulti-
mately was fleshed out in NSC-68 as the policy of "contain-
32 Ibid., 22.
JJPaul Nitze, with Ann M. Smith and Steven L. Rearden, From Hiroshima




merit," was carefully defined as an American-led effort:
...by all means short of war to (1) block further expansion
of Soviet power, (2) expose the falsities of Soviet preten-
sions, (3) induce a retraction of the Kremlin's control and
influence and (4) in general, so foster the seeds of des-
truction within the Soviet system that the Kremlin is
brought at least to the point of modifying its behavior to
conform to generally accepted international standards.
Contrary to what many Americans remember, NSC-68 was not
a recommendation for dramatically changing American policy,
for "on the contrary, the report concluded by calling for the
reaffirmation of what was already approved policy in NSC 20/4,
a general policy paper covering our relations with the Soviet
Union. That report, masterminded by George Kennan in 1948, had
described the serious nature of the Soviet threat and had gone
on to recommend 'timely and adequate preparation' to combat
internal and external moves that might jeopardize our securi-
ty.' 6 As Paul Nitze remarks in his memoirs, "the major change
recommended in NSC 68 was a stepped-up level of effort to
counter recent developments, with emphasis on strengthening
our military capabilities in the face of significantly
increased Soviet capabilities. It was a prescription for
a military build-up far in excess of what was then the current
defense policy, and it got the needed boost it required in




June 1950, when the Korean War broke out and firmly launched
the United States into its anti-communist crusade.
This crusade was not exactly what the Truman Adminstration
had had in mind though, for it had tried to limit its rhetoric
to simply opposing the forces of "totalitarianism;" neverthe-
less, "anti-communism" quickly supplanted that notion, with
sometimes disasterous results for American policy in the
following decades. ° This broadmg of the threat to include
all "communism" worldwide needs to be placed in the context of
the times in order to better understand why this new threat
perception was able to skew almost all foreign policy deci-
sions in the years that followed. J. William Fulbright,
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1972,
commented back then, in his analysis of postwar foreign
policy, that:
By early 1947... the assumptions of the Cold War were all
but unchallenged within the United States government and
anti-communism had become a national ideology. It was
assumed that the object of Soviet policy was the commun-
ization of the world; if Soviet behavior in Europe and
northern China were not proof enough, the design was spelled
out in the writings of Lenin and Marx, which our policy
makers chose to read not as a body of political philosophy
but as the field manual of Soviet strategy.
10
J0These disasterous policy turns can be illustrated by such Cold War
travesties as the infamous McCarthy Hearings, the tragic military exper-
ience in Vietnam, and the immoral and persistent US support of "anti-
communist" dictatorships throughout the world.
39J. William Fulbright, The Crippled Giant: American Foreign Policy
and Its Domestic Consequences (New York: Random House, 1972), 20-21.
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These are some of the elements which worked to shape
American national security policy over the next four decades.
It was a geopolitical policy which was, in the end, narrowly
defined, for "NSC-68 derived its view of American interests
primarily from its perception of the Soviet threat,"^ (along
with its attendant policy correlation of "anti-communism"),
and with the implementation of that strategic paradigm, the
Cold War began in earnest.
B. THE END OF THE COLD WAR: ECONOMICS AS THE NEW EMPHASIS IN
NATIONAL SECURITY
The Cold War has ended with a decisive victory for the
United States. In the Soviet Union today, Marxism-Leninism-
Stalinism is finally as dead as its revolutionary founders,
and the world has witnessed such spectacles as large Soviet
cranes toppling over statues of Marx and Lenin to the enthusi-
astic cheers of Soviet workmen. While these unexpected sights
confirm the end of an era, it was actually Mikhail Gorbachev's
unofficial repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine in 1989 which
signalled the real end of the Cold War, because that action
made it clear that the bankrupt Soviets were willing to
sacrifice their hegemony over Central-Eastern Europe in
exchange for better political and economic relations with the
Gaddis, Strategies of Containment , 98.
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West. This dramatic shift in Soviet policy resulted in
revolutionary changes which startled the entire world and
shattered an empire.
The rapid toppling of the Soviet hegemon was the unantici-
pated result of loosening the totalitarian reins of control
just a little too much, for when the people of Central-Eastern
Europe were given an opportunity that year to make political
choices which were free from the grinding influence of Soviet
tanks, the oppressed workers did unite, but as they marched
forward into the dawn of a new era, it was over the torn and
trampled banners of Marxist-Leninism. Millions of disgruntled
and impoverished "comrades" throughout that region of the
world repudiated communism with a pent-up vengeance and voted
to consign that tired ideology to the trash heap of history.
Now, even in the Soviet Union itself, the Marxist-Leninist
structure has collapsed into a confused heap of economic
rubble.
As a result of these revolutionary events, the danger of
military conflict with the Soviet Union is rapidly fading as
41 See in Richard Nixon, In The Arena: A Memoir of Victory, Defeat,
and Renewal (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), pp. 317-318, where Nixon
commented that "all of [Gorbachev's earlier] actions [had] been directed
toward two geopolitical goals. First, to revive his moribund economy, he
wantfed] to gain access to Western capital and technology. He [knew] that
his economic reforms [could not] succeed without this assistance, and he
[was] willing to pay a geopolitical price to achieve this key objective.
Second, he want[ed] to divide his adversaries and to end the political
isolation of the Soviet Union."
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economic concerns, ethnic violence and the threatened break-up
of the Union itself, have force the Soviet leadership to give
up its old expansionist ambitions and turn its attention
inward to deal with those pressing national problems. This
Soviet retreat from imperialism has cracked and broken the
very foundations of the postwar international regime, and with
it the raison d'etre of America's postwar strategic para-
digm. 42 Even though a defeated Soviet Union remains the one
nation on earth capable of destroying the United States, there
still should be little doubt even in traditional "cold war"
circles that "containment" of the Soviet Union can no longer
serve as the linchpin of American security policy. The
See in Charles William Maynes, "America without the Cold War,"
Foreign Policy 78, (Spring 1990), p. 8, where Maynes says that "perhaps
the most important consequence of the Cold War's end will be to deprive
the American foreign policy establishment of its main organizing prin-
ciple: an ti communism. For decades this principle justified every aspect of
American foreign policy from the composition of its alliances to the size
of its foreign aid programs."
* 3This proposed change in policy focus does not mean that American
strategic planners can dismiss the Soviet threat, because any cautious
analyst realizes that even though the Soviet Union is in broad retreat all
across the geopolitical spectrum, it is conducting that retreat with its
massive military machine still largely intact for the time being: this
harsh reality demands that policy-makers understand very clearly that
while Soviet/Russian intentions appear to have changed dramatically in the
past few years, Soviet military capabilities continue to improve and will
remain formidable for some years to come. Despite this dangerous fact,
American policy-makers also must begin to recognize that although deter-
rence of the Soviet nuclear threat was an integral part of "containment,"
this connection is not conversely true. Maintaining a policy of strategic
deterrence will still allow the focus of US security policy to safely
swing away from the old goal of containing Soviet expansionism. The simple
fact is that the Soviets no longer need to be contained. What is needed
now is new strategic thinking that deals with the Soviet Union as an
25
nature of the threat has fundamentally changed, and the United
States now needs to reexamine its national security policy in
the bright new light of this epochal change.
Many Americans are saying that the end of the Cold War
came "...not a moment too soon, for the global grand strategy
of the United States can no longer be sustained by the Ameri-
can economy. 4 Those sobering words reflect the thoughts of
many anxious Americans, who maintain that when one looks
around at America's crumbling infrastructure, its bankrupt
school systems, and its increasingly aging capital stock in
many critical areas of industrial production, that there has
been a tremendous cost in waging this Cold War, with increas-
ing doubts in many minds as to the American ability to pay for
it. These doubts are not new ones either, for concerns about
the cost of this "war" have played across the American
political landscape for decades.
Robert Kuttner, for one, maintains that "America's mili-
tary leadership, its relentless promotion of laissez-faire,
and the costs to its own economy..." should all be linked
together when attempting to assess the true costs of the Cold
element of US national security policy, not as its driving force.
^Robert Kuttner, The End of Laissez-Faire: National Purpose and the
Global Economy After the Cold War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 8.
45
This litany of woes does not reflect the even greater costs repre-
sented by the one hundred-thousand or more American soldiers who have died
on foreign battlefields fighting "communism."
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46War. He makes an interesting observation about earlier
attempts to shift the emphasis of security away from over-
whelming reliance upon military defense. Kuttner writes:
The idea that the United States should revise its conception
of national security to emphasize geoeconomics rather than
geopolitics had a certain logic, but it was very difficult
case to make in domestic politics. For even if the American
economy was admittedly deteriorating, the high politics of
Cold War remained paramount so long as Soviet policy seemed
to threaten Western Europe, or peripheral areas of the
world, or the nuclear balance. Moreover, the central role of
the United States as propagator of the faith in liberal
commerce made it awkward to commend economic nationalism as
the policy of choice for the United States itself. As a
result, politicians who favored any form of planning, or
industrial policy, or "conversion" from military to commer-
cial prowness, or a new emphasis on economic renewal, were
dismissed, not as proponents of a dissenting school of
political economy but as jingoists, simple protectionists,
and geopolitical naifs.
The crux of the problem has been that military power does
not come cheap, and throughout the last forty-some years, the
American geopolitical paradigm has focused heavily on military
strength as the primary means of confronting perceived threats
to US security. This focus was adopted early in the Cold War,
as implementation of NSC-68 switched the emphasis of "contain-
ment" from George Kennan's broad-based approach (encompassing
political, economic, psychological, and military means) to one
centered more tightly on creating just the military response




unequivocally stated: "Without superior aggregate military
strength, in being and readily mobilized, a policy of ' con-
tainment '... is no more than a policy of bluff." 48 It was a
clear call for dramatically increasing the size of the Ameri-
can armed forces, but, significantly, it "...contained no
estimate of what these forces would cost or how long they
would be used." 45
But, while the Korean War ensured the adoption of this new
policy, and temporarily muted many of the arguments about the
eventual cost of such a build-up, many prominent Americans
began warning early on of the tremendous social costs to be
borne because of this military expansion. NSC-68 had "...in-
cluded a sophisticated rationale for increased defense
spending based on Keynesian notions of an expanding econo-
my," JU but it still did not give a true notion of what the
opportunity costs of maintaining a Cold War defense would be
Gaddis, Strategies of Containment , 99.
Ibid., 99. As Gaddis says on the same page, "imprecision, its draf-
ters believed, was necessary to gain action: debates over budget alloca-
tions and force deployments could only delay clearance of the document,
especially in the pentagon, where inter-service disputes over these issues
had become both bitter and public." See too in Nitze, From Hiroshima to
Glasnost
, p. 96, where Nitze comments that "Tru-man was properly cautious
about the budgetary implications of NSC 68 My personal estimate was
that the buildup recommended in the report would probably require annual
appropriations of around forty billion dollars for the next four or five
years. But the report itself contained no money figures."
SO
William H. Becker, "Containment and the National Economy," in Terry
L. Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., Containment: Concept and Policy
,
Vol. 1, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986), 138.
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for the nation. Dwight Eisenhower, in an address to the
American Society for Newspaper Editors in 1953, expressed his
deep concern about the social costs to American society of
engaging in a spiraling arms race with the Soviet Union, llic,
words eloquently expressed in concrete terms which many Ameri-
cans could understand, the true cost of the Cold War. As
Eisenhower put it:
Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every
rocket fired signifies in the final sense, a theft from
those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are
not clothed.
The world in arms is not spending money alone. It is
spending the sweat of its labors, the genius of its scien-
tists, the hopes of its children.
The cost of one modern bomber is this: a modern brick
school for more than 30 cities.
It is two electric plants, each serving a town of 60,000
population.
It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals.
It is some 50 miles of concrete highway.
We pay for a single plane with half millions bushels of
wheat.
We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could
have housed more than 8,000 people.
That is not a way of life at all in any true sense.
But it was an evil that even Eisenhower recognized as
necessary, for he too "...anticipated a long term competitive
relationship with the Soviet Union....," with this competition
occurring primarily in the military sphere, as American
policy-makers emphasized the strategic imperatives of the
^Seyom Brown, Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States




escalating arms race. American policy-makers routinely
relegated to a lower level of concern the equally important
economic competition between the two superpowers, and the
macroeconomic aspect of the US-Soviet confrontation was
usually seen in simple terms of either denying the Soviets
economic opportunity at home, or in denying them opportunities
for mischief abroad. Denying them economic opportunity at home
simply required the establishment of barriers to trade,
economic assistance, and technology transfer to the Soviet
Union and its satellites, actions which cost the United
States relatively little. Denying them opportunities for
mischief abroad, however, was another matter, because this
seemed to demand that the United States grant its "allied"
competitors within the world marketplace significant and




52John Lewis Gaddis, "The Evolution of U.S. Policy Goals Toward the
USSR in the Postwar Era," in Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum, eds.
Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press,
1988), 326-327.
53For instance, denial of membership in the GATT and non-participa-
tion in world financial organizations like the World Bank and the IMF.
Technology and trade were also restricted through the establishment of
COCOM.
"This policy provided strategic benefits to the United States that
far outweighed its economic costs at the time, for in the broader
geopolitical sense, encouraging the economic growth of American allies
enabled the United States to promote its values abroad and enhance its
national security at the same time. For instance, see in John Lewis
Gaddis, "Toward The Post-Cold War World," Foreign Affairs 70, (Spring
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Lawrence Krause, in his recent analysis of American
economic leadership during the Cold War, has written that the
United States— as the recognized hegemon in the capitalist
camp--essentially wrote the rules for Free World Trade, and,
while doing so, consciously promoted a liberal economic order
designed to build a bulwark of prosperity against the threat
of communism. He observes that:
While the United States prospered during the postwar period,
other countries benefitted even more from the stability and
openness of the system. It was the United States that
shouldered a disproportionate share of the defence
burden. It was the United States that had the most open
markets. The United States exercised no control over the
outflow of private capital, and it gave generous amounts of
foreign aid. Even when political necessity forced the
United States to take protectionist trade actions, its
preferred instrument was the voluntary export restraint
(VER) which gives windfall gains to foreign producers at the
expense of the American consumer. It was willing to do all
this because the benefits went to other countries within the
capitalist camp. Hence, even if there was some economic
cost, there was an offsetting security gain by strengthening
Allied countries.
Selig Harrison and Clyde Prestowitz have questioned
whether or not this Cold War economic policy was unavoidable
given its geopolitical context. Their answer is deliberately
1991), p. 105, where Gaddis states that "the prosperity associated with
market economics tends to encourage the growth of liberal democracies; and
one of the few patterns that holds up throughout modern history is that
liberal democracies do not go to war with one another."
J Lawrence Krause, "Trade policy in the 1990s I: good-bye bipolarity,
hello regions," The World Today 46, (May 1990): 83. Krause goes on to say
that "the end of the Cold War has dissolved the glue that was holding the
system together. The United States is no longer willing—and probably no
longer capable—of playing the role of the benevolent hegemon."
31
vague as they hand off to history the responsibility for
determining the ultimate verdict. They have commented about
some of the economic effects of the that policy though, and
they maintain, for example, that:
The continuing shift of economic power to East Asian
competitors [like Japan] has been due in significant
measure to the single-minded American focus on security
concerns in the Asia-Pacific region. Since the Truman
administration, successive presidents have subordinated U.S.
economic interests to perceived geopolitical requirements.
As the price for their military and diplomatic cooperation,
the United States has actively promoted the economic power
of its East Asian allies. Critical American technology and
industrial know-how have been repeatedly transferred at
little or no cost [italics mine]. At the same time, Washing-
ton has accepted trade and investment relationships based on
an implicit understanding that U.S. markets would be rela-
tively open while those of its partners would be much
more restrictive. Whenever this asymmetry has caused
economic disputes to reach a crisis the United States has
generally avoided pressing the issue to conclusion.
The burden of exerting this type of economic leadership
may prove to have been too costly. In order to redress some of
the harmful economic imbalances which have cropped up because
of this Cold War leadership, the United States must begin to
reframe its national security policy to reflect the changing
56Selig S. Harrison and Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., "Pacific Agenda:
Defense Or Economics?," Foreign Policy 79, (Summer 1990): 57. See too in
C. Fred Bergsten, "The World Economy After the Cold War," Foreign Affairs
69, (Summer 1990), p. 98, where Bergsten writes that "throughout the post-
war period, the overriding security imperative blunted trans-Atlantic and
trans-Pacific economic disputes. The United States and its allies. . .made
economic concessions to avoid jeopardizing their global security struc-
tures. Cold War politics in fact sheltered the economic recoveries of
Europe and Japan, and America's support for them. The United States seldom
employed its security leverage directly in pursuit of its economic
goals. . ."
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balance between its current economic resources and its newly
defined geopolitical/economic goals. The dangers posed by
America's economic competitors must be recognized and con-
fronted, and the old emphasis on a military-oriented security
policy directed primarily against the Soviet Union must give
way to new military and economic realities. American geopol-
itical emphasis must shift towards increased competitiveness
within the economic realm because that is where the future
to
battles will be fought.
This then is the real challenge the United States now
faces, for as America marches forward into the new realities
of the post-Cold War era, it finds its economy—a critical
component of its geopolitical power--faltering and under
57 See in C. Michael Aho and Bruce Stokes, "The Year The World Economy
Turned," Foreign Affairs 70, (America And The World 1990/91): 177, where
Aho and Stokes make the proposal that "as economics supplants defense as
the foundation of national security, Washington must give new priority to
international economic policymaking. The economic arm of the National
Security Council needs to be strengthened. Responsibility for coordinating
international economic policy, now scattered throughout the executive
branch, should be centralized in the White House."
CD
30This is something the Japanese have understood all along. For
instance, the United States perceived Japanese economic assistance to
Southeast Asia during the post-war period as helping to support peace and
stability in a region not only threatened by communism, but one which was
crucial to the economic recovery of Japan. Japan's economic recovery was
seen by the US as a critical factor in making that country a strong anti-
communist bastion in Asia. The Japanese, however, took an entirely dif-
ferent view of the Cold War in Southeast Asia and never openly acknow-
ledged the strategic implications of their aid policy. See in Dennis T.
Yasutomo, "Why Aid? Japan As An "Aid Great Power"," Pacific Affairs 62,
(Winter 1989-90): 492, where Yasutomo writes that "it is clear that [for
the Japanese] commercial objectives overwhelmingly overshadowed diplomatic
and political-strategic goals during this period." [italics mine]
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siege. Theodore C. Sorensen's recent article in Foreign
Affairs speaks specifically to this concern when he writes:
The once powerful beacon of this nation's economic strength,
particularly in relative terms—relative not only to an
economically ascendant Japan, a newly united Germany and
Western Europe and other nations in general, but relative as
well to the worldwide ranking we once enjoyed and could
enjoy again—no longer shines so brightly in the global
marketplace of today. We have the world's largest trade
deficit. We are losing our competitive position, our market
share in both domestic and export markets, in one after
another of the industries in which our leadership was once
vaunted... We have become—thanks to our trade deficit and
enormous foreign borrowing required in light of our low
savings rate and large federal budget def icits--the world's
largest debtor... if these trends of deficit, debt and
relative decline are permitted to persist and harden into
fixed patterns, this nation's economic effectiveness and
independence—meaning the flexibility to make decisions and
the ability to fend for oneself, which are indispensable
parts of any country's national security would indeed be
endangered.
C. Michael Aho has observed that "throughout the postwar
period, the United States was accustomed to being master of
its own economic fate. As the world's predominant economic
power, America had the authority to mobilize other industrial-
ized economies in time of crisis and to act unilaterally if
necessary to protect its interests." 60 This unilateral action
is no longer possible because Europe and Japan are now equally
important economic entities within a new multipolar economic
world—a world which no longer slavishly revolves around the
to
Theodore C. Sorensen, "Rethinking National Security," Foreign
Affairs 69, (Summer 1990): 8
60 C. Michael Aho and
Turned," Foreign Affairs 70, 160.
Bruce Stokes "The Year the World Economy
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United States or its currency. The US must come to under-
stand that its overwhelming economic preeminence after World
War II was an anomaly of history, and that the US share of the
world market was bound to decrease significantly as the indus-
tries of other nations recovered from their wartime damage and
began to compete directly with the US; but, this does not mean
that the US must accept an ever decreasing share of the world
marketplace. In order to change recent economic trends, the
United States must first carefully develop, and then pursue a
new economic agenda which will allow it to regain its competi-
tiveness within world markets, and thus maintain the techno-
logical edge necessary for continued economic growth.
Considering the health of the economy as a critical com-
ponent of national security is certainly not new thinking, but
considering it as the key component may be. Consider this
important point. In the end, it really wasn't the Strategic
Defense Initiative or stealth bombers which forced the Soviets
to their knees: it was, instead, the massive failure of their
economy. It turned out to be economics which really determined
*See in Aho and Stokes, "The Year The World Economy Turned," where
the authors give an example of this hobbling of economic independence.
They write that "previously autonomous decisions on domestic economic
policy [have become] hostage to international developments. It was no
coincidence that President Bush's decision in the summer of 1990 to
reverse his 'no new taxes' pledge came only days before completion of the
Structural Impediments Initiative talks with Japan, in which the United
States was obligated to demonstrate a willingness to reduce its budget
deficit."
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the outcome of the Cold War, for over the longer term,
military strength is primarily determined by productive and
revenue-raising capacities: it is national wealth which is the
real underpinning of military power. The Soviets are just now
beginning to learn the painful historical lesson outlined by
Paul Kennedy, that if "...too large a proportion of the
state's resources [are] devoted from wealth creation and
allocated instead to military purposes, then that is likely to
lead to a weakening of national power over the longer term." 62
This may prove to be an equally important lesson for the
United States, for the economic cost of its triumph over
Communism was considerable and the debt is yet to be fully
paid. Kennedy's argument that an "...uneven pace of economic
growth has .. .crucial long-term impacts upon relative military
power and strategical position of [nations] ," has proven to be
tellingly accurate. The collapse of the Soviet threat has
been due primarily to the failure of its centrally-planned
economic system; the Soviets, quite simply, were unable to
compete with good "old-fashioned" American capitalism. The
62 Paul Kennedy, The Rise And Fall of the Great Powers (New York:
Random House, 1987), xvi.
^During the last decade, the United States' aggregate budget deficit
totalled a staggering $1.7 trillion.
° 4Ibid., xv-xvi.
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Cold War ended, not with a military bang, but rather with an
economic whimper.
This economic defeat of the Soviet Union has ushered in a
new era. Charles William Maynes, the editor of Foreign Policy
,
has recently commented to that fact when he stated that "in
one fundamental respect the new world that is unfolding con-
trasts very sharply with comparable periods of major histori-
cal transition. Unlike those earlier periods, no major new
military threat is likely to replace the old one anytime
soon." 65 Maynes is probably correct in his contention that
there will be no major new military threat to engage the
energies of the United States, but, as Theodore Sorensen has
pointed out in very clear terms above, there is already most
certainly an economic one.
C. CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY: THE SHIFT
FROM COLD WAR ALLY TO UNFAIR COMPETITOR
The September 1945 policy document, "U.S. Initial Post-
Surrender Policy for Japan," clearly outlined the American
purposes of the occupation as including "...the disarmament
and demilitarization of Japan, the punishment of war crimi-
"Charles William Maynes, "America without the Cold War," Foreign
Policy 78, (Spring 1990): 3-4. See also in John Lewis Gaddis, "Toward The
Post-Cold War World," Foreign Policy 70, (Spring 1991): 102, where Gaddis
says that "for the first time in over half a century, no single great
power, or coalition of powers, poses a 'clear and present danger' to the
national security of the United States."
37
nals, encouragement of individual liberties and democratic
processes, the direction of industry toward a peaceful
economy, and the payment of agreed reparations in kind."^
John Lewis Gaddis observes, however, that "American occupation
authorities ... initially emphasized the punishment of [their]
former adversaries." This was done through such instruments
as SCAPIN (SCAP Instruction) 550, which was part of General
MacArthur's attempt to demilitarize Japan by the "elimination
of leaders of the militarists and the military" through the
"Removal and Exclusion" list, and the SCAP-sponsored Deconcen-
tration Law, pushed through the Japanese Diet in 1947, which
was the high point of the American efforts to breakup the
powerful pre-war zaibatsu .
By 1948 though, this emphasis on punishment began to
change, as it became increasingly apparent to the Truman
administration that the Soviet Union was not only engaged in
a brutal and systematic "colonization" of Eastern Europe, but
that it also was attempting to extend its pernicious influence
into other countries along the "periphery," like Greece and
Turkey. The growing fear was that this type of communist
Dean Acheson, Present At The Creation: My Years in the State
Department (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), 427.
°'Gaddis, Strategies of Containment , 38.
fa
George Friedman and Meredith Lebard, The Coming War With Japan (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 101-105.
38
penetration could also destabilize Japan if Occupation efforts
to punish the Japanese continued to take precedence over the
revitalization of their economy. Curiously enough, "even the
Communists [had been] encouraged in the very early days of the
occupation" to participate freely in the revamped Japanese
political system, 07 and the "...liberalisation of the labour
laws had worked greatly to the advantage of the Japanese
Communist Party; to conservatives in Japan and America, the
Communists seemed to be everywhere [in 1947] —marching,
speaking, publicising, making the most of their new-found
70democratic rights." This encouragement rapidly ceased as
anti-communism started to become the driving force behind
American policy worldwide. These growing fears of Japanese
communism, which accelerated after 1947, were reflected by the
American perception that "the Soviet Union was. . .a superpower,
unabashedly hostile to [the United States] , operating all over
the world through fifth columns of national communist par-
ties." 71
Meirion and Susie Harries have written that "with every
turn of the screw in East/West tension the strategic impor-
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tance of Japan, poised on the frontier of the Communist world,
increased," and the American fear was that "should the kind of
technical expertise and industrial potential shown by Japan in
the war years be combined with the limitless manpower and raw
materials of the Asian mainland [through the potential
creation of a communist bloc with China] , the United States
faced the menace of a truly formidable war-making complex. 2
Some American strategists like George Kennan believed that the
emerging Soviet threat warranted a dramatic change in the
existing "punishment" policy towards Japan, and they advocated
"...shifting the goal of Japanese occupation policy from
control to rehabilitation, and delaying the signing of a peace
treaty that would end the occupation until the basis for a
stable, self-confident society had been established." As
Kennan himself expressed it (in terms very reminiscent of Sir
Halford MacKinder) : "Any world balance of power means first
and foremost a balance on the Euroasian land mass. That
balance is unthinkable as long as Germany and Japan remain
power vacuums."' 1 The ultimate result of this geopolitical
72Meirion and Susie Harries, 190-191.
71Gaddis, Strategies of Containment , 38-39.
' 4 Ibid., 39. Gaddis also writes that Kennan believed that what had
to be done was "...to bring back the strength and the will of these
peoples to a point where they could play their part in the Euroasian
balance of power, and yet to a point not so advanced as to permit them
again to threaten the interests of the maritime world of the West."
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thinking was that the postwar concept of Japan being rebuilt
as a peaceful, non-militarized, medium-sized economic entity
was cast aside as containment of communism and the Soviet
Union came to be the dominant focus of American policy-makers.
Kennan and other members of the Policy Planning Staff
(PPS) of the State Department had begun to argue as early as
1947 that the main emphasis in Japanese occupation policy
"...should lie in the achievement of maximum stability of
Japanese society, in order that Japan may best be able to
stand on her own feet when the protecting hand is with-
drawn." 5 This was of intense concern, and was to have a major
impact on US postwar policy towards Japan, for when faced with
what seemed to be a very real communist threat to the nations
of the Free World, especially those with hungry people and
devastated economies, many American strategists came to
believe that domestic stability in Japan (and Europe) could
ultimately only be achieved through American efforts to help
rebuild those shattered economies. As Dean Acheson points out
in his memoirs, "not only do human beings and nations exist in
narrow economic margins, but also human dignity, human free-




Meredith Lebard note how this thinking changed Occupation
policy towards Japan:
Prior to 1947, the main concerns of SCAP had been political
and institutional: demilitarization and democratization.
After 1947, a new imperative emerged: economic recovery,
which had not been of primary concern in the first phase.
The beginnings of this new phase in Japanese occupation
policy started with a January 1948 speech by Secretary of the
Army Kenneth C. Royall, in which he stated that "we are
building in Japan a self-sufficient democracy, strong enough
and stable enough to support itself and at the same time to
serve as a deterrent against any other totalitarian war
threats which might hereafter arise in the Far East." This
declaration was followed up later that same year by a National
Security Council (NSC) report (NSC-13/2) which recommended
that "second only to U.S. security interests, economic
recovery should be made the primary objective of United States
7Qpolicy in Japan for the coming period." ' This policy recom-
mendation suggested that in order to accomplish that objec-
tive, the United States needed to not only provide economic
aid to Japan, but also "...cut away existing obstacles to the
77
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revival of Japanese foreign trade, with provision for Japanese
merchant shipping and to facilitate restoration and develop-
ment of Japanese exports." 80 Pushed by the fear that the
Soviet Union would attempt to extend its influence into other
areas of the Pacific (particularly Japan) , the "turn around"
in American occupation policy began in earnest.
The demilitarization of the Japanese society, along with
American efforts to break up the pre-war zaibatsu , was rapidly
suspended as the United States felt forced by the tensions of
this new "Cold War" to both redefine Japan's postwar interna-
tional role and undertake an urgent revival of Japanese
industry. As Japan began to move center stage again in
American geopolitical concerns, the US had to change its
immediate postwar policy that the United States was "...not
[to] assume any responsibility for the economic rehabilitation
of Japan or the strengthening of the Japanese economy." 81 This
"reverse course," as the Japanese called it, was philosophi-
cally in line with the "containment" policy to be outlined
later in NSC-68. While still in its earliest phases, the
underlying American policy was becoming clear: Japan was not
going to be allowed to fall into the Soviet camp.
0UNSC 13/2, 861.
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To many Americans that danger seemed imminent in the
following few years. After China was "lost" to the Free World
in December 1949, Dean Acheson and others began expressing the
constant American fear that if "Japan [was] added to the
Communist bloc, the Soviets would acquire skilled manpower and
industrial potential capable of significantly altering the
balance of world power." Stopping the Soviet Union in the
Pacific seemed to demand that economic cooperation between
Japan and the United States become a top priority. The
establishment of a security alliance with an economically
strong Japan therefore became a critical element in an
evolving US Pacific security strategy. The only real problem
in this proposed strategy was the Japanese economy itself— it
was in terrible shape with little prospect of getting any
better. So, in order to bolster the viability of this alli-
ance, the Americans concentrated on creating a strong Japanese
economy which would not only provide a domestic environment
conducive to the promotion of democratic values at home, but
also one which would be capable of helping to develop the
struggling economies of Southeast Asia— thus preventing
13
communist encroachment in that region of the world as well.
Gaddis, Starteqies of Containment , 77.
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Japan, the United States had finally decided, was to assume a
pivotal role in the American geopolitical strategy of checking
the advance of communism in Asia. The first efforts towards
the establishment of a "collective security" structure in East
Asia began.
John Lewis Gaddis points out that during the early postwar
years "...there were two ways to deny once hostile concentra-
tions of industrial power to the Russians: one could negotiate
their demilitarization and neutralization, or one could act
unilaterally to bind them to the United States and its
allies." 84 The US chose the latter course with Japan; and so,
on the same day that the Treaty of Peace with Japan was signed
in September 1951, the Japanese-American alliance formally
came into being. The reason given in the Security Treaty
itself was that "on the coming into force of that [Peace]
Treaty, Japan will not have the effective means to exercise
its inherent right of self-defense because its has been
disarmed. There is danger to Japan in this situation because
irresponsible militarism has not yet been driven from the
world." 85 Earlier that same year, a NSC report (NSC 48/5) had
outlined basic American aims in the alliance as developing a
strong Japanese economy, strengthening Japanese military
Gaddis, Strategies of Containment , 77.
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defenses, and establishing "...long-term relationships between
the United States and Japan which will contribute to the
security of the United States." 86
The American view of Japan had shifted dramatically from
that of a defeated enemy to that of a Cold War ally in the
course of just a few years. As NSC 48/5 obliquely stated, a
"...Japan with a rapidly and soundly developing economy,
internal political stability, and an adequate military
capability for self-defense....," would serve American
interests by providing a deterrent effect upon the Soviet
Union in Asia. Joseph Dodge summed up the American view of
how this new relationship was to work in a report entitled
United States-Japan Economic Cooperation in the Post-Treaty
Period . This report stated that:
There will be substantial reliance on Japan in the post-
treaty period for:
a. Production of goods and services important to the United
States and the economic stability of non-Communist Asia.
b. Cooperation with the United States in the development of
raw material resources of Asia.
c. Production of low-cost military material in volume for
use in Japan and non-Communist Asia.
d. Development of Japan's appropriate military forces as a
defensive shield and to permit the redeployment of United
States forces.
"National Security Council, "NSC 48/5: U.S. Objectives, Policies and
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As George Friedman and Meredith Lebard point out:
The Dodge memorandum set the stage for Japan's growth over
the next decades. The United States would provide political
and military protection to Japan. Japan, in turn, would be
an economic adjunct in this relationship, strengthening the
economies of non-Communist Asia while supplying the U.S.
with low-cost goods. Ultimately, the United States would be
happy if Japan prospered, and would be doubly pleased if
Japan's prosperity set off a boom in the rest of Asia.
It was a role that ultimately worked to Japan's advantage.
Rebuilding the shattered Japanese economy under the American
security umbrella enabled the Japanese to pursue what became
know as the Yoshida Doctrine a pragmatic policy that es-
chewed any military role whatsoever for Japan and emphasized
maximization of economic profit through mercantile trade
relationships. Prime Minister Yoshida "...was convinced that
military growth would inevitably lead Japan to foreign
involvements not in its interest, as well as to spending
resources that could better be spent on economic activi-
ties," and he "...vigorously resisted calls for [Japan's]
rearmament...," for he saw "...Japan surviving in the world
01
primarily as an economic entity." 71 This geopolitical outlook
was expressed in many ways. Before signing the Mutual Defense





government successfully fought to have the following phrase
incorporated into the preamble of that treaty:
In the planning of a defense assistance program for Japan,
economic stability will be an essential element for consid-
eration in the development of its defense capacities, and
that Japan can contribute only to the extent permitted by
its general economic condition and capacities.
Defending this position and using it to their own economic
advantage was fairly easy for the Japanese, for if nothing
else, Yoshida and other leaders could wield a powerful legal
mechanism given to the Japanese by the Americans themselves
—
Article 9 of the US-designed Japanese Constitution. Article 9
"...renounced war as a sovereign right of the nation," stipu-
lating that "...land sea and air forces, as well as other war
potential, will never be maintained. J It became a convenient
constitutional 'escape clause,' a clause which allowed the
Japanese to control the extent of their military participation
in America's collective security plan. Article 9 essentially
gave the Japanese the legal right to become classic 'free-
riders' of American defense spending. The Japanese had decided
to stake their future on economic growth protected by American
military might, and any attempts by the Americans (starting
with the Korean War) to have the Japanese play a substantial
^Martin E. Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968 (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 75.
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military role in this collective defense effort met with
little cooperation. The frustration of American officials was
manifest, but they had been hoisted upon their own petard and
their idealism blew up in their own faces. There was little
that they could do about it, and as Friedman and Lebard
remark:
It is ironic that this drive to rearm Japan occurred a scant
two years after the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers had
written Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. The United
States had quickly lost interest in that clause. The
Japanese had not.
At the time, this stance seemed irritating but of only
marginal consequence, for the Japanese reluctance to spend
money on defense didn't seem out of line with theur current
economic conditions. Japan was still a weak economy struggling
to overcome the effects of the Second World War. The extent of
its economic weakness during those early years can be put into
some perspective when one realizes that Japan's GNP in 1952
was "...smaller than that of Malaya; it was only in 1959 that
Japan's exports recovered their pre-war level; only in 1965
that it scored a trade surplus; and only in 1966 that it
recovered its pre-war share of world exports (5 per cent)." 95
It was a long, difficult struggle, and one which lasted for
almost two decades. In fact, it wasn't until 1955 that Japan
94
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was even admitted to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) , and acknowledged as any sort of real economic
player in the international marketplace.
Consequently, throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s,
while the United States "...pursued geopolitical influence,
Japan pursued exports and no contradiction was seen between
the two activities." 96 Afterall, didn't the collective
security agreement between the two nations implicitly encour-
aged this behavior on the part of the Japanese? While the
Japanese had begun to challenge US industry in some areas by
the mid-1960s, there seemed to be little concern during those
years that any nation, much less Japan, would ever be able to
successfully challenge the US economy; in fact, up until the
mid-1960s, it was the United States which was seen as the
97
unbeatable economic superpower. In his best-selling book,
The American Challenge , French journalist J. -J. Servan-
Schreiber described prevailing European fears in 1967 that the
United States would continue to expand its dominance of the
96Ibid., 169.
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world economy. He wrote that "fifteen years from now it is
quite possible that the world's third largest industrial
power, just after the United States and Russia, will not be
Europe, but American industry in Europe,"^ As far as Japan
was concerned, Servan-Schreiber admitted that it "...will
manage to keep up to the American level by concentrating their
forces in special areas," but then added carefully that the
Japanese "...will not be strong enough to deal with the U.S.
as equals, nor will they be truly competitive." 99 This outlook
towards Japan was prevalent in both Europe and the United
States. Part of the reason why so many Americans (and Europe-
ans) were shocked by Japan's sudden emergence as an economic
power in the late-1960s, was that "...in the rubble of postwar
Japan, the West somehow came to regard Japan as a developing
country—an attitude that ignored the fact that by 1938 it was
already one of the world's leading industrial and military
powers." 100
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Despite this national hubris, there were signs which
should have alerted more Americans about the growing extent of
this Japanese economic competition. There was, for instance,
the new trend in US-Japanese trade relations, which began as
early as 1965, when "...economic relations between Japan and
the U.S. were reversed. For the first time, Japan exported
more to the United States than it imported." 101 But, because
the overall American trade balance remained positive, this
passed with little notice. There were some American analysts
during the mid-1960s, however, who were predicting Japan's
economic rise; Herman Kahn, the Hudson Institute's preeminent
geopolitical thinker, had written as early as 1967 that Japan
would become one of the world's first post-industrial societ-
ies, and his book in 1971, entitled The Emerging Japanese
Superstate , expanded on that provocative theme, adding the
contention that Japan also would become a major capital-
exporter in the near future.
By 1969, Japan's rapid economic growth and increasing
penetration into the American marketplace was becoming too
great to ignore. As the American economy began to stagger
under the twin burdens of declining productivity rates and
inflationary pressures brought about by the Vietnam War,
American policy-makers began to reexamine the US relationship
101Friedman and Lebard, 128.
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with Japan. The Cold War was still being fought by the United
States in the jungles of Vietnam, so the importance of Japan
as an East Asian ally remained critical; but, while Japan was
still viewed as a military ally, American criticism over
Japan's failure to assume more of its own defense burden grew.
Japan was seen increasingly criticized as a "free-rider," a
nation which flourished economically under an American defense
umbrella that the United States was finding increasingly
difficult to afford.
The Nixon Doctrine, which was announced that same year,
signalled a fundamental shift in American policy. It said that
while the United States would continue to honor its treaty
obligations and maintain the American nuclear umbrella, there
would be no more direct US military involvements like Vietnam.
The doctrine made it clear that "in cases involving other
types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic
assistance. . .but we shall look to the nation directly threat-
ened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the
102
manpower for its defense." This change in emphasis result-
ed in renewed attempts by the US to reduce Japanese dependency
102W6Gaddis, Starteqies of Containment , 298. Gaddis points out on the
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on American defense; within the context of the Nixon Doctrine,
the "U.S. urged Japan to build-up its [armed] forces" and to
begin to assume more of the financial burden of its own
defense. 103
It was becoming obvious by this time that the Japanese
had derived major economic benefits from its dependent
military relationship with the US, and it began to rankle
American leaders that the Japanese continued to resist paying
their fair share for their own defense. Americans were
beginning to understand the costs of their hegemonic relation-
ship with Japan, and the old assumption that Japanese economic
growth was simply just a component of the much wider American
plan to resist communist subversion in Asia began to fall
apart. The Japanese had always had their own plans about econ-
omic expansion, and these plans didn't always coincide with
American economic interests. It was clear now that Japanese
economic might had progressed far beyond earlier American
expectations, with implications for US economic interests far
different than might have been expected just two decades
earlier.
During this period, burgeoning trade disputes were
continually papered over by the United States in favor of
having the two nations maintain a united front against the
'"•'Ralph N. Clough, East Asia and U.S. Security (Washington, D.C.
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American-defined "mutual" enemy--communism and the Soviet
Union. The US-Japanese security relationship, in the minds of
many American policy-makers of the postwar era, was much too
important to jeopardize by enagaging in acrimonious trade
disputes; so, it has long been the policy of the United States
to allow the Japanese to make significant inroads into the
American marketplace, while, at the same time, accepting the
notion that the Japanese market, for all practical purposes,
would remain closed to American business.
It was a policy that offered the Japanese a curious
freedom of action, because "Japan's extraordinary relationship
with the USA entails significantly more than diplomatic help,
mutual trade and promised military protection. It [is a policy
which] has allowed Japan to deal with countries on the basis
of purely economic priorities, with scant regard to political
consequences." It was also a policy stance readily recog-
nized in Japan, and one of which they often took advantage.
The growing US-Japanese trade imbalance showed that quite
clearly, as it continued to grow throughout the 1970s and the
early-1980s, eventually peaking at a US deficit of $52 billion
in 1987. 10i> As Tomio Kubo so frankly said to Lee Iacocca in
1971, "we in Japan look out for our self-interest. What I
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105Keizai Koho Center, "Japan 1990," 38.
55
don't understand is why your country doesn't always do the
same." It was a question that many Americans were begin-
ning to ask as well.
For many years, Japanese economic growth had been narrowly
viewed as "...the heart of any collective effort to defend the
Far East against aggression." 107 As such, the US had been
willing to subsidize this economic growth by not only provid-
ing for Japan's defense, thus assuring "...Japanese security
without the burden of massive [Japanese] defense expendi-
tures," but also by giving the Japanese "...virtually unimped-
ed access to the largest market and the best technology in the
world." 108 This benign view of Japanese growth began to
shift, however, as Japanese imports started flooding the
United States, causing large dislocations in important
American industries like steel and automobiles. Persistent and
growing trade deficits with Japan finally forced American
policy-makers to recognize that Japan was " . . .continu [ing] to
enjoy virtually unrestricted trade and investment opportuni-
ties in the United States while American trade and investment
Lee Iacocca with William Novak, Iacocca: An Autobiography (New
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1 0Qin Japan. .. [was] still subject to. . .many limitations."
This was an asymetrical relationship which was now costing the
United States more than it could afford to pay.
Despite President Nixon's efforts at correcting the trade
imbalance by suspending the convertibility of the dollar into
gold and imposing the 'Nixon shoku ' , the US-Japanese trade
imbalance continued to grow. The economic consequences of this
growing trade deficit were severe for many American indus-
tries. Overwhelmed by fierce Japanese competition, the Ameri-
can consumer electronics industry was practically extinct by
the mid-1970s, and the United States "...had also been forced
to protect its textile and steel industries." 11 The automo-
tive industry was being shaken badly by Japanese imports, with
industry leaders like Lee Iaccoca saying that "...in the name
of free trade, we're sitting by and watching Japan systemati-
cally capture our industrial and technological base. By com-
bining the skills and efficiencies of their culture with a
host of unfair economic advantages, Japan appears capable of
looting our markets with impunity. 111 It is a view increas-
ingly shared by many rank-and-file Americans.
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There were attempts to solve these persistent trade prob-
lems, but they were pursued in case-by-case bilateral negotia-
tions which provided nothing more substantial than stop-gap
measures designed to staunch the financial hemmoraging of key
American industries like steel and automobiles in order to
give them the time to restructure and become competitive
again. Part of the problem in negotiating with the Japanese
about VERAs though, was that the US was caught upon the horns
of a dilemma. It had preached the benefits of free trade ever
since the end of the Second World War, but now it was suffer-
ing from the economic consequences of that policy, as many
American consumers, exercising their rights under the capital-
istic system, increasingly chose Japanese over American
products. As Robert Kuttner attempts to explain:
It made pragmatic sense for America in the 1950s and 1960s
to preach the freest possible markets, it made less sense in
the 1980s and 1990s. Yet by 1980, as laissez-faire hardened
from self-interest into dogma, the world was turning into
one big marketplace, outrunning the macroeconomic policies
of individual nations. During the 1950s and 1960s, the
potential instabilities of a global market system were
tempered by the reality that the economic power of the
United States and the American dollar gave ballast to the
world economy: a quarter of a century later, that was no
longer true. 2
This propensity for supporting free trade principles in
the international marketplace has complicated US policy
towards Japan, because even as Japanese economic power
112Kuttner, 6-7.
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steadily increased, US policy-makers chose "...to believe
that, at the right time, and under the right mix of internal
and external pressures, Japan would gradually start managing
its economic machine in a manner that the United States found
more acceptable. It is a simple assumption, yet it has been
the cornerstone of the U.S. [economic] stance towards Japan
for decades." 113 Because of this long-standing belief, the US
has attempted to deal with Japan as though its market system
could be changed to fit the American model; it is a policy
which has been dead wrong, because "Japan, Korea, and other
economically vigorous Asian nations use an explicitly develop-
mental state," and they "...do not have free markets in the
Western sense."
Just how wrong can be seen in the large and persistant
trade deficits that the United States has had with Japan
despite decades of trade negotiations and Congressional
pressure. For many observers, these immense trade deficits and
the dismal American economic performance during the 1970s and
early-1980s seemed to show that the United States and its once
preeminent economy were in continuing decline, especially
relative to that new economic juggernaut Japan. The signposts
of the late-1980s seemed compelling: "Persistent trade and
11
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budget deficits, the weak dollar and stock market turbulence,
the emergence of Japan as the world's foremost financial
power--all were seen as harbingers of a bleak future for the
nation." 11
Even though competition from the newly-industrializing
"Little Dragons" has been just as fierce as that posed by the
Japanese in some of the most troubled US industries, many
Americans continued to see the Japanese as the most threaten-
ing of their Asian competitors, primarily because Japan's
spectacular ascendence in the world economy was so difficult
to ignore. For years, the financial papers have been full of
articles touting the "Japanese miracle," and for many average
Americans, it is a miracle which has happened far too quickly
for them to comfortably accept.
Japan has experienced some of the highest growth rates in
the world during the last three decades, and it has seen its
GNP continuously rise until today it's economy stands only
behind the United States in overall economic power. It has
been a sudden, unexpected rise as well, for as late as 1960,
Japan's GNP "...was smaller than that of Britain, France or
West Germany. By 1986, [however] the gross national product of
that small island-nation exceeded that of Britian and France
combined by over 30 percent, and [was] twice that of West
11 Joel Kotkin and Yoriko Kishimoto, The Third Century: America's
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Germany." To many Americans, Japan was an economic
freight-train that had roared past the European nations in a
little over two decades and was now beginning to nudge the
American locomotive that was racing to stay ahead. But, in
some very important ways, it was already behind: in 1985, for
instance, Japan became the world's largest creditor nation
even as the United States became its largest debtor nation. To
many, it was clear that the United States and Japan had begun
"trading places."
Americans were perplexed about this sudden reversal of
roles; Selig Harrison comments that Japanese and American
perceptions of the postwar role that the United States had
played in helping Japan achieve its economic success began to
diverge significantly as that economic power increased.
Harrison says that this was because:
As many Americans saw it, the United States showed rare
benevolence in helping a defeated enemy to its feet, and the
affluent Japan of the 1980s [and 1990s] should feel indebted
for past assistance as well as for its continuing military
ride "free ride." This view held that Japan could never
have achieved its "economic miracle" without American loan
capital and technical help, not to mention Japanese earnings
from the Korean and Vietnam wars. In Japan, however, this
concept of a "debt" was flatly rejected, since most Japanese
believed that the United States rebuilt Japan for its own
strategic reasons as an industrial bulwark against the
Soviet Union and China. In Japanese eyes the postwar
"miracle" was a natural outgrowth of the progress Japan had
achieved on its own before the war. This progress was
attributed to many of the same factors typically cited by
foreign observers—a unified social structure unique in
116Ibid., 2.
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Asia, a driving nationalism, and a disciplinarian work
ethic. These were the all-important qualities that, to
the Japanese, explained why they were able to make more
effective use of the cold-war dollars flowing their way than
most other Asian countries.
The Japanese are correct when they state that the US
1 10
rebuilt Japan for its own strategic reasons, 110 but American
perceptions of what constitutes its national interests in that
region have begun to shift. While the United States is still
fundamentally committed to collective security in Northeast
Asia, there is a firm recognition that the US cannot continue
to bear the brunt of the economic costs of maintaining
military defense of that area; economic costs which are not
only direct costs associated with the armed forces themselves,
but the indirect economic opportunity costs exacted in the
form of reduced financial and industrial competitiveness. For
instance, Colin S. Gray writes that "there is resentment in
the United States that the competitiveness of the Japanese
economy is noticeably, even perhaps measureably, a function of
11711 Robert W. Barnett, Beyond War: Japan's Concept of Comprehensive
National Security (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey 's International
Defense Publishers, 1984), 47.
110
. ,
See in Meirion and Susie Harries, Sheathing The Svord
, p. 191,
where the authors state that one reason was that, during the late-1940s,
"the American economy was in increasing danger of stagnating through lack
of overseas markets for the output of its immense industrial capacity.
Other nations were for the most part in desperate financial straits, their
economies in ruin, and were unable to earn, by exporting to America, the
dollars with which to pay for the goods America needed to sell. There was
in effect a 'dollar gap'; and Japan was a crucial component of America's
strategy for bridging it in Asia...."
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the modesty of the scale of Japan's diversion of high-technol-
1 10
ogy talent to military purposes." 117
Japan-basher Pat Choate comments rather cynically that it
was actually the single-minded pursuit of profit under the
Yoshida Doctrine that first "...assured Japanese security
without the burden of massive defense expenditures," and then
"...facilitated the accelerated rebuilding of Japanese indus-
try." 120 He is not alone in that cynicism, for many American
analysts have come to express their deep concern about how the
Japanese have used this strategy to take economic advantage of
its 'free-rider' status in the Western Alliance. Some thought-
ful criticism is offered by Robert Kuttner, who writes that
both:
West Germany and Japan had grown accustomed to the conve-
nient dual role of geopolitical client and geoeconomic free
rider. As economically productive nations with high savings
rates and deliberately undervalued currencies, they enjoyed
the best of all worlds: low real interest rates (which meant
low capital costs for their industries) and export surplus-
es. Export surpluses meant that they could have steady
growth and full employment, but without the high fiscal
deficits that generate inflation and trigger high interest
rates. They grew faster than everybody else, capturing the
benefits of the global trading system while bearing few of
its burdens. In effect, they were exporting their austerity
to the rest of the world, while enjoying domestic
prosperity. 1
11Q7Colin S. Gray, War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft
for the Next Century (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 269-70.
120Choate, Agents of Influence , 67.
121Kuttner, 73.
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Many Americans are now demanding that the United States change
these economic relationships, and begin to deal with trading
nations like Japan on the basis of what Clyde Prestowitz calls
a "level playing field." But, however the United States even-
tually approaches its trade problems with Japan, it is clear
that the era of sublimating the economic interests of the
United States to the requirements of military defense is
122
rapidly drawing to an close. "
122 . .
See in Harrison and Prestowitz, "Pacific Agenda: Defense Or Econ-
omics?," Foreign Policy 79, (Summer 1990): 57, where the authors write
that "Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has now made it possible for
Washington to put economic priorities first and to strengthen its [econ-
omic] leverage with the East Asian capitals hitherto regarded as indis-
pensable pillars of U.S. security."
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III. UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE JAPANESE
CHALLENGE
In April 1989, the late Senator John Heinz met with
Yoshiro Kurisaka, the Policy Counsellor at the Keizai Koho
Center in Japan, and took a predictably hard line regarding
the US-Japan trade Imbalance. "Japan and America have
different market systems," he told Kurisaka. "But that is no
excuse for the trade imbalance. Under certain circumstances
101
America could justifiably adopt protectionist measures."
These calls for protectionism are usually made by Americans
in an attempt to leverage the Japanese into reducing their
trade barriers and "opening up their domestic market" to
American exports. 2 * For many Americans, this seems to be a
simple solution to the trade deficit. The thinking is that
if Americans firms are allowed to compete in Japan on the
same basis that Japanese firms compete in the United States,
comparative advantage will carry the day and the trade
deficit will disappear as a host of American products find a
12116JYoshiro Kurisaka, "High Time to Reform Backwards Politics," Japan
Update No. 12, (Summer 1989): 1.
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See in Donald C. Hellmann, "The Imperatives For Reciprocity and
Symmetry," p. 256, where the author states that "protectionism is rarely
defended on grounds of principle but is justified as a temporary expedient
to rectify "unfair" practices abroad impeding the operation of a free
market. Free trade is sanctified by the capitalist experience in America
and finds intellectual sustenance in the neoclassical economic tradition
that dominates in U.S. universities."
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ready-made market in Japan. That thinking is also wrong. This
macroeconomic approach to trade with Japan actually points out
that many Americans do not understand either the nature or the
extent of the Japanese economic challenge.
In his relentless crusade to make American policy-makers
understand that the Japanese are pursuing a totally different
economic agenda than the US, Clyde Prestowitz, Jr. has
repeatedly stated that:
In lieu of a significant military establishment or policy,
industrial policy aimed at achieving "economic security" has
become Japan's national security strategy and its only
assurance of some degree of independence of action on the
international stage. As a result, Japan's industrial
policies encompass broader concerns than merely those of
economics. Japan's economic and strategic thinking is
integrated. Economic policies are formulated with an eye not
only to their contribution to Japan's material welfare, but
also to their effect on Japan's power--not military, but of
an overall political sort. Such policies are not conceived
with short-term consumer welfare as the major objective, and
cannot and will not always be in accord with the principles
of free trade, which are based only on economic
considerations . *"
Robert W. Barnett, in his summary of Japan's 1980 Report
on Comprehensive National Security, points out that "Japan's
central concern has always been the competitive effective-
ness—even survival—of Japan's dynamic but vulnerable
economy." 14 " The tone of that report is very clear to an
125Prestowitz, 149
12
°Barnett, 9. See too on page 32 where Barnett quotes Gregg
Rubinstein, a US foreign service officer, as saying that "since the middle
of the nineteenth century Japan had been obsessed by its vulnerabilities
and by the necessity of surviving in an unfriendly world. The response to
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American reader, and that is, that for the Japanese there is
little distinction made between economic security and
national security. Barnett's analysis lends firm support to
Prestowitz's contention that the Japanese are primarily
concerned with "economic security," when he points out that
"among dangers that most alarm Tokyo are fear of losing
access to overseas sources of food and energy. .. fear that
Washington may be indifferent to Japan's need for vital
imports and its need for access to American and other
markets, fear of loss of acceptability as an active partner
in the economic growth dynamic of Southeast Asia, fear of a
breakdown of the international system, and fear of surges of
great disorder anywhere." These national fears are usually
expressed in economic terms, even though in reality they
encompass much more than simple balance-sheet worries. The
Japanese version of "comprehensive national security"
predicates economic interdependence as a precondition for
national security; consequently, in Japanese eyes the
"administration of a stable, growth-oriented, and reliably
outward-looking/interdependent economic system is the
this obsession over the past century had been varied— from Meiji Japan's
feverish modernization of state and society, to prewar Japan's search for
security through military domination of East Asia, and then to the postwar
emphasis on trade expansion and international economic cooper-ation. The
need to survive, however, had been a constant challenge, and given




bedrock of Japan's own security...." 1 ' Stated in simpler
terms, Japan prefers an international free trade system that
essentially preserves the status quo—which means relatively
open American markets for Japanese export goods without the
requisite need for Japan to open its domestic market in any
significant way.
The differences between the two countries' approaches to
international trade during the postwar years are dramatic, for
while the US committed itself to the establishment of a free
and open international economic system, and pursued laissez-
faire economics , Japan, which had been destitute at the end of
the war, felt forced to embark upon a national effort to
create "...an export economy sheltered behind a wall of
protectionism and buoyed by a pattern of cooperation between
government and industry that was designed to stimulate growth
in jobs and gross national product (GNP) and to provide export
earnings to finance imports of raw materials and food that the
1 9Q
resource-starved island economy needed to survive." 1".
Understanding the reasons behind Japan's autarkical
approach to economic security, (particularly in sophisticated
manufactured goods), is just as important as understanding the
mechanics of that approach. So, before examining the structure
128Ibid., 10.
1 2Q14 Edson W. Spencer, "Japan as Competitor," Foreign Policy 78,
(Spring 1990) : 155.
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of Japan's economic system, Americans first must be cognizant
of the very important fact that Japan is, and always has been,
1 10
a resource-poor country. What that means in a practical
sense is that the Japanese have little indigenous resources
beyond the hard-working, highly-educated nature of the people
themselves. Japan is heavily dependent upon its trading
partners for a great portion of its food and fuel; in fact,
fully one-third of Japan's food imports, as well as large
amounts of industrial raw materials, come directly from the
United States. In order to pay for these critical imports, the
Japanese feel that they must always export more manufactured
goods to the United States than Americans export back to them;
consequently, even though exports have rarely amounted to more
than 12 percent of Japan's GNP, the Japanese perceive this
13 See in George Friedman and Meredith Lebard, The Coming War With
Japan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 163, where the authors
write that "Japan's dependency on imports of minerals is enormous. Japan
must import virtually all of its iron ore, copper, nickel, bauxite,
manganese, molybdenum, titaniumand, most important, all of its oil and
liquid natural gas. Overall, it imports 99.6 percent of all its mineral
ores, and 96.3 percent of all its mineral fuels— less than 99 percent only
because Japan has some coal. Japan's food situation is only marginally
better. It needs to import 85 percent of its wheat, 70 percent of its
corn, 80 percent of its barley, and 97 percent of its oil seed."
ill1J1As Michael Porter points out in The Competitive Advantage of
Nations
, p. 395, that "with a long tradition of respect for education that
borders on reverence, Japan possesses a large pool of literate, educated,
and increasingly skilled human resources. Japanese are disciplined,
hardworking, and willing to cooperate with the group."
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percentage to be a crucial element of their national securi-
11?ty. Etched on the consciousness of every Japanese is the
central fact that Japan must export in order to feed its
people and supply its industry. This feeling of vulnera-
bility is one of the reasons why the Japanese continue to
oppose, for example, "...all efforts to open its US$35
billion-a-year rice market," on the grounds that "...rice
1 14
self-sufficiency is a non-economic issue."
The American vision of how the world's postwar economic
system should work was outlined in large part in the Bretton
Woods Agreement, which was an American effort to reshape the
112
This percentage is much lower than some other trading nations.
While Japan's export percentage of 9.2% of nominal GNP in 1988 was about
twice as large as that of the United States (at 4.7%), both these
percentages were dwarfed by Germany's 24.3%.
111. •
See in Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations
, p.
399, for instance, where Porter writes that "at the broadest level,
Japanese children are taught at an early age that Japan can only survive
through kako-boeki , or exports based on imported materials. The concept of
upgrading is implanted early. "See too in Frantz and Collins, Selling Out
,
p. 21, where the authors quote Harvard Busi-ness Scholl professor Thomas
K. McCraw, who says: "Simply, there is no escape from the logic of Japan's
physical setting: a very large population in a small and mostly barren
land mass. Thus, whatever other national goals it might con-ceive for
itself— a strong voice in world politics, wide recognition for its
artists, honors for its athletes—Japan cannot, even for a moment, forget
about its need to export."
13
*Carl Goldstein, "The big casualty," Far Eastern Economic Review
149, (27 September 1990): 61. See too in James Fallows' More Like Us
,
page
9, where Fallows says: "I have interviewed urbane government officials
about Japan's farm subsidy programs, asking why Japanese families should
pay $8.00 for a sack of Japanese-grown rice when they could buy a sack of
equally good rice from Thailand or the United States for a dollar or two.
The seemingly sincere response is usually 'What? And risk being starved
out?"'
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international economic system in the direction of free trade
and market-oriented national economies. In addition, through
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) , the US has
continually championed liberal trade policies between nations
in order to enhance general world prosperity. 35 The underly-
ing problem is that Japan has continued to engage in managed
trade (to an extend far beyond what is seen in other OECD
countries) , and has not signed on to certain other "informal"
rules that US trade officials believe important to the smooth
working of this integrated international economic system— the
sovereignty of the consumer and the shareholder, for example,
and tough anti-trust policies which place sharp curbs on
corporate power. But, to say that Japanese trade practices are
unfair though is simply incorrect, because, more precisely,
they are just different. The word "unfair" somehow implies
that the Japanese have been cheating on some mutually agreed
1 35JJSee in Prestowitz, Trading Places
, p. 230, where Prestowitz writes
that "Americans and Europeans who led the restructuring of the world
economy after the war founded it on the doctrine of free trade, which was
institutionalized in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the
International Monetary fund (IMF) , and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) . There the concepts of multilateral
trade (trading within an overall multinational framework rather than on
the basis of bilateral agreements) , most-favored-nation and national
treatment (giving the same treatment to both foreign and domestic com-
panies) were enshrined. All of these agreements and structures were based
on the competitive market and comparative advantage theories of the
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century economists Adam Smith and David Ricardo
and their later elaborators."
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upon set of rules that govern the conduct of commerce, and
that is simply not the case.
The reasons behind this fundamental misunderstanding lie
hidden in the nature of the Japanese economic system itself,
for the capitalist systems found in Japan and the United
States differ sharply in their respective approaches to doing
business. In contrasting the two systems, Yamamoto Shichihei
has stated in The Spirit of Japanese Capitalism iJ0 that "in
both countries the label on the outside says 'capitalist, ' but
when you open it up and look at the contents, they are very,
very different." 1 This is a critical point for American
policy-makers to understand, because "our intellectual concep-
tual ization of the Japanese economic system undergirds
13 °Nihon Shihonsuqi no Seishin .
1J Frank Gibney, Miracle by Design: The Real Reasons Behind Japan's
Economic Success (New York: Times Books, 1982), 7. See too in Hellmann,
"The Imperatives For Reciprocity and Symmetry," p. 256-257, where Hellmann
writes: "In Japan the liberal economic concepts of a competitive market,
a small role for the govern-ment, and free trade have roots neither in the
practices of the modern Japanese state nor in the schools of economics in
the universities. Indeed, as [Chalmers] Johnson boldly states: 'The
ideology of Japan's political economy can be located precisely in the line
of descent from the German Historical School, sometimes labelled "economic
nationalism" or neomercantilism. ' Free trade and liberal econ-omics do not
have the emotional overlay they carry in the United States, nor do they
implicitly guide the formulation of policy. In an interdependent world in
which flexibility in managing foreign economic policy is peculiarly
important, neomercantilist institutions and instincts give Japan enormous
advantages."
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policies toward Japan. If our picture is distorted, our
policies will be, too. J °
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SAMURAI CAPITALISM: THE NATURE OF THE
JAPANESE ECONOMY
On the face of it, the Japanese economy resembles the US
economy, for it has had as its key objectives: low taxes, low
interest rates, high savings, and capital formation. Economist
in both countries generally agree that these economic objec-
tives provide a business climate which is conducive to large-
scale industrial expansion—the hard part, of course, is
formulating the public policies that will generate these
outcomes. The Japanese, it seems, have been much better at
reaching those economic goals than the United States. The tax
system in Japan, for instance, is generally less burden-some
than in the United States. Commodity-taxes are low, capital
gains taxes are virtually nonexistent, and the average income
tax in Japan is around 16 percent, with only about 24 percent
of total national income being taken by the government. (This
contrasts very favorably with the 28 per-cent of national
income taken by the American government, and the 40-50 percent
138Alan S. Blinder, "There Are Capitalists, Then There Are The
Japanese," Business Week 3181, (October 8, 1990): 21.
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The Japanese system is characterized more than anything
else by its very high savings ratio: the Japanese save about
16 percent of their household income (as opposed to a very
anemic five percent for Americans), and this tremendous
amount of national savings permits extensive business capital-
ization without the fear of significant inflation or high
interest rates. Japan has taken supply-side economics and
applied it in a classic manner: it accumulated massive amounts
of capital through the world's most impressive savings pro-
gram, and then used that capital for plant modernization
and technological development. The profits realized from those
endeavors then went to fund even more industrial expansion,
110
Peter Tasker, The Japanese: Portrait of a Nation (New York:
Meridian, 1987), 44.
140Daniel Burstein, in his book Yen I: Japan's Nev Financial Empire
And Its Threat To America , estimates that "every single working day,
Japanese individuals and corporations generate over a billion dollars
worth of savings."
Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York:
Free Press, 1990), 396. Porter writes that historically "...the savings
habit was partly cultural and partly a reflection of government policies,
among them the absence of social security, a low housing stock which made
the purchase of a home difficult for many, and impediments to placing
capital abroad. To compensate for weak financial institutions [in the
early postwar period] , the Japanese govern-ment instituted a financial
investment policy ( zaisei-to-yushi ) that involved encouraging savings and
deploying it in priority fields. Individuals were given tax incentives to
deposit savings in the postal savings system (yubin chokin ) , banks, and
securities companies."
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which in turn resulted in even larger market shares for
Japanese companies and correspondingly greater sales. But,
while this approach to economics would seem to reflect the US
economy, appearances can be deceiving.
As Business Week columnist Alan S. Blinder and others have
observed, "market capitalism, Japanese-style, departs so much
from the conventional Western economic thought that it de-
serves to be considered a different system." 142 This is
perhaps at the crux of American misunderstandings of the so-
called "Japan Problem," for few Americans understand that the
Japanese have "...their own cultural, social, and political
priorities [which] have led them to organize and run their
econom[y] on the basis of principles different from those of
the United States." 143 Expecting Japan to follow the American
capitalist model, the United States is confused by what it
sees in Japan—because a lot of the economic principles as
practiced in Japan do not make sense in classical economic
terms. As one MITT official so blithely put it: "We did the
opposite of what American economists said. We violated all the
normal concepts." 1 * 4 Consequently, understanding Japanese
samurai capitalism may require a reexamination of some of the
142Blinder, 21.
Harrison and Prestowitz, 60.
144Ibid., 21.
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basic tenets of traditional Western capitalism, for the
Japanese "...have succeeded by doing everything wrong (accord-
ing to standard economic theory)." Among the most funda-
mental of these concepts is the underlying supposition in
Western societies that greater consumption is the real purpose
behind all economic activity. This concept that "...the
economic system exists to serve the wants of consumers...." is
rooted deeply in the classic writings of Adam Smith and David
Ricardo, 1^ and as "one of history's greatest ideas," the
"essence of the invisible hand" in the marketplace has become
the guiding light of Western economic thought. *' According
to traditional views of capitalism:
The doctrine of laissez-faire, as explicated in Adam
Smith's Wealth of Nations, holds that market economies,
when left alone, are essentially self-regulating. Sellers,
left to their own devices, will produce goods and services
in response to the demands of buyers. The interplay of
supply and demand will generate the right signals, in the
form of prices, of what ought to be produced. Correct
prices will "clear the market," as in an auction. The
unfettered operation of the price system leads to an
optimal allocation of resources and the most efficient
possible distribution of production, based on the logic of
specialization, in which each producer gets to do what he
does best. The resulting distribution of income and wealth





Kuttner, 4. Kuttner also points out that "...even Smith, however,
recognized that government had a function in all this—in caring for the
needy, in building public works, in education and public health, and in
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Americans have embraced Adam Smith and free-trade whole-
heartedly, and have concentrated on consumption as the main
economic locomotive of their culture—with the American
consumer as the engineer in control; the Japanese, meanwhile,
have elected to focus instead almost exclusively on production
and the dominance of certain key industries in order to reach
national goals centered squarely on achieving "economic
security." The Japanese, with their very successful emphasis
on production instead of consumption seemed to have turned
traditional Western economic theory on its head, because
Japanese priorities put:
...producers, not consumers on the economic throne.
Japanese businesses seek profits, to be sure, but not for
their stockholders. They want them, instead, as the well-
spring of growth, which they see as an integral part of
nation-building. ^
It is clear from this fundamentally different perception alone
that Japan's economic behavior is bound to be unlike that of
the United States. This is not the only difference between the
two systems, however, because another key difference is that
while the United States has formulated a de jure adversarial
relationship between government and business and management
and labor, the Japanese, with their consensual cultural style,
have striven to achieve de facto cooperation amongst all those
preventing merchants from conspiring against the public interest."
149Blinder, 21.
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ISO .groups. Americans have traditionally viewed "...monopolies
and cartels [as] economic pathologies. [They] are also wary of
vertical integration, because captive suppliers or retailers
may serve the interests of the dominant company rather than
those of consumers." This wariness manifests itself in
such legal restraints as the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, which
essentially prohibits the creation of large industrial and
financial monopolies. The Japanese have taken a totally
different approach and have encouraged the growth of "...the
keiretsu— the ultimate vertically integrated megacompany.
"
152
This means that how business is conducted in Japan is much
different than how its conducted in the United States, for:
When major Japanese manufacturers purchase components,
they often do not seek out the lowest-cost provider. They
look instead to their regular supplier, often part of
their keiretsu. The same is true of financing and, in some
icn1JULeonard Silk, "Can U.S. Recover In Electronics?," The New York
Times (May 4, 1990): C2. See where Silk writes about whether or not the US
should adopt an industrial policy. In his analysis he quotes Canadian
economist Sylvia Ostry, former chief economist of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Develop-ment, as observing that the United States
and Japan work on different models in their struggle for competitiveness:
"The American model 'is strongly consumer and short-term oriented,' she
said. 'Its strength is dynamism and flexibility.' Business interest groups
generate an implicit "industrial policy" response from the Government in
specific fields like military production and agriculture, while most
industries insist Government leave them alone. .. .By contrast, the Japanese
model... is a "corporatist market economy," unique in its producer orien-
tation, strategic use of cooperation and competition, and in the close and




cases, of retail outlets. To [the American] way of think-
ing, such restrictive practices lead to higher costs. To
their way of thinking, long-term, reliable relationships
cut costs as business partners learn from and help one
another.
This difference in thinking is significant because it
carries over into the way Japan conducts its international
trade as well. The United States has followed an economic
policy which emphasizes customer satisfaction and individual
choice in the marketplace— the general sense has been that the
American consumer (and the country itself) benefits by buying
from the lowest-cost producer of quality goods, regardless of
country of manufacture. Indeed, classical thinking says that
if "...other countries are stupid enough to subsidize their
export industries, American consumers ought to welcome the
gift." Philosophically, that means that if certain Ameri-
can industries have to suffer because of their non-competi-
tiveness, so be it. Practically, it is not quite that simple
though, for as Robert Kuttner explains, "the prevailing
ideology of economic liberalism has eschewed having industrial
1C1
Ibid., 21. See too in Fallows' More Like Us , page 40, where he
points out that "...Japanese suppliers [of soda ash used in making glass],
with their very high energy costs, are at an inherent disadvantage
compared with American suppliers. Nonetheless, Japanese customers buy five
sixths of their soda ash at home. An executive of Asahi Glass, a major
purchaser, announced in 1986 that he would never leave his high-cost
Japanese supplier. After all, they'd been friends in school. 'This isn't
exactly collusion,' an American diplomat told me. 'It's just a refusal to




goals in the United States: in principle, it is none of the
government's business where steel, or automobiles, or semicon-
ductors, or VCRs, or civilian aircraft are produced; if
production migrates abroad, this must be the market speaking,
and if foreign industrial policies are the guiding, not
invisible hand of global markets, this is deemed to make no
significant difference. In practice, this makes America's
industrial fate partly the captive of other nation's industri-
al strategies. " lJJ
This means that large dislocations in American industry
have often been the result of Japanese targeting rather than
the competitive interplay of the free-market system. This has
given rise to increasing trade frictions between the two
countries because Japan takes a totally different approach to
international trade than the United States. Jeffrey Garten,
formerly on the staff of the White House Council on Interna-
tional Economic Policy, says that "Japan's main policy objec-
tive has been to protect its economy—access to raw materials
abroad, access to foreign markets, and the nurturing of power-
ful conglomerates in industry and finance..." 156 This differ-
ence in approach contributes to what is generally perceived as
155Ibid., 11.
^Jeffrey E. Garten, "Japan and Germany: American Concerns," Foreign
Affairs 68 (Winter 1989/90): 86.
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the "Japan Problem." This "problem" exists because:
Not only does Japan export more than it imports, but its
exports, in combination with its inhospitality to foreign
products, undermine Western industries. The term 'adver-
sarial trade' was coined by Peter Drucker to distinguish
the Japanese method from competitive trade, in which a
country imports manufactures of the same kind as it
exports ... .With sectors such as consumer electronics and
semiconductors— the bases for more specialized indus-
tries—being taken over almost completely by Japanese firms,
Westerners have begun to fear they may suffer a gradual
'de-industrialization'. Once it has obtained the required
technology, Japanese industry appears capable, with a
concerted effort, of outcompeting and taking over from the
original inventors and developers in any field. 157
This "concerted effort" is another factor which should not
be underestimated in its importance to the success of the
Japanese economy. The group-oriented structure of Japanese
society allows the Japanese to achieve a fixation of purpose
seldom achieved by Americans outside of wartime. Kanji Haitani
claims that:
Japan's unsurpassed international competitive strength
owes much to the group-oriented value system of Japanese
society. The high productivity of Japanese workers, their
hard work and cooperative attitude; the harmonious rela-
tionships between management and labor and between govern-
ment and business; the long time horizon of Japanese mana-
gers, their marketing strategy with a focus on market
share, product quality, and innovation—all of these
strengths have been attributed to Japanese society's em-
phasis on the group and its "others-oriented motivation"
system. The voluminous studies that have been published in
recent years seldom fail to stress that the Japanese
13
'van Wolferen, 2. van Wolferen writes that "West Germany's trade
surpluses are also very large, but West Germany practices competitive
trade, as does the USA."
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ability to work as a group is at the heart of Japan's
competitive strength. °
This is important enough to explain at length, for Japan's
"groupism" is a critical factor in understanding how and why
the Japanese economy operates the way it does. Kanji Haitani
outlines seven key dimensions of this Japanese variety of
collectivism which should be examined:
1. The Japanese "...find identity and a sense of security
through affiliation with a group— a family, school,
corporation, or nation state. In smaller groups such as
business corporations, the membership is diffuse, that
is, involving the total personality as human beings.
These groups are what the Japanese call unmei kyodotai-
-communities of shared destiny ... .Members of the group
are aware that their well-being is maximized when their
group prospers; hence they are willing to make sacri-
fices for the group.";
2. Within Japanese groups, a major characteristic is
"...the hierarchial relationship among its members that
is based on seniority. Within the same category of
membership— for example, male managerial employees— in
a small group such as a business firm or government
of f ice. .. there is a close correlation between the
member's age (or year of entry) and their rank. This
emphasis on the seniority of members is closely related
to the Japanese belief that groups are organic commun-
ities... that exist and grow through time. By belonging
to a small group, which belongs to successively larger
groups that ultimately make up the family of Japan,
each member of the group feels somehow linked to... the
national family.";
3. "The third dimension. .. is its stress on the relation-
ships of harmony and cooperation ( wa) . Members and the
group are isshin-dotai (one mind, same body). Here,
"one mind" does not mean unanimity of opinion in the
Western, democratic sense. Rather, it means the absence
of dissonance or discord that is achieved by senior
158Kanji Haitani, "The Paradox of Japan's Groupism: Threat to Future
Competitiveness?," Asian Survey 30, (March 1990): 237.
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members taking the views of junior members seriously
into account but, ultimately, by lower-level members
internalizing and accomodating the wisdom of senior
members. In general, the use of logic cannot be used to
achieve wa. "
;
Also very characteristic of Japanese "groupism" is its
"
. . .exclusivism, or the insider-outsider mentality.
Especially in a small group, Japanese form a closely
knit, highly integrated organization in which members
are particularistically related with a high emotive
content and distinctions among individual members are
blurred. A clear distinction is made between the
insiders and the outsiders, the latter being treated by
the former with indifference or even hostility. .. .This
fact makes it doubly important for Japanese to belong
to some group and be embraced by it because the outside
world is inhospitable.";
"The fifth key dimension is its rank and status con-
sciousness, which is now well known and understood in
the West. The rank consciousness translates into a
keen sense of rivalry among individuals and groups for
higher rank and status within a larger group. That
this rank consciousness constitutes one of the key
driving forces of the Japanese economy is also well
known . "
;
Another major characteristic of this "groupism" has to
do with "...its overall organizational structure, par-
ticularly in its macro dimension. Fundamentally, Japan-
ese are averse to centralization of power. The whole
society consists of a complex of overlapping hier-
archies, at the top of which is a curious absence of a
power center."; and
Lastly, "...the most important aspect of the Japanese
view of the relationship between self and group, is
their Weltanschauung or world outlook. Inasmuch as the
Japanese are group oriented and that the largest group
they can identify themselves with is their country, the
national self-interest of Japan takes precedence over
all other values. "
159Ibid., 238-240
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This concept of "groupism" helps to provide an answer to
why Japanese workers are so fanatically loyal to their com-
panies and work such long hours to ensure their firms' suc-
cess, why Japanese subcontractors remain loyal to the large
firms above them, refusing to sell to competitors even during
difficult economic times when cash-flow is critical, and why
large firms like Asahi Glass continue to buy more expensive
pot ash from their regular Japanese supplier even when it is
markedly more expensive than that offered by an American
competitor. It also explains why it is so difficult for
American firms to crack the Japanese marketplace, where the
interconnecting networks of different groups makes it almost
impossible for an outsider to break in. This cooperation with-
in groups can be seen in the workings of the Japanese govern-
ment itself:
Japanese government, in the broadest sense of the word, is
the rule of politicians, bureaucrats, and industrialists,
incorporating the opinions of interest groups, scholars,
media people, and even opposition figures. Major decisions
are taken only after all affected parties have been con-
sulted and their opinions sought. This makes policy-making
a slow business, but once a direction has been fixed, far-
reaching measures can be implemented with little
resistance.
Closely connected to this "groupism" is an overarching
concept of racial homogeneity which provides the Japanese with
a social cohesion and awareness of national identity which is
160Tasker, 47
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unmatched in the United States. In fact, "being Japanese" is
undoubtedly the single most important aspect of their lives.
Both the politicians and business leaders alike, consciously
promote nihonjinron (the theory of being "Japanese") with the
result that there exists a strong sense of shared purpose
among the Japanese people. This concept of nihonjinron
provides "...a strong sense of comity and mutual obligation,
a deference to hierarchy, as well as an insular sense of
dif ferentness. " 161 Robert Kuttner points out further that:
The idea is deeply rooted that the Japanese are unique and
in many ways superior
—
yet vulnerable to undesired foreign
influences. In an almost feudal way, deference within the
hierarchy is balanced and reinforced by a reciprocal
responsibility on the part of the superior toward the
subordinate. Much in Japanese society, including its
business practices, is built on long-term relationships,
which is Japan's way of delivering comity and dealing with
its sense of vulnerability. In contrast, relationships
with foreigners, who are not part of the social contract,
tend to be expedient and contingent. As it turns out,
these cultural traits mesh beautifully with the strategies
of the developmental state. And the successes of the
developmental state, in turn, allow Japanese industry to
fulfill its mutual obligations to a complex network of
suppliers, customers, and employees. 2
This combination of social cohesion and shared purpose is
among Japan's greatest strengths and translates directly into
the success of Japanese industrial policy. A very important
aspect of this success comes from the sanguine fact that the




al economic priorities. Maximization of economic advantage is
an objective with which nearly all Japanese agree. The econ-
omic framework of Japan is based primarily upon the overriding
national priority of building an ever stronger industrial and
commercial base, which makes for a more powerful and secure
Japanese nation. James Fallows makes the assertion that:
The operational realities of the Japanese political and
economic system are distinctly different from those in
North America and most of Western Europe. The Japanese
system is more likely to sacrifice the consumer's welfare
in order to strengthen its businesses. It encourages the
very concentrations of economic power that American-style
trustbusting and deregulation seek to break. When indi-
vidual rights and collective well-being come into
conflict, Japan is more likely to promote what it sees as
the whole society's interests. The result of these and
other traits, we contend, is a system whose goals and
performance may not be accurately described by the Western
model of democratic capitalism.
Robert Kuttner states that "although Japan is a fiercely
capitalist country, it is not a market system in the same
sense as the United States." Alan Blinder writes that:
American capitalism rests on a grand theory begun by Adam
Smith. There is no comparable theory of Japanese capital-
ism, but we need one if we are to formulate an intelligent
economic policy toward Japan. The Japanese themselves
For instance, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida (1948-1954) had
emphasized throughout his term of office that maximization of economic
profit was the real foundation of Japan's "economic diplomacy" ( keizai
qaiko ) , and many observers feel that this policy outlook has not changed
significantly over the years.
1 James Fallows, Chalmers Johnson, Clyde Prestowitz and Karel van






seem less concerned with conceptualizations than with
results. So. we may have to produce that theory
ourselves.
That is an undertaking fraught with problems of perception,
for arguments about the nature of the "Japan Problem" usually
pit "...orthodox macro-economists and the diplomatic estab-
lishment against structuralist economists and scholars of
1fi7Japanese history and society." 10 The first group "...derives
its notions about Japan from building models and making deduc-
tions," while the second group "...examines in detail how
ICO
Japan actually works." 100 So, "if Japan is essentially [seen
to be] a market society rather like ours, whose members merely
happen to save more and work harder, the only 'Japan problem'
is that we are not so diligent as they. If, on the other hand,
Japan's system of strategic 'tribal bureaucratic capitalism,'
as the writer Murray Sayle has called it, works well within
Japan but turns predatory when applied to Japan's trading
partners, then the 'Japan problem' is a severe one for the
rest of the world." 169
Chalmers Johnson is of the second (and more persuasive)






Johnson maintains that the Japanese have never really believed
in Adam Smith, and that Japan is a "developmental state,"
which also "...can be located precisely in line of descent
from the German Historical School--sometimes labeled economic
nationalism, Handelspolitik , or neomercantilism. " As
Johnson explains it, "in those states that were the first to
industrialize, the state itself had little to do with the new
forms of economic activity but towards the end of the nine-
teenth century the state took on regulatory functions in the
interest of maintaining competition, consumer protection, and
so forth," while "in states that were late to industrialize,
the state itself led the industrialization drive, that is, it
171took on developmental functions." Johnson states that:
The United States is a good example of a state in which
the regulatory orientation predominates, whereas Japan is
a good example of a state in which the developmental
orientation predominates. A regulatory, or market-
rational, state concerns itself with the forms and pro-
cedures— the rules, if you will—of economic competition,
but it does not concern itself with substantive matters.
For example, the United States government has many regu-
lations concerning the antitrust implications of the size
of firms, but it does not concern itself with what indus-
tries ought to exist and what industries are no longer
needed. The developmental, or plan-rational, state [like
Japan], by contrast, has as its dominant feature precisely
170Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of






e setting of such substantive social and economic
ls.m
He continues with this further explanation of how the two
systems work:
In a plan-rational state, the government will give
greatest precedence to industrial policy, that is, to a
concern with the structure of domestic industry and with
promoting the structure that enhances the nation's inter-
national competitiveness. The very existence of an indus-
trial policy implies a strategic, or goal-oriented,
approach to the economy. On the other hand, the market-
rational state usually will not even have an industrial
policy (or, at any rate, will not recognize it as such)
.
Instead, both its domestic and foreign policy, including
its trade policy, will stress rules and reciprocal conces-
sions (although perhaps influenced by some goals that are
not industrially specific, goals such as price stability
or full employment) . Its trade policy will normally be
subordinate to general foreign policy, being used more to
cement political relationships than to obtain strictly
economic advantages.
It can be argued pervasively that these descriptions
closely fit the postwar economies of the United States and
Japan; therefore, they can be used as a starting point for
explaining why this different economic development translates
into different forms of capitalism. The next step is to
briefly look at "capitalist economic dynamics" as explained in
the works of Joseph Schumpeter, an Austrian-born economist
writing at Harvard in the 1940s, who postulated that:
Capitalism. .. is by nature a form or method of economic
change and not only never is but never can be stationary.




is not merely due to the fact that economic life goes on
in a social and natural environment which changes and by
its change alters the data of economic action; this fact
is important and these changes (wars, revolutions and so
on) often condition industrial change, but they are not
its prime movers. Nor is this evolutionary character due
to a quasi-automatic increase in population and capital or
to the vagaries of monetary systems of which exactly the
same thing holds true. The fundamental impulse that sets
and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from new
consumers' goods, the new methods of production or trans-
portation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial
organization that capitalist enterprise creates. *
The Japanese, with their emphasis on the production of
different and increasingly sophisticated consumer goods, the
constant technological upgrading of their factors of produc-
tion, and the hard-pressed battles for ever increasing market
shares by large, dominant industrial/financial combines like
the keiretsu , seem to find a philosophical home in the
economics of Joseph Schumpeter, and are reflections of this
"fundamental impulse" as constituted in Japan. An argument can
be made as well, that Japan's extensive network of domestic
protectionism has:
...stemmed [in part] from an emphasis on the importance of
the internal market which came, in turn, from an impli-
citly. .
.
[Schumpeterian] view of the growth process— that
the key to development and international competitiveness
is economies of scale in manufacturing, particularly in a
few large firms in each branch [of industry] . Trying to
achieve such economies through export growth was too
expensive and risky a strategy— it required a high inti-
tial level of subsidy, since Japan's industry was too weak
to sustain world market competition, and it relied
implicitly on the maintenance of high demand abroad and on
1
'
.Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 2nd
ed., (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1950), 82-83.
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the absence of foreign protective barriers, neither of
which could be taken for granted in the 1950s. Hence the
required scale economies had to be achieved first through
domestic market growth, which would provide Japanese
industry with sufficiently high levels of demand for the
chosen few large firms to reach best-practice technology
and internationally competitive cost levels. 5
This policy fits Schumpeter's theory that capitalism is an
evolutionary process by which competition occurs around
innovations by a few dominant firms. There are many examples
of how fierce competition between competiting keiretsu fosters
significant industrial innovations and sparks rapid introduc-
estion of new product lines. 1 '
While this type of hardy competition helps to keep the
"capialist engine in motion," there is another key factor
involved in Schumpeterian capitalism, and that is the idea of
"creative destruction." Entrepreneurship, in Schumpeter's
view, is a critical factor in this process of capitalistic
evolution, for industrialized societies will change econ-
omically through the "creative destruction" of old industries
paving the way for new ones. Schumpeter wrote that:
The opening of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the
organizational development from the craft shop and factory
to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same process
of industrial mutation—if I may use that biological term-
USJAndrea Boltho, "Was Japan's industrial policy successful?,"
Cambridge Journal of Economics 9, (1985): 190.
17fi,0See in van Wolferen, page 397, for instance, where he points out
that when a battle developed between Honda and Yamaha for the motor-cycle
market in the early 1980s, it produced "...a proliferation of some ten to
fifteen new models a month."
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-incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating
a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the
essential fact about capitalism.
In examining this process of "creative destruction" in the
Japanese economy, James Abegglen and George Stalk point out
that:
This whole process is, of course, nothing more than
economic growth. It is the kind of change that must take
place if a people are to increase their productivity and
thus their standard of living. This process of change is
not unique to the Japanese economy, but what is unique in
Japan is the speed with which these changes take place,
and the ability of the Japanese company to deal with them
continuously over a long period of time. This process of
restructuring requires a continuing shift of the resources
of the economy—capital and labor--out of relatively low-
growth, low-technology, labor-intensive sectors, toward
high-value-added, higher-technology sectors. The [Japan-
ese] economy has moved on this course very steadily and
rapidly, the process both a result and a cause of its
ability to out-perform other economies in terms of real
growth of output. '
This essential fact of "creative destruction" fits the
Japanese emphasis on intense competition between their
keiretsu and the constant development of new technologies and
industries to replace the old. In Japan, much more so than in
most other countries, it can be seen that "...while whole
industries are moving from central to declining positions as
labor costs change, technology advances, competitors strength-
en, and material costs change, so within any industry in
177Schumpeter, 83.
l' 8James C. Abegglen and George Stalk, Jr., Kaisha, The Japanese
Corporation (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1985): 27-28.
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Japan's dynamic economy there is a steady shift from the less
sophisticated to more sophisticated products." 1 ' 7
As Clyde Prestowitz explains: "In [Schumpeter ' s] theory,
what matters is not price competition or resource endowment
but the competition arising from new technology, new sources
of supply, and new types of organization. Such dynamic
competition can reverse a decisive cost or quality advantage
by striking not at the margins of profit but at the founda-
180 ...tions of the existing system." 10 " With this in mind, Ameri-
cans must begin to recognize that the two economic systems are
fundamentally different, and that trade negotiations must
always proceed from that basic truth. Americans should take
heed of what French journalist J. -J. . Servan-Schreiber said in
his 1960s' classic, The American Challenge , when he wrote
that:
The experience of Japan, while rather different, leads to
a similar conlcusion: economic growth can be adapted to
social behavior and concepts of society far removed from
the American model. Growth is compatible with a great
variety of social institutions and individual behavior.
"The power of Japan's example is not that it encourages us
to imitate her society, but to accept a cultural relati-
179Ibid., 27.
1800UPrestowitz, 127-128. Prestowitz goes on to comment that "Schum-
peter 's concept of dynamic competition based on factors other than price
suggests the possibility of catching up and the legitimacy of government
intervention in order to do so. Although at odds with much of Western
doctrine, this theory accords well with the samurai instinct of the
Japanese who cannot accept that Japan remain behind in anything."
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vism that allows each country to sink the roots of indus-
trialization and economic progress into its own history."
Varying balances can then be worked out between initiative
and security, individual consumption and community devel-
opment, private power and public power. A nation that is
master of itself is free to stamp its own mark on
society.
B. GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS IN JAPAN: MITI AND JAPANESE
INDUSTRIAL POLICY
As a result of Japan's perception that industry is the
critical component of their national security, the Japanese
have developed an industrial policy designed to obtain for
themselves as much industrial autonomy as possible. Through
such key governmental organizations as the Industrial Struc-
ture Council of the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) , the Telecommunications Advisory Council of
the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, and other
similar groups established to advise other ministries, the
Japanese government has been instrumental in molding its
economy into the highly successful entity it is today.
Government advisory councils have been tasked over the
years with evaluating industrial performance throughout the
Japanese economy, and then periodically producing White Papers
which articulate visions for the future. There are many ways
in which the Japanese government promotes and supports these
181Servan-Schreiben, 195.
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visions', special depreciation rates, tax incentives, control
over the establishment of industrial standards, a patent sys-
tem designed to preclude foreign dominance of certain technol-
ogy, and guidance to banking and financial institutions on
preferred areas of loan activities. These tools have been used
primarily to reduce financial risk for targeted growth indus-
tries and to increase their comparative advantage vis-a-vis
foreign firms. In describing this interlocking structure of
government and industry, Frank Gibney states that:
The [Japanese] government continues to sit at the controls
of the whole operation, although it is, of course, constant
ly talked to and influenced by the huge trade associations
and other business interests. When it is time for subsidies,
they are forthcoming. When an industry needs protection, it
is quietly helped and protected. Working through the Mini-
stry of International Trade and Investment ... the government
assigns informal quotas, "suggests" useful mergers and ex-
tends needed financial support by tax benefits, helping with
raw material imports, plant expansion credits, technical
help, and other ways too numerous (and often too devious) to
mention. This finely calibrated support is one of the many
secrets of Japan's successful export trade [italics
mine] , 182
It has long been accepted (and resented) in the West that
"Japan's recovery from World War II was managed by the Japan-
ese state and conducted along highly mercantilist lines." 183
This process started right after the SCAP emphasis shifted
from "...cultivation of a model democracy to the rapid




creation of a powerful economy." 1" When this shift took
place, Japanese bureaucrats quickly began to use methods,
which were little different from those used before the war, to
strengthen their devastated economy— to this end, "foreign
trade was strictly controlled. ... Resources were directed away
from the consumer sector to strategic heavy indus-
tries .... [and] a select group of internationally competitive
companies were nurtured with subsidies and tax credits and
supported by a plethora of low-wage, low-productivity suppli-
ers." 185 The bureaucrats of the various ministries did not
attempt to regulate the private sector through a multitude of
laws. On the contrary, they seemed to prefer to keep legisla-
tion to a minimum. Their most effective tool was qyosei shido,
or administrative guidance. Through this guidance they set
goals for various sectors of the economy, identified growth
industries and encouraged exports, controlled the money supply
and inflation rate, and tried to divert twilight industries
into other diversified fields. 8 ° It was a process which the





°Frank Gibney, Miracle By Design: The Real Reasons Behind Japan's
Economic Success (New York: Times Books, 1982), 136.
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Many analysts maintain that this bureaucratic guidance of
business has been an absolutely critical factor in the post-
war resurgence of Japan's economy. As Japan moved from
labor-intensive industries in the 1950s to capital-intensive
industries in the 1960s and 1970s, and then finally into
technological-intensive industries in the 1980s, the not-so-
hidden hand of MITI has often been in evidence: textiles and
other ailing industries were diversified and redirected after
they had lost their comparative advantage; chemicals and some
other heavy industries were aided and strengthened as energy
prices rose after 1973; and, the growth of the automobile
industry was charted and then heavily assisted through the
encouragement of timely mergers.
Even before the Meji Restoration in 1868, the Japanese had
begun to outline a mercantilist plan for their country that
would not have seemed out of place in the conference rooms of
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) during
the 1990s. The remarks of Japanese scholar Honda Toshiaki
(1744-1821) must have seemed strangely topical for those
Japanese trade officials who read them over a 170 years later.
His simple recommendation was that:
As part of a national policy, every effort should be made
to promote in this country of articles that are of as fine
manufacture as possible. If such efforts are made, indivi-
dual industries will be encouraged, and attempts to
improve the quality of Japanese products will follow. In
that way many articles famed for their excellence will be
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produced in this country. This will help us gain profit
when trading with foreign nations.
It has been a policy taken to heart by Japanese leaders
ever since the Meiji Restoration, and consequently, government
promotion of Japanese industry has a long history. Chalmers
Johnson, contends that "...modern Japan began in 1868 to be
plan-rational and developmental," and as such, it "...had no
ideological commitment to state ownership of the economy." 188
Japan, therefore, developed as "...its main criterion. .. the
rational one of effectiveness in meeting the goals of develop-
ment," and "...began to shift away from state entrepreneurship
to collaboration with privately owned enterprises, favoring
those enterprises which were capable of rapidly adopting new
technologies and that were committed to the national goals of
1 pqeconomic development and military strength." 1 That rela-
tionship in the prewar era "...took the form of close govern-
ment ties to the zaibatsu (privately owned industrial
empires) , " which " . . .pioneered the commercialization of modern
technologies in Japan, and ...achieved economies of scale in
manufacturing and banking that were on par with those of the







...the reforms of the occupation era helped modernize the
zaibatsu enterprises, freeing them of their earlier family
domination. They also increased the number of enterprises,
promoted the development of the labor movement, and recti-
fied the grievances of the farmers under the old order,
but the system remained plan rational: given the need for
economic recovery from the war and independence from
foreign aid, it could not very well have been otherwise.
Most of the ideas for economic growth came from the
bureaucracy, and the business community reacted with an
attitude of what one scholar has called "responsive depen-
dence." The government did not normally give direct orders
to businesses, but those businesses that listened to the
signals coming from the government and then responded were
favored with easy access to capital, tax breaks, and the
approval of their plans to import foreign technology or
establish joint ventures.
Using these methods "...in the fifties and early sixties,
when Japan's industrial infrastructure was being built up, the
bureaucrats continued to play an all-important role in shaping
the nation's economy." 192 As Peter Tasker puts it, "the most
influential ministries—such as Finance, Construction, and
Trade and Industry—had power of life and death over the
sectors under their control. They could virtually shut down an
industry, as MITI did to coal, or expand or cartelize it by
'administrative guidance', a system of directives which were
not legally binding but which no businessman in his right mind





Japanese officials, however, tend to deny that their
government exerts that much control over their economy. They
maintain that growth industries are not targeted for special
consideration beyond what occurs in other countries, and,
furthermore, they state that their domestic markets are not
protected from foreign competition. The reason these officials
continue to deny the overall importance of their industrial
policy, and "...claim that Japanese economic policy plays only
a supportive rather than an initiating role," is probably
because any "...admission that industrial policy is important
carries with it, at least in American eyes, an admission that
Japanese business
—
government relationships are 'unfair' and,
1 Q4therefore, justify the imposition of protective measures." 171
This is undoubtedly a valid assumption, for many Americans
firmly believe that MITI has been able to create "winners" in
Japanese industry, and they have decried Japanese efforts to
target US markets through government support of critical
industries. Marie Anchordoguy, a professor at the University
of Washington, gives an example of this type of government-
sponsored targeting of growth industries:
. . .between 1961 and 1981 the government [of Japan] handed
out some $6 billion to computer makers. In other cases,
like semiconductors, MITI leaned on competitors to send
their best scientists to government labs where break-
through research was being done. Heavy investment fol-
lowed. By the late 1980s, most keiretsu ended up with a
mBoltho, 187
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fully integrated electronics producer able to compete in
global markets.
But, while most Japanese officials hedge on the actual
effectiveness of their industrial policy, most do not deny
that Japan has followed one, for as Nobuaki Takahashi, a
research officer of the Japan Development Bank, has said, "if
the nation's ultimate goal is to realize greater affluence in
more people's lives, then any government policy must be a
means of achieving that goal," and "the policy structure in
Japan, centered around the strengthening of international
industrial competition, which continued for forty years, was
merely one means for attaining that end."
As part of that government policy, MITI was created in
1949 by combining the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and
the Board of Trade, with the result that almost all major
industries fell within its jurisdiction. MITI is notable for
"...a variety of roles it plays—broad policy architect, as
hoc working-level problem solver, formal regulator, regional-
policy arbiter, and informal administrative guide. In some
industries, it has a strong statutory authority." 19 These
IOCi7JCarla Rapoport, "Why Japan Keeps On Winning," Fortune 124, (July
15, 1991): 84-85.
170Nobuaki Takahashi, "Toward the Legacy of Industrial Policy,"
Japanese Economic Studies (Spring 1990): 50-51.
1Q7l7
'Ira C. Magazmer and Mark Patinkin, The Silent War: Inside the
Global Business Battles Shaping America's Future (New York: Vintage Books,
1989), 358.
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are all important aspects of how MITI directs industrial
policy, but some analysts, like Andrea Boltho, declare that it
was actually MITI ' s establishment of "an extensive network of
protection," that established its primary methods of control-
ling the Japanese economy. She argues that:
Control of raw material imports gave MITI the power to
cajole firms to move in desired directions. Control of
technology imports allowed MITI to select the industries
and processes it wanted to see develop. Control of manu-
factured imports, combined with selective exemption from
import duties from foreign machinery and indirect tax
systems geared to favor domestic purchases of certain
products, meant that MITI could create hot-house condi-
tions for the expansion of pre-determined sectors.
Finally, control of inward investment, preserved the
Japanese nature of these sectors by sheltering the under-
capitalised Japanese firm from the danger of foreign take-
over bids.
While many Japanese ministries have been involved in
working towards those ends, it is "...MITI that has been most
closely identified with Japan's post-war 'economic miracle',"
and many Americans take a less than sanguine view of its
1QQ
policies. They remember all too well how MITI, in the
past, was able to enforce mergers within Japanese industry (in
the interest of what it called economic rationality) , and
exert firm control over prices and domestic competition, while
carfully diverting imported technology to the companies that





Japanese industries were sharpened for penetration into
targeted overseas markets. 20 The ruthlessly efficient manner
in which US industries seem to have been targeted by the
Japanese, and then driven into the ground by fierce competi-
tion from Japanese firms, has scared a lot Americans, and it
shows. There is "...voluminous literature [which] recounts how
MITI pursued critical technologies, restricted imports, and
propelled Japanese industry into the technologies it regarded
as critical: steel and autos in the 1960s, consumer electron-
ics and computers in the 1970s, an entire range of advanced
technologies in the 1980s." 201
Many analysts point out, however, that "while in the 1950s
and the 1960s the importance of... [MITI] in shaping the
country's industrial structure was considerable, in the 1970s
909
and early 1980s its role seemed to have declined." But,
while there may be some debate as to the amount of influence
that MITI actually exerts upon the Japanese economy today,
Americans are essentially correct in their assessment that
"MITI is the most important institution in Japan's industrial





to play a major role in Japan's strategic thinking. 203 Prest-
owitz, points out that "in Japan's view, economic power and
security go hand in hand. Industrial policies, which include
those of ministries other than MITI , are also national
security policies, and because Japan tends to define security
in terms of remaining apart from the world, such policies are
an expression of its age-old drive to guarantee to the maximum
extent possible its autarkic position among the world's
nations." 204
When Japan's industrial policy is examined by Americans
however, it is often overlooked that this policy engenders
much more than simply promoting industrial comptetition
abroad. Prestowitz says that "many American experts argue
that, at best, the effect of Japanese industrial policy has
been minimal , " and that "...given its high savings rate, well-
educated labor force, and relatively large population, [the
experts] say, Japan would have achieved the same results with
or without an industrial strategy or policy aimed at promoting
90Skey industries." He argues vigorously that this entirely
misses the point, and supports that contention by stating:
That this view is very wide of the mark is evident from
the fact that no Japanese hold it. The misperception is




based on the assumption that everything begins with
macroeconomic policy and that high savings and investment
rates and educational levels arise from cultural bases.
Industrial policy is seen as at best a bauble added to
these basic conditions. But in fact, in Japan, indus-
trial policy is the starting point. As the economist
Hiroya Ueno has noted, the Japanese government has always
intervened "to attain a specific economic order or econ-
omic structure viewed favorable to the national or public
interest."* 06
It is a persuasive argument, and one which explains very
directly the real impact of Japan's industrial policy, for
that policy not only sought to promote competitiveness through
the restructuring of a protected Japanese industry, it also
attempted to shape and mold Japanese society itself, so that
Japan's greatest resource--its people—could be harnessed in
that effort. As James Fallows observes, "in the long run, a
society's strength depends on the way ordinary people volun-
tarily behave," and "successful societies—those which
progress economically and politically and can control the
terms on which they deal with the outside world—succeed
because they have found ways to match individual self-interest
2(17to the collective good. "' Fallows further states that
"government policies make a difference in how any society
develops--in the short run, the greatest difference," and that
"...laws and government policies can heavily affect how people
206Ibid., 125-126.
on?
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'choose' to behave.' Nobuaki Takahashi supports that view,
and points out that "in fact, many policies were developed for
the purpose of nurturing and promoting the industries in
Japan," and that among them:
These included the monetary policy, which strove to
provide a stable supply of funds to the industries by
encouraging the people to save; educational administration
with an emphasis on the production of homogenous and high-
quality technical workers through the creation of new
universities and colleges and new college disciplines
centered around engineering, expanding the capacity of the
universities and colleges and the creation of new tech-
nical colleges; the public project policy, which gave
preference to the building and improvement of highways
useful for industries and of ports and harbors; farm
policy to soften the discontent of the declining farming
population in the process of shifting industrial structure
in favor of secondary and tertiary industries and, as a
result, promoting the movement of worker population to the
manufacturing sector; and the Ministry of Finance's
national budget making that was intended to attain the
allocation of revenues and strengthen the taxation system
aiming at the smooth overall progress of this policy. 9
Prestowitz's point that the Japanese government's poli-
cies for enhancing industrial competitiveness are grounded in
influencing the way the Japanese people themselves approach
education, labor-productivity, and quality-control is a valid
one. Michael Porter has pointed out, for example, that;
The process for creating capital was not the only impressive
Japanese factor creation mechanism. More significant was the
rapid and continual upgrading of human resources, which
supported a growing sophistication of competitive positions.
A first-rate primary and secondary educational system in




and science. Primary and secondary education is highly com
petitive, and family involvement, especially the mother's,
in education is the highest of any nation I studied. .. .While
Americans often claim (with some justification) that a lack
of creativity results from Japan's rigid system, Japanese
education provides most students all over Japan with a sound
foundation for later education and training. A Japanese high
school graduate knows as much math as most American college
graduates
.
The results speak for themselves, for the Japanese have become
an industrial and financial powerhouse through this shaping of
their society.
210Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations , 396-397
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C. THE STRUCTURE OF THE KEIRETSU AND THEIR KAISHA: THE
MECHANICS OF JAPANESE COMPETITION
There are many business analysts in the United States who
believe that the " . .
.
keiretsu [enterprise groups] are critical
to [Japan's] special brand of capitalism, the reason Japan
Oil
keeps dominating world markets." 61 Chalmers Johnson goes so
far as to say that "the keiretsu are Japan's most important
contribution to modern capitalism [a creation that distin-
guishes capitalism in the West from capitalism in Japan]." 212
These keiretsu are huge business combines, with close inter-
locking links between finance and industry, financial links
which would be highly illegal in the United States under its
existing anti-trust laws. These "...cross-sharing holdings,
interlocking directorates, joint ventures, and long-term
business relationships—all underpinned by common educational
and historical links—create a family of companies that do not




,,aiJ These keiretsu are the natural successors of
the pre-war zaibatsu (financial cliques) , those huge industri-
al/ financial concerns like Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and
Yasuda, which dominated the Japanese economy up until 1945.
211Rapoport, 76.
2124i,sChalmers Johnson quoted in William J. Holstein, "Mighty Mitsubishi
Is On The Move," Business Week 3179, (September 24, 1990): 100.
213Holstein, "Mighty Mitsubishi Is On The Move," 100.
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These zaibatsu were family-owned networks of industrial,
financial, and commerical firms, with a "...holding company
(limited or unlimited partnership) acting as a central focus
for the group. * The groups were held together primarily
through a system of internal financing by the groups' own
banks, and the "close connection between the concern's various
enterprises was maintained by such means as interlocking
01 c
directorships and mutual shareholding." 61 '
Attempts were made by American Occupation authorities to
breakup the zaibatsu after the Second World War, for it was
felt that they had "assisted the development of aggressive
militarism in Japan." Through such devices as the Anti-
Monopoly Law of April 1947, which "...prohibited holding
companies, private monopoly, cartel agreements, unfair
dealings and competition, shareholding above certain desig-
nated levels, as well as containing other related provi-
sions," and the December 1947 Deconcentration Law (Law for the
Exclusion of Excessive Concentrations of Economic Power)
,
which "...was aimed at disbanding existing organizations
considered dangerously monopolistic," Occupation authorities
managed to break the power of the zaibatsu families them-
?14 ...
Janet Hunter, Concise Dictionary of Modern Japanese History




selves, but they were unable to completely destroy the
zaibatsu system of interconnected companies. 21 ' Janet Hunter
points out that "the failure to touch banks, subsequent legal
reform, and government policy since the Occupation mean that
many of the connections between companies dissolved at the
time have been revived," and now the keiretsu have appeared in
place of the zaibatsu , albeit in less dominant form. 8 In
fact, "three of the big six horizontal keiretsu were formed in
the 1950s..." out of pieces of the zaibatsu, and "the other
21Qthree have formed around major banks." 617
Currently, Sumitomo, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Fuyo, Sanwa, and
Dai Ichi Kangyo are the six dominant keiretsu in Japan (with
Hitachi, Toyota, and Matsushita rapidly progressing to the top
ranks). They are business groups which "...sprawl horizontal-
ly, like Mitsubishi with nearly 190 member companies and
annual sales of over $300 billion, and vertically, like Toyota
with 175 primary suppliers and 4,000 secondary ones. In
addition, distribution alliances exist between leading
manufacturers, like Matsushita, and thousands of retailers
22(1






compete in every major sector of the Japanese economy—
a
fairly typical example would be "...the structure of the
Sumitomo group, which has major companies in such fields as
banking, insurance, trading, steel, electronics, glass, oil,
forestry, and metals; and overall sales of over $200 bil-
lion." 221 Many American businessmen fearfully maintain that
the keiretsu system "...pulls together government, industry,
capital, and the best information on high-technology worldwide
999
to create a machine that grinds competitors into powder." 646
Typical are remarks like those made by Jim Martin, head of
Rockwell International's Asia Technology Liaison Office in
Tokyo, who says: "I don't know which system is better—Japan's
or ours. But I know which one is winning." 223
The power of the keiretsu is enormous, for "although
keiretsu companies constitute less than 0.1% of all compan-ies
in Japan, they account for 78% of the value of all shares on
the Tokyo Stock Market;" but, it's not simply their immense
market value which is important, because, "since World War II,
the six biggest corporate families, comprising companies in





one-quarter of Japan's rapidly growing GNP." 4" The interre-
lationships within the groups are far beyond anything that
could be found in the United States, because anti-trust
legislation would quickly break up anything close to what can
be seen monthly in the boardrooms of these Japanese keiretsu .
For instance, "when the Sankin-kai , or president's council of
the DKB group, gets together for its monthly lunch, the
presidents of the world's largest bank (Dai-Ichi Kangyo) , the
world's largest textile company (Asahi Chemical), and the
world's second-largest computer company (Fujitsu) are at the
table, along with the heads of Kawasaki Steel, Isuzu Motors,
cosmetics maker Shiseido, and a couple dozen other important
companies." 225 The American equivalent would be like having
IBM, American Express, General Electric, and Citicorp all
belonging to a finacial group which works to protect and
expand the influence of each of its companies. The Federal
Trade Commission would call it simple collusion and bust it up
before their presidents ever had a chance to sit down at the
table, much less eat any lunch.
Norman J. Glickman and Douglas P. Woodward point out that
one of the reasons the keiretsu are so successful in the




listic behavior to the US with minimal interference. Because
"...collusion and other forms of anticompetitive practice are
difficult to detect across borders [in Japan]," it is almost
impossible for the Justice Department and the Federal Trade
Commission to break up monopolistic competition from the
Japanese. 226 Consequently, "through the keiretsu, the Japa-
nese transfer strong industry ties to the United States and
build a separate economic structure of assemblers and suppli-
ers, avoiding ties with local industry. Evidence of this
process is already present in the Japanese-American auto
industry ...[and] the strong, but often hidden vertical
linkages among Japanese companies can inhibit and destroy U.S.
competitors. " 227
Japanese keiretsu ties in the United States "...account
for more than half the Japanese-owned manufacturing facilities
000
in California. n "° The problem this poses for the American
economy is that Japanese "...manufacturers will almost always
support their own suppliers at home or abroad before buying
OpQ
from the Americans."" This has been confirmed by a "Univer-
00£
"°Norman J. Glickman and Douglas P. Woodward, The New Competitors:






sity of Michigan study of a Honda plant in Ohio, [where] only
16% of its parts requirements were met by U.S. suppliers; the
rest came either from Japan or from transplanted Japanese
suppliers."" This extensive group support among the various
kaisha (the generic term used for a Japanese business corpora-
tion) within the keiretsu goes way beyond just the automotive
industry. All the keiretsu try to provide ready-made markets
for their individual firms. As a high-ranking executive of NEC
admitted: "We can always count on a customer base among the
other Sumitomo Group companies. It does not mean we get 100
percent of the business, but we know we'll get most of it. It
lends stability to our planning and reduces risk."" 1
While Japan does have a Fair Trade Commission, it does
little to inhibit this type of collusive corporate behavior.
As Makoto Kurita, a director of the commission, baldly stated:
"Continuous or strong relationships between companies do not
necessarily result in monopolistic behavior or reduce competi-
tion. This remark is true in only one sense, because
210
Ibid., 80. Rapoport reports that a Japanese auto executive
confirmed this by admitting that "first choice is a keiretsu company,
second is a Japanese supplier, third is a local company."
Oil6J1Prestowitz, 160. The Japanese would rather purchase an inferior
product produced by one of their fellow keiretsu companies than break
ranks and buy a superior American product. To the Japanese, this sense of
mutual obligation and duty to one another seems only reasonable, because




while there is certainly monopolistic behavior amongst the
kaisha within a particular grouping, the keiretsu themselves
tend to compete fiercely with one another in the Japanese
domestic market, as well as overseas. In fact, one of the
primary reasons Japanese companies are able to compete so
vigorously in the American market is because they are the
hardy survivors of their own domestic market, which is
probably the toughest and most hotly-contested in the
world. 234 Nevertheless, this "...relaxed [Japanese] approach
to antitrust makes targeting possible," and "to many Ameri-
cans, combined efforts by government and groups of Japanese
companies to tackle specific industries or tech-nologies is
like industrial smart bombing—aimed at them." 235
Ill6JJThere have been about a dozen Japanese automobile plants built in
North America
—
plants which will give the Japanese an annual capacity of
over 2 million automobiles. There are also some 300 Japanese component
makers which have also set up facilities in the US. One important result
of this shift away from exports to local production is that the Japanese
are now far better positioned to compete in global markets than the
Americans, who have been essentially shut out of Japan.
234See in Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New
York: Free Press, 1990), p. 401, where Porter says that "demand conditions
prove to be one of the most important of the determinants of national
competitive advantage in Japanese industry. In a remarkable number of the
industries in which Japan achieved strong positions, the nature of
domestic demand characteristics provided a unique stimulus to Japanese
companies. The domestic market, not foreign markets, led industry develop-




James Abegglen has described the general pattern used by
the kaisha for their competitive thrust into world markets.
The pattern calls for:
...rapid growth of the Japanese market; fierce competition
in Japan for marketshare; steadily improving cost and
quality position of the leading Japanese companies; then
an export drive by the domestic winners from "Fortress
Japan's" maturing industry, their base position protected
from the lack of foreign competition in the Japanese
market." 6
Naohiro Yashiro, a former OECD official, supports this
view and points out that "Japanese manufacturers engage in
aggressive price competition in open foreign markets but take
advantage of a sheltered distribution sector to avoid price
competition at home." This offers Japanese firms in the
United States a tremendous advantage, for the Japanese
"...domestic market is a relatively stable arena that allows
the Japanese corporation to concentrate on competition abroad.
In the battle for foreign market shares, Japanese managers are
aided by 'economies of scale' achieved through reliance on a
solid share of the home market and relatively high domestic
earnings that often subsidize the exports." 238
This protection at home from foreign firms comes largely
from the Japanese institution of the kiqyo keiretsu, or





enterprise groups. These are an extensive network of relation-
ships which tie both suppliers and distributors in with a
particular manufacturer. In fact, "...almost two-thirds of all
small manufacturers are financially dependent on one of the
large firms...." 2 This pervasive network is perhaps the
single most important structural obstacle faced by American
firms when they attempt to enter the Japanese domestic market,
for the Japanese place great emphasis on the importance of
personal relationships in business, and, consequently, there
is a strong sense of inherent loyalty built into the entire
commercial system. ° Suppliers and distributors become
"captive partners" with a particular manufacturing company,
and it is considered extremely disloyal for those suppliers or
distributors to deal with that manufacturer's competitors.
The keiretsu system brings many other advantages to
Japanese companies as well. The highly-integrated structure
and tremendous assets of the keiretsu allow it to protect and
239Ibid., 171.
240See in Thurow, The Zero Sum Solution , p. 361, where he asks the
problematic question: "How does an American firm break in as a new sup-
plier of industrial components when Japanese firms place a premium on
maintaining long-term intimate supply relationships in the just-in-time
inventory system?"
241Karel van Wolferen comments on page 393 of his book that
"wholesalers and retailers are not independent competitive units. A
majority of shops retail-ing durable goods are, in fact, comparable to the
regular subcontractors of Japanese manufacturers. They are provided by the
manufacturers with capital, and if necessary, technical know-how."
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support declining industries within its grouping, while at the
same time providing massive financial backing for those
companies in expanding sectors of the economy. This offers
Japanese firms, which compete against American companies,
significant advantages; for example, whereas American firms
will raise the majority of their funds by issuing and selling
shares, the Japanese kaisha rely heavily upon bank financing.
This translates into dramatically different perspectives on
how to conduct business: the American firm must constantly
concern itself with short-term economic performance lest its
quarterly P&L adversely affect its stock price. The Japanese
kaisha by contrast, can take a long-term approach in its
competition with that same American firm because once the
banks are satisfied with the kaisha ' s long-term plans, the
Japanese firm becomes relatively free from any short-term
pressures to generate immediate profits and, therefore, it can
concentrate on improving its all-important market share.
With respect to the losses a Japanese firm can sustain in
its battle for this increased market-share abroad, Japanese
exporters are ultimately limited only by the relative strength
of the other firms in their keiretsu and their major banks.
This is an important element in Japan's indus-trial policy,
for implicit ex ante guarantees against bankruptcy are
"...particularly important in Japan, in view of the tradition-
al heavy reliance of many corporations on borrowed funds.
118
Knowledge that a sector has priority status, as shown in the
availability of JDB [Japanese Development Bank] loans and as
known via administrative guidance from the Ministry of Finance
or the Bank of Japan, means that lending to firms in that
10
sector becomes virtually risk free. " In fact, if the firm
is in one of the industries which the government considers
"essential," the firm and its main lending banks can rely on
the ultimate guarantee of Japan's central monetary authori-
ties. 2"
Because of this intimate relationship with their bankers,
Japanese firms possess a substantial advantage over their
American rivals in managing corporate debt. Japanese kaisha
typically carry around 70 percent debt in relation to their
total capitalization; the average for American companies is
substantially lower, with most companies carrying about 30
percent debt. 244 Using the Nippon Electric Company (NEC) as
an example, it rapidly becomes clear why the Japanese system
of capitalization offers Japanese firms a distinct advantage
over similar American companies.
In 1986, for instance, NEC had a debt ratio of 70 percent.






capital and enabled NEC to leverage its investment rates to
potentially three times its rate of earnings growth. NEC's
cost of capital was essentially lowered because interest
payments on that debt were less than the total returns
expected by shareholders on equity because of the higher risk
assumed by them. That, combined with the fact that interest
payments were deductible from taxes as a business expense
while payments to shareholders were not, made NEC's high debt
an asset instead of a liability. Following through with this
analysis then, NEC had the ability to leverage its debt so
that it was able to borrow twice as much as its new earnings.
This meant that NEC had the capability of investing three
times its retained earnings into capital growth. An American
company would be hard pressed to even come close to this level
of capitalization. NEC's sustainable growth rate (the theoret-
ical rate of annual growth a firm can sustain over a period of
time, given specified levels of earnings, debt, taxes, and
dividend payments) is therefore about 24 percent, as opposed
to an American firm like DuPont (which has a much lower debt
ratio, but cannot capitalize as quickly as a Japanese firm)
245
which is happy to obtain 15 percent.
Simply put, American firms cannot afford to carry the same
amount of debt as the Japanese, and the primary reason is
245Ibid., 168-169
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risk. Large debt for American companies usually translates
into Chapter 11 bankruptcy if there is a significant reduction
in sales during a prolonged economic slow-down. Japanese
kaisha, however, actually suffer much less risk on even
greater debt because of the risk-reducing structure of
Japanese industry. Probably the most important aspect of this
is that Japanese lenders are usually large main banks and
industrial conglomerates which are shareholders in the
corporations to which they loan money; consequently, these
loans will not be called regardless of how poorly a firm
performs over the short-run. The Japanese view investments
much differently than Americans; because, for the Japanese,
"...investments are not primarily for the purpose of making
money but are to ensure the groups' position and survival in
strategic industries in the future." 246
246Prestowitz, 167-169.
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IV. AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY AS A THREAT
TO US NATIONAL SECURITY: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE TRUTH
To many on both sides of the Pacific, the economic rise of
Japan appears to have led to a fundamental shift in the
balance of world economic power. The Japanese today seem to be
the financial giants of the modern age, and they now challenge
the United States in almost all areas of industrial production
and technology. To begin to understand the magnitude of
Japan's growing presence in the international marketplace, it
might be helpful to examine some of the statistics. A Club of
Rome report, for example, pointed out that "from 1985 to 1987,
Japan's total national assets rose from $19.6 trillion to
$43.7 trillion. During the same three-year period, the total
national assets of the United States climbed from $30.6
trillion to [only] $36.2 trillion." 247 The difference between
the two rates of increase during those years is startling, and
that seems to be only the beginning, for the "OECD estimates
that the Japanese [overall trade] surplus will be... $37 bil-
lion in 1991, and $36 billion in 1992...," with "the interna-
tional assets of Japan. .. reach [ing] $1 trillion in the mid-
1990s." 248
7il
Alexander King and Bertrand Scheider, The First Global Revolution
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1991), 79.
248Ibid., 79.
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Looking at the financial imbalance which is developing
between the United States and Japan shows an equally disheart-
ening shift in Japan's favor, and it can be brought into
perspective through Japanese economist Yoichi Shinkai's rough
comparison of American and Japanese external assets and lia-
bilities. Shinkai says that:
The net balance of Japanese securities investments in the
United States is in the vicinity of $200 billion and the
outstanding direct investment to build U.S. plants and
acquire American property at a little less than $100
billion. Then there are the outstanding Japanese loans,
which amount to tens of billions of dollars. American funds
in Japan, meanwhile, are much smaller, especially for direct
investments and loans. When the two are subtracted, Japan
has a net asset position amounting to well over $200
billion. This is, moreever, a conservative estimate.
Shinkai further states that when Mitsui and Taiyo Kobe
banks merged in 1989, many Americans were surprised to find
out that "...in terms of deposits, the new bank would be the
world's second largest and that Japanese banks [now] dominated
the world's top-10 rankings. Quietly, Japan's banks, securi-
ties houses, and insurance companies had become global
behemoths." 250 Today, "Japanese banks control nearly 10
249Shinkai, 23.
Ibid., 22. One of the primary reasons why Japanese banks suddenly
have come to dominate the world banking system, is that, unlike American
banks, the Japanese are able to not only invest in publicly traded
companies but also are allowed to count paper profits as capital. One
important result of this critical difference between the two nations'
banking regulations, was that during the 1980s, the soaring Japanese stock
market created billions of dollars in capital for Japanese banks— a flood
of capital, which in turn, greatly boosted their lending capacity, and
assisted them in their penetration of the American market.
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percent of U.S. retail banking assets—up from next to nothing
a decade ago," and in the state of California, the Japanese
presence is even larger, for "...five of the top ten banks are
now Japanese." A closer look at some other statistics show
that the Japanese are not only making significant inroads into
American banking, they are also beginning to supplant the US
in many international finance markets as well. For example:
In early 1984 U.S. banks were lending and borrowing more
than those of any other country, with a 27% share of the
global total. Japan was in second place with a 23%
share.... But Japan's share was rising fast, and the U.S.
share was declining. Before the year was out the two coun-
tries had traded places, and Japan went on to command more
than a 35% share at the start of 1988, while the United
States dropped to about 15%. 52
And, it isn't only in banking that the Japanese are begin-
ning to pull ahead of the Americans either, because Japanese
firms have become powerhouses in the securities market as
well. Over the last decade, the Japanese have moved aggres-
sively into securities, and, "the 'Big Four' Japanese securi-
ties companies—Nomura, Daiwa, Nikko, and Yamaichi—are four
of the largest securities firms in the world today," and, in
fact, "in terms of market capitalization, Nomura is currently
more than twenty times the size of Merrill Lynch, the largest
251Burstein, 38. See too in Choate, Agents of Influence
,
page xv,
where Choate says that the Japanese "...control more than $329 billion of
U.S. banking assets (a 14 percent share of the U.S. market).
252Ibid., 22-23.
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American brokerage house. J These are certainly dismaying
developments for Americans used to being number one, and the
extent of the Japanese economic presence in other areas of
traditional American dominance is equally discouraging. A
quick glance at recent figures, show that:
1. In 1987, the "...total value of all stocks listed on the
Tokyo Stock Exchange surpassed the total of all stocks
listed on the New York Stock Exchange...," and the
Japanese lead is continuing to widen; 254
2. If the Fortune 500 began ranked American subsidiaries of
Japanese-owned companies like Nissan, Sony, and Honda,
"
. . .they would already account for thirty of the biggest
U.S. industrial corporations."; 2"
3. "A single Japanese company—Nippon Telegraph & Telephone
(NTT) — is worth more than IBM, AT&T, General Motors,
General Electric, and Exxon combined. "
;
2
4. Already more than a quarter-million Americans are
employed by Japanese owned companies in the United
States, and that number is expected to "...rise to a
million in the 1990s."; 257
5. Japanese investors now finance "...as much as 30 percent
R ft
of the American government's budget deficit," repre-
6 Burstein, 37-38. Burstem also says that Nomura's pretax profits








senting «unet purchase of almost $200 billion from 1984
to 1989; 259
6. "One in fifteen new funding dollars for young [American]
high-tech companies now comes from Japanese sources, who
see involvement with these innovative entrepreneurs as
a 'window' on the latest American advances."; 26 ''
e Japanese "own $285 billion of America's direct and
rtfolio assets. "; 261
7. Th
po
8. "Between 1980 and 1988, Japanese direct investment in
the United States increased by more than 1,000 per
cent."; 262 and
9. The Japanese "produce nearly 20 percent of the semicon-
ductors sold in the United States; more than 30 percent
of the automobiles; almost half the machine tools; and
a majority of the consumer electronics, among dozens of
other goods and services." 2
In addition to these developments, Japan is now the
largest creditor and the largest net investor in the world,
and its GNP per capita already has overtaken that of the
United States. This should be no surprise when one realiz-
es that during the last decade alone, "...the U.S. imported
some $920 billion more in merchadise than it exported," and
Takahiko Ueda, "Japanese money stays at home," The Japan Times
Weekly International Edition , (18 March 1991): 1.
260Burstein, 40.





much of that was Japanese-made. 265 The Japanese have flooded
American markets with manufactured exports, and "...the
American deficit with Japan actually grew as a percentage of
the overall U.S. trade gap and by late 1989 accounted for
nearly half the total." 266
The increasingly gloomy viewpoint held by many Americans
that Japan is starting to overtake the United States in almost
all areas of the economic activity has been reinforced by
polls similar to that conducted by Business Week in September
of 1990. It sampled executive attitudes simultaneously across
three continents, asking American, European, and Japanese
business leaders to comment on "...the popularly held view
that Japan is destined to become the world's leading economic
superpower by the end of the century." Their responses have to
be discouraging for American leaders:
Only 18% of Americans and 23% of Japanese polled said they
believed Japan will reach that position, although more than
half of Japan's leaders think they will increase their share
of world market at the expense of their industrial rivals.
But 30% of European expect Japan to reign as the No. 1
economic power by the. end of the century, and a startling
50% believe Japan has already won the global economic race
[italics mine] . '
Business Week continues with the dismal prognosis that "...one
265Stewart 14.
266Holstein, 244.
^'Keisuke Mizumoto, "How Global Executives See Japan's Power,"
Business Week , 3 September 1990, 48.
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clear agreement emerges from the poll: The outlook for the
U.S. role in the global economy is grim. Asked about the U.S.
share of the world market in 10 years, 73% of Japanese
respondents, 54% of Europeans, and 47% of Americans said it
would decrease." 268
All of these negative indicators lead "...American indus-
trialists to say things about an ally that they should not be
saying about an enemy. 07 David Smick, publisher of The
International Economy magazine, observes that as a result of
Japan's growing economic power, "there's been a sea change in
American politics. . . .In Congress you have to be a Japan-basher
or you're considered either a naive idiot or a tool of the
270Japan lobby. There's no rational middle anymore. w
A. AMERICA'S "JAPAN-BASHERS " : WARNINGS ABOUT THE JAPANESE
There are significant problems in the US-Japan relation-
ship, because "for all our dealings of the past four decades
—
one war, a surprisingly successful occupation, innumerable
government conferences, summit meetings, books, seminars,
guided tours, student exchanges, and a [multi-billion dollar]
yearly trade relationship— the perspective of Americans on
268Ibid., 48.
269Thurow, The Zero Sum Solution, 360.
270Kondracke, 12
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?71Japan has been extraordinarily bad," and the reason is
directly related to the economic competition between the two
nations. As the economic battle is now joined, it appears to
many Americans that Japan holds a distinct advantage over the
United States--an advantage that many of them feel is dis-
tinctly "unfair." Clyde Prestowitz makes this point very
vividly, when he declares that:
Few, if any, American companies can compete with the
Japanese in the areas the latter deem important. The social
and industrial structure of Japan have made it an extremely
difficult market to penetrate; furthermore, the Japanese
government views industrial performance as akin to national
security and pours enormous energy into ensuring that its
industry is the world leader. By comparison, the United
States has been relatively easy to penetrate. Its open
society makes for an open market that has welcomed foreign
goods and foreign businessmen. Most important , however, the
United States does not view industry as a matter of national
security as Japan does [italics mine].
His views are increasingly shared by many informed Americans,
who have begun to charge, among other things, that "the unem-
ployment that would normally flow from a stagnant Japanese
economy is essentially being exported to the United States,"
a situation which "...was acceptable when Japan had a small
weak economy and America a strong one, but that it is not
permissible given a large Japanese economy and a less strong
American one." 23
'^Gibney, Japan: The Fragile Superpower , 5
272Prestowitz, 13.
273Thurow, The Zero Sum Solution, 360.
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A more serious contention is that during the last couple
of decades, the United States has allowed Japan to take advan-
tage of certain unique American vulnerabilities--the most
important one of which was the ability of political lobbies to
influence American decision-making. In his controversial best-
seller, Agents of Influence , Pat Choate says that the
Japanese have managed to use their purchased "political clout"
to obscure the methods by which Japanese industry has pene-
trated the American marketplace. According to Alan Webber,
managing editor of the Harvard Business Review ;
The world has changed and Japan is different. On both sides
of the Pacific, the old, entrenched interests are hard at
work denying these conclusions, pretending that business as
usual will do, and silencing the observers and analysts who
call attention to the new situation. Japan's motives are not
hard to fathom; after all, every day the country gains in
wealth, economic power, and global momentum. The longer
Japan successfully confounds U.S. leaders into thinking that
the old rules still apply, the longer the transfer of wealth
and power can continue unimpeded. It is not Japan's job to
inform us of our blind stupidity.
on j
See in Mary Lord, "Does Japan have too much clout?," U.S. News &
World Report , September 17, 1990, p. 44, where Lord says that "the
controversy appears to have contributed to Choate* s removal from his post
as TRW's vice president for policy analysis, though he still remains with
the company as a consultant. TRW denies removing the vocal trade critic
from his job, but friends assert the Cleveland-based technology company
sought Choate' s resignation rather than jeopardize some $400 million in
business with Japan." See too in an interesting sidelight that "ironical-
ly, Choate 's message promises to play better in Tokyo than in Washington.
Well before the first galley proofs for Agents of Influence had rolled off
the presses here, the Japanese translation rights sold for close to
$300,000— a record for any foreign book."
275Choate, Agents of Influence , 147.
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In part, this "blind stupidity" which Choate and others
declare has prevented the United States from taking any effec-
tive action to reduce American economic vulnerabilities is a
function of the American political system itself. Given
the democratic nature of this system, every couple of years a
new set of officials are either elected or appointed and they
must learn afresh that the Japanese economy does not operate
in the same manner as their own; therefore, there tends to be
a doctrinal adherence to the concept of "free trade," an
institutional bias which often results in stopgap trade
policies which do little more than end up imposing handicaps
on American trade and industry while enriching the Japa-
6 uSee in John B. Judis, "The Japanese Megaphone," p. 25, where Judis
tries to put it as simply as possible: "the United States must hold
discussions among its own citizens before it can hold discussions with
Japan. There have to be two separate debates or discussions. Americans
first have to decide among themselves what is in their national interest.
But the effect of Japan's influence campaign is to make the first debate
impossible. When two prominent Americans rise to discuss U.S. -Japan trade
relations, there's a good chance one or both is in the pay of the
Japanese." See also in Morton Kondracke, "Trade Gales," The New Republic
202, (april 2, 1990), p. 13, where Kondracke, taking a slightly different
view of the problem, writes that "in hearings before Congress, officials
of the Commerce Department and the U.S. Special Trade Representative's
office sound nearly as hard-line on the Japanese as the legislators they
are addressing. Meanwhile, officials at the State Department, National
Security Council, Office of Management and Budget, and the Council of
Economic Advisors are eager to avoid a rift, lest it upset the close
cooperation the United States has with Japan on defense, economic
assistance to Eastern Europe and the Third World, and global stability
—
not to mention job-providing Japanese investment in the United States and
purchase of U.S. Treasury bonds to finance the budget deficit."
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nese. This constant turn-over in officials has resulted in
a paucity of institutional memory in the very government
agencies designed to oversee American economic interests as
070
they relate to Japan.
To make matters worse, critics like Choate say, many of
the top American officials who do come to understand the
nature of the Japanese challenge are often co-opted by the
Japanese themselves, for the money spent by the Japanese lobby
creates what they call "structural corruption," which is "...a
kind of systemic bias that does not require conscious acts of
corruption but yield much the same results. Government offi-
?77
Endymion Wilkinson, in his book Japan Versus The West: Image And
Reality , cites on pages 186-187 a 1987 OECD study of the costs of
restricting imports in the automobile industry: "(t)he OECD reached the
following conclusions:
* The immediate losses to the US and European consumers were enormous ($5
billion a year in the USA)
.
* The short-term benefits to domestic industry and employment were modest
at best.
* The long-term effects were negative and included: distortion of
investment patterns; delayed reaction of the domestic companies; and
increased import penetration by non-Japanese firms, for example from Korea
and Yugoslavia (as had happened in so many other sectors)
.
* A major plus was the increase of Japanese investment and diffusion of
its manufacturing techniques through a wave of joint ventures and other
alliances.
* The winners were the firms, especially Japanese exporting firms,
because they were able to take higher profits as they raised their prices






cials in the U.S. Trade Representative's office are constantly
tempted to allow their negotiating stance to be colored by
lucrative future employment possibilities as Japan lobby-
ists."^79 As soon as they leave office, many of these former
officials are quickly seduced by the Japanese into using the
expertise and influence they gained through their official
positions in the US government to lobby for Japanese inter-
ests. There are literally hundreds of Washington's power elite
now working to advance Japan's political and economic inter-
980
ests in America. ou
279John B. Judis, "The Japanese Megaphone," The New Republic 202,
(January 22, 1990): 20. The author cites an example of this type of
behavior: "Two years ago Robert E. Watkins, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Commerce for automotive affairs and consumer goods, resigned after the
Associated Press reported that he had sent about 500 letters and resumes
to companies including Mazda, Toyota, and Nissan, describing himself as
'uniquely qualified to establish and lead an automotive association
committed to market principles.'"
6 Choate, 15. Choate also cites a 1986 General Accounting Office
(GAO) survey on page 19 which revealed that seventy-six former federal
officials had become registered foreign agents. Among them were eight
special assistants to the President, five assistants to the President, two
deputy assistants to the President, one presidential counselor, one deputy
White House press secretary, one chief of staff to the Vice President, a
chairman and a vice chairman of the U.S. International Trade Commission,
two Deputy U.S. Trade Representatives, six senators, nine representatives,
twelve senior Senate staff, five senior House staff, and four retired
generals. Of these ex-officials, almost one-third of them went to work for
Japan. See too in John B. Judis, "The Japanese Megaphone," p. 23, where
Judis states that "this army of lobbyists and advisors furnishes Japanese
companies with the troops necessary to win battles in Washington. The
Japanese usually know what the Administration plans to do before most
Adminis-tration members do. Through their lobby and their funding of think
tanks, the Japanese have also acquired a virtual monopoly of economic
expertise. When House or Senate members want to learn about a complex
trade issue, they will almost inevitably fall back on someone who is an
advisor to, a lobbyist for, or a recipient of funding from the Japanese."
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To the Japan-bashers this means that Japan has a strategic
economic advantage over the United States because this Japan-
ese lobby works hard to influence American perceptions about
the Japanese economic threat, while at the same time Americans
find little opportunity to exert the same sort of political
influence in Japan. 81 In outlining this threat, Choate lists
these six critical goals of the Japanese lobby:
1. to keep the American market open for Japanese exports;
2. to smooth the way for additional Japanese purchases of
key American assets;
3. to prevent discovery or criticism of Japan's adversarial
trade practices;
4. to neutralize the political opposition of Japan's
American competitors;
5. to influence America's trade policies toward Japan, as
01
Choate maintains on page xvni that the cost of this lobby to the
Japanese is more than $400 million a year— an amount roughly equivalent to
the combined total expenditures of the 1988 House and Senate congressional
campaigns. See too in Donald C. Hellmann, "The Imperatives For Reciprocity
and Symmetry...," p. 256, where Hellmann writes: "It is inconceivable that
a similar influence could be exerted on the making of Japanese economic
foreign policy. Influence in Japan flows through well-established
channels, defined not by legal rules but by a web of personal and informal
ties that blur distinctions between the public and the private sectors.
This largely closed, elitist process offers limited access for domestic
interest groups and far less for foreign lobbies. The dynamics of the
Japanese political system proscribe the development of an American lobby,
ensure more effective institutional management by Japan no matter what
reforms the United States may institute, and will surely be a source of
frustration to American political leaders in future economic conflicts."
See also in John B. Judis, "The Japanese Megaphone," where he says that
"in Japan no self-respecting lawyer, let alone former government official,
is willing to lobby for an American company. 'They would be seen as paid
men, ' one Japanese official remarked. But what is culturally and morally
forbidden in Japan is accepted procedure in contemporary Washington. 'In
Washington,' Chalmers Johnson says, 'the fix is always in.'"
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5. to influence America's trade policies toward Japan, as
well as its policies toward Europe and other nations
where Japan has significant economic interests; and
6. to force the integration of the U.S. and Japanese
economies to the point where America will be politically
and economically unable to confront Japan's mercantile
policies.m
Japan-bashers say that the public relations battle waged
by Japan is not confined to just paid lobbyists pushing the
above agenda, however, because the most influential advocacy
of the Japanese point of view generally comes from the so-
001
called Chrysanthemum Club. 0J Through newspaper interviews,
articles in professional journals, and speeches to influential
organizations, these Americans push the Japanese propaganda
line that Japan is not an economic threat to the US economy.
Commenting on the Chrysanthemum Club, Kevin L. Kearns, an
American diplomat who has served in Tokyo, reported in the
Foreign Service Journal in December 1989 that members of this
club, for whatever reasons:
Somehow fail to see the trail from predatory Japanese
policies, to lost markets, to destroyed industries, to large
282Choate, xviii.
9 p "1
'"•The Chrysanthemum Club is generally thought to consist of
Americans with an intellectual, personal, or business stake in maintaining
good U.S. -Japanese relations. Choate maintains on pages 171-172 that this
grouping contains not only businessmen who share in the Japanese economic
success, but also members of America's foreign policy establishment who
try to preserve "...the relationship" by defending Japan to Americans
(like former Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield) , Defense Department
officials who wish to retain the status quo of American military bases in
Japan, and many American academics who feel one-sidedly positive about
Japan for a variety of reasons.
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outflows of wealth in the form of trade deficits, and fin-
ally to the resultant decline in American power and influ-
ence .. .Chrysanthemum members seem to see their function not
as representing U.S. interests but as balancing the demands
of both sides... to make the increasing Japanese domination
of the U.S. economy as painless a process as possible for
our institutions and the American people. M
B. AMERICAN STRENGTHS AND JAPANESE WEAKNESSES
Arguments that the American share of world GNP has con-
tinuously declined since the end of the Second World War are
true, but only if the American economic preponderance which
prevailed immediately after the war is taken to be a valid
benchmark for measurement. Use of this benchmark has always
provided a fallacious argument about American decline though,
because US dominance of the world economy during the early
postwar years was an anomaly of history brought about by the
unique geographic conditions of the war. Because of its
protected position, American industry remained almost un-
touched by the war, thereby positioning it for a domineering
position in global trade and commerce after 1945. As Germany
and Japan staged spectacular postwar economic recoveries, the
American share of world output did begin to shrink dramatical-
ly relative to those nations; but, "if a more appropriate and
representative base year is used--say, the mid-1960s (or even
a pre-World War II year such as 1938) --the remarkable fact is
284Choate, 172.
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that the U.S. economy's share of the global product was about
the same 'then' as it is now: about 22% to 24%. " 285
When viewed in this broader historical context, it is
clear that the American share of the global economy has not
significantly eroded— in fact, it has remained about the same.
And, while "the U.S. balance-of-trade deficit has dropped from
$157 billion in 1987 to a projected $80 billion shortfall in
1991.-286 v/hile the trend is down, the numbers are still
frightening— that is, until one realizes that:
If America's 'trade' imbalance is measured on the basis of
nationality of ownership rather than residency (i.e., adding
the sales, net of local purchases, of overseas subsidiaries
to the recorded trade balance and deducting all intra-firm
flows to avoid double counting), then in 1986 America's
recorded visible-trade deficit of $144 billion is trans-
formed into a $57 billion surplus. Doing the same calcu-
lations today would probably give America the world's
biggest trade surplus. 28 '
Likewise, declinist fears about the "deindustrialization"
of America are also beginning to appear increasingly mis-
placed, for while some analysts were busy bemoaning America's
crumbling manufacturing base, many US manufacturing companies
were equally busy making a remarkable comeback in world
markets. Many business pundits declare that American industry
""Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American
Power (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1990), 6.
286Thomas A. Stewart, "The New American Century: Where We Stand,"
Fortune 123, (Fortune 1991/ The New American Century): 15.
287
"Tricks of the trade," The Economist , (30 March 1991): 61.
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has spent the 1980s "...mastering the discipline of making
worldclass products." Hundreds of US firms have become
pace-setters for the 1990s, by "...going after rivals on their
own turf, by scouring the world for new products and the
technologies to make them, by speeding products to market, by
bonding with their suppliers, and by creating specialized
goods for their customers.*" '
Part of the reason for this turn-around is that the United
States has suddenly become one of the world's low-cost manu-
facturers again: American factory workers no longer lead the
world in pay and benefits, (which could become a problem only
if this eventually caused a decrease in American living Stand-
ards) , and the result has been a resurgence of American
" BErik Calonius, "Smart Moves By Quality Champs," Fortune 123,
(Spring/Summer 1991): 24. Calonius writes that "the motto of the 1980s, as
enunciated by Carl Stern of the Boston Consulting Group [was]: 'Products
are expected to be nearly perfect.'"
289Ibid., 24. The author gives these examples of 1990s-style American
competitors: "Stanley Works, which proves that basic manufacturing can
still be profitable in the U.S., even in New England; Compaq Computer,
which gets more than 50% of its revenues abroad; Nike, the world's top
designer and marketer of sports shoes; Monroe, a subsidiary of Tenneco,
that sells defect-free shock absorbers to Toyota; and Rubbermaid, which
sets the standard for humble housewares."
29 See in article "U.S. exports rise, likely to power economy in
future," p. 14A, where it states that "at current exchange rates, Ameri-
cans earn $14.31 an hour in pay and benefits. German workers, in compar-
ison, earn $17.58. In Japan, where pay has more than doubled since 1979,
workers now earn the equivalent of $12.63. Thus, part of the price of
greater U.S. competitiveness has been paid by American factory workers.
Blue-collar pay rose at a slower pace in the United States than almost
anywhere else."
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cost-competitiveness. This ". . .new cost-competitiveness varies
from product to product, but what is striking is the huge
across-the-board swing since the mid-' 80s. Now the United
States is even more competitive in manufacturing costs than it
was in the late '70s, when its trade in factory goods was
001
balanced and exports were booming." The result is that
"...America's docks are jammed with exports, up 77% in the
1980s to a record $398 billion last year [1990]. "m
This unheralded American revival in manufacturing has been
further outlined in an comprehensive Commerce Department re-
port released earlier this year. The two-and-a-half-year study
showed that "manufacturing's share of GNP fell from 1979 to
1982, to its post-World War II low, and had not recovered by
1987. But by 1988, the share of GNP matched that of 1979, and
by 1990 exceeded it." 293 The figures clearly show that manu-
facturing in the United States has rebounded dramatically:
industrial output in 1990 accounted for 23.3 percent of the
oQi
"U.S. exports rise, likely to power economy in future," San Jose
Mercury News (April 21, 1991): 14A.
292Stewart, 15.
00067JSylvia Nasar, "American Revival in Manufacturing Seen in U.S.
Report," The New York Times (February 5, 1991): Al. See also where Nasar
cites a related report by the Bureau of Labor Statistics that showed that
manufacturing productivity had been growing at a sluggish 1.4 percent of
GNP in the 1970s—reflecting a rate of growth which was only a third the
pace at which US trading partners like Japan were recording gains in their
own hourly worker efficiencies. That rate steadily increased during the
1980s, and it is now at a competitive 3.6 percent, matching the average
rate of US trading partners.
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American GNP--up significantly from its low of only 20 percent
in 1982—and this percentage now places US manufacturers on
par with their counterparts in Western Europe and Japan. "^
In fact, during the last half of the 1980s, US share of
exports by all industrial countries expanded until it is now
larger than the previous peak year of 1980. As Robert Law-
rence, an economist at the Brookings Institution, said about
the findings: "Fears of [American] deindustrialization were
overblown. " 295
In fact, even many of the industries which derogatorily
had been written off as "smokestack America" began to restore
their competitive positions in the mid-1980s, as a weakening
dollar pushed down the prices of American manufactured goods
abroad. With the dollar's value today about a third less than
it was in 1985, the United States is now able to "...ship
steel to Seoul, transistors to Tokyo, cars to Cologne and
bicycle pants to Bologna. Exports ranging from beer and boards
to carpets and computer chips have surged by 76 percent since
1986. " 296
Even with the dollar gaining strength recently (there has




"U.S. exports rise. . . ,"14A,
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economists believe that American export growth will continue.
As Antonio Villamil, chief economist at the Commerce Depart-
ment states: "American exporters have developed improved and
expanded distribution networks abroad. . . [and] these advantages
won't fade away as the dollar recovers." 29 ' The numbers
firmly support this contention. Almost all of America's top 50
exporters posted an increase in foreign sales in 1990. Boeing,
the export leader, had over $16 billion in foreign sales alone
last year, a leap of over 46% from 1989 levels. °
These types of numbers are generating an increasing opti-
mism about American business, an outlook which is beginning to
show up repeatedly in US business journals. For instance, a
recent Business Week survey of its Global 1000, a database
ranking of the world's biggest companies by market value as of
May 31, 1991, showed that American companies "...were far
better investments this year [than, surprisingly, the Japa-
nese]. U.S. companies made up the entire list of the top 15
share-price gainers." 299 While Japanese companies dominated
the top ten global firms in sales dollars, taking the top five
positions, American firms dominated the list of companies
997
James Beeler "Exports: Ship 'em Out," Fortune 123, (Spring/Summer
1991): 58.
298Beeler, 58.
299Robert Neff, "A Year of Twists and Turns: U.S. Markets Shine as
Japan Loses Its Lead and Europe Gets Pummled," Business Week 3222, (July
15, 1991): 52.
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showing the most profits. For many Americans, the big sur-
prise may be that the survey shows that US companies are even
enjoying success in Japan itself. Exports to that country
totalled $48.6 billion in 1990, and are expected to increase
even more this year. Perhaps even more significant is that
almost 60 percent of these exports are now manufactured goods,
a fact which should silence critics who maintain that the US
is becoming just another "colony" of the Japanese, capable of
sending only raw materials to the "home islands." In fact,
"...in 1989 U.S. manufactured exports to Japan totalled $27
billion—higher than U.S. exports to Germany and France
302
combined." This growing strength in export markets like
Japan means that American companies are now "...taking the
battle for markets to its overseas competitors' home market
ground. Last year 42% of manufacturers surveyed by Deloitte &
Ibid., 52-53. The top ten companies listed by total sales (in bil-
lions of dollars) was: (1) C. Itoh, $152.0; (2) Mitsui, $150.8; (3) Sumi-
tomo, $144.9; (4) Mitsubishi, $142.8; (5) Marubeni, $141.6; (6) Exxon,
$116.0; (7) Nissho Iwai, $111.8; (8) General Motors, $107.0; (9) Royal
Dutch/Shell, $ 106.5; and (10) Ford Motor, $97.7. By contrast, the top ten
companies listed by profits (in billions of dollars) was: (1) Royal
Dutch/Shell, $6.53; (2) IBM, $6.02; (3) Exxon, $5.01; (4) General Elec-
tric, $4.30; (5) British Telecom, $3.56; (6) Phillip Morris, $3.54; (7)
Toyota Motor, $3.19; (8) British Petroleum, $2.87; (9) AT&T, $2.74; and
(10) Du Pont, $2.31.
301Beeler, 58.
302Bernard K. Gordon, "The Asian-Pacific Rim," Foreign Affairs 70,
(Winter 1990/91): 154.
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Touche declared themselves ready to invade the fortress of
their toughest foe, Japan. " J
This American assault upon the Japanese home market is
being led by aggressive companies like Motorola, which is
expecting its Japanese subsidiary, Nippon Motorola, to gene-
rate sales of close to $1 billion this year (1991). By
"...knocking down trade barriers and competing head-on with
the Japanese on their own turf...," Motorola has become a huge
success story in cracking the sheltered Japanese market.
Motorola has shown that Americans not only can compete suc-
cessfully with the Japanese in their own home market, but that
US firms can beat them in both the development and sales of
important high-technology products like cellular phones and
microchips. In the United States itself, industry watchers are
saying that "...after years of battering by quality-conscious
Japanese companies, U.S. semiconductor equipment makers are
slowly making a comeback. .. .As one indicator, they cite a
recent survey of customers that for the first time rated eight
U.S. equipment companies among a list of the 10 best in the
world." 305 It is a welcome trend found in many high-technolo-
303Stewart, 15.
3
"Jim Impoco, "Fighting Japan on its home turf," U.S.News & World
Report 110, (June 24, 1991): 50.
305Valerie Rice, "Making a comeback: U.S. chip equipment firms are
gaining respect," San Jose Mercury Nevs (May 21, 1991): 8E. See too in her
article where she quotes Dan Hutcheson, president of VLSI Research Inc.,
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gy manufacturing areas, even though in many high-tech areas,
the US never lost its lead.
The United States, for instance, is still far ahead in the
development of software for computers; and, in fact, with
"...sales of $40 billion last year [1990], the software indus-
try is a national asset." 36 Just how important is this soft-
ware market? Peter Tasker offers this answer:
In communications and data processing the value of the
manufactured part of the product— the hardware— is steeply
declining as a proportion of the whole. The highest growth
and the highest value added is in the software, the know-
ledge-intensive element that no machine can provide. In the
new industrial order now taking shape, the winners, amongst
both companies and countries, will be those who control the
software market. So far, Japanese achievements in this area
have been relatively undistinguished.
While software development has always been an American
strength, American firms have been falling behind their for-
eign competitors in many other types of product development,
and Japanese companies "...were accelerating their development
as saying "American companies have had time to really study Japanese
equipment for three or four years now, and the perception that it is auto-
matically better is changing. American equipment is now pretty close or on
par with the Japanese." Hutcheson further maintains that "American equip-
ment companies have really gotten their act together. Their reputation is
coming back."
306Thomas McCarroll, "Whose Bright Idea?," Time (June 10, 1991): 44.
107
Tasker, 55. See too where Tasker writes that "although Japanese
companies have captured the market for memory chips they have made little
headway in the development of the more complex 'logic elements' that do
the actual thinking. Nearly all the logics made in Japan and used in
Japanese-made products are 'second-sourced' (licensed) from American
companies."
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cycles and getting higher quality, better performing, more
attractively priced products to customers while U.S. firms
were still lacing up their sneakers." 308 That has changed,
and as management consultant Preston G. Smith writes:
The tide is turning. Xerox, which was tardy in responding to
Japanese low-end copiers, reduced its product development
cycles 50 percent over the past decade and plans to cut
another year out by 1993. A rapid development team at
Carrier Transicold of Syracuse, N.Y., introduced a highly
successful semi-trailer refrigeration unit in six months
instead of the customary two years. Other winning new
products have resulted from rapid development projects at
Honeywell (thermostats) , Ingersoll-Rand (air-powered grin-
ders) , Warner Electric (Clutch brakes) and Hewlett-
Packard (computer printers)
It would appear that the outlook for American industry is
not quite as glum as many would make it out to be. American
industry is competitive in a great many areas, and continues
to dominate the marketplace in many product lines. And, as
their undistinguished efforts at creating commercially viable
software shows, the Japanese are not able to dominate any
market that they wish, and Japan's economy is not without its
own problems.
Many Americans seem mesmerized by Japan's postwar economic
success, and can only focus on the impressive performance of
the world-class Japanese kaisha which have come to dominate
certain areas of the US consumer market. It's true that the
1A1JU0Preston G. Smith and Donald G. Reinersten, "U.S. firms are finally
getting up to speed," San Jose Mercury News (April 1, 1991): 3E.
309Ibid., 3E.
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Japanese economy has significant clusters of competitive
industries grouped around:
...transportation equipment and related machinery, office
machines, entertainment and leisure (notably consumer elec-
tronics) , steel and fabricated metal parts, electronic
components and computing equipment, and optical-related
products (including cameras and film) . Japanese firms also
have strong or emerging positions in printing equipment,
telecommunications equipment (mostly hardware) , ceramics-
related products, household appliances, electrical goods,
personal mechanical or electronic products such as pens,
watches, and clocks, and a growing array of general business
inputs such as fans, pumps, and tools. 10
But Japan, "...more so than perhaps any other nation, is
a study in contrasts." 311 As Michael Porter remarks:
On the one hand, it contains some of the most competitive
firms and industries in the world, that have powered remark-
able national economic progress. On the other hand, however,
there are large portions of the Japanese economy that not
only fail to measure up to the standards of the best world-
wide competitors but fall far behind them. The continued
existence of these sectors is both a refelction of the
complicated balance of Japanese policy and a growing
restraint to future Japanese prosperity.
Agriculture, the large construction sector, the poorly de-
signed distribution and retailing structure, and the financial
110
Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York:
Free Press, 1990), 394. Porter points out on the same page that "semicon-
ductors and electronics technology unite a number of clusters. Japan's
position in semiconductors grew out of earlier positions in consumer elec-
tronics and telecommunications. Office machines and computers emerged
later out of the previous three."
311Ibid., 394.
J1
'Ibid., 394. Porter further states on page 420, that "Japan today
is in many ways two economies. One economy is vibrantly competitive and
characterized by rapid upgrading and productivity growth. Side by side is
another economy in which there is little true competition and widespread
inefficiency."
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and professional services industries are just some of the
areas where Japan has lagging productivity. Many of these
industries are not competitive because they have been protect-
ed from international and domestic competition, or else have
been sanctioned as "recession" and "rationalization" cartels
by MITI. " In fact, "very few of the many industries in
which such cartels have been allowed have ever subsequently
achieved a significant international position." 314 These
cartels are not the only problem areas however, because there
are many other weak sectors in the Japanese economy. For
example, Japan has:
...little national competitive advantage in forest products
or related fields, chemicals and plastics (many of the
positions Japan holds [in the world marketplace] are declin-
ing. .
. ) , food and beverages, packaged consumer personal pro-
ducts such as detergents or toiletries, and defense-related
goods. Japan is also weak internationally in services of
nearly all types and in home furnishings. Positions in
health care and textiles/apparel (except machinery) are also
modest .
This is not the Japan that most Americans think about when
they complain about Japan, Inc., and "the continued existence
of these sectors is both a reflection of the complicated
balance of Japanese policy and a growing constraint to future
ill •1JSee in Porter, p. 708, where he lists these industries as
examples: petroleum and related products, aluminum smelting, tobacco,




Japanese prosperity." Just as certain sectors of domestic
demand have fueled the highly successful export industries,
certain other domestic demand conditions have worked in the
opposite direction, actually retarding growth in a number of
industries. For instance, the system of fragmented retail and
wholesale channels used to distribute food and other consumer
packaged goods in Japan has impeded the development of compe-
titive advantage in those industries which have to actually
work within that system; consequently, Japanese firms abroad
have generally done poorly in the marketing of consumer
packaged goods through supermarkets and other mass-retailing
establishments because they have had so little experience in




Surprisingly enough, even in the area of productivity the
Japanese have significant problems. Those large sectors of the
Japanese economy which perform poorly in comparison to their
316Ibid., 394.
117
Ibid., 405. Porter gives another excellent example of why the
Japanese are not competitive in all areas. He says that "in health care,
the Japanese system is socialized and quite homogenous. Doctors all re-
ceive similar training, and there is central control over approved pro-
cedures and treatments. Hospitals have little reason to change. Japanese
doctors are primarily compensated not for their time and services but
through reimbursements for the drugs they prescribe. This makes Japanese
per capita drug demand the highest in the world, but it is not quality de-
mand from the perspective of international competition. Japan provides a
poor environment for innovation in health-related fields. Except in med-
ical equipment heavily based on electronics technology (such as ultrasound
and CT scanners), Japan has a weak international position."
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international counterparts, end up pulling down overall pro-
ductivity. The end result is that "in the economy as a whole,
average productivity is well behind such nations as the United
States and Germany. In the manufacturing sector, one study
estimates that Japan's average output per man hour was 32
percent less than the United States in 1985. " 318
Michael Porter writes that there are other emerging
factors which will also cause Japan economic problems in the
future. Some of those that he mentions are:
1. "Rising incomes and a rapidly accumulating pool of
wealth in Japan threaten to change the motivation of
individuals. Many Japanese point to a declining willing-
ness of young people to do factory work or make commit
ments to their company. Mid-career job mobility is
rising. A recent survey of university graduates in
science and engineering found that a declining percent-
age wanted careers in manufacturing, but the proportion
wanting to go into finance, insurance, and real estate
has doubled since 1986. "; 319
2. "A new generation of managers is taking the helm in
Japanese industry. They are replacing, in many cases,
the founders and entrepreneurs who built up the com-
panies after the war. The risk is that vision and
institution building may be replaced by stewardship and
— T?T
conservatism.", and
"Companies may also find it easier to make money in the
stock market, speculate in real estate, and buy compa-
i0Ibid., 708. Porter also says that "the drag of unproductive
sectors is increasingly a constraint that rapid upgrading in internation-
ally competitive sectors will be unable to overcome. . .Japan's overall rate





nies than create new products and processes. Indeed, a
recent survey found that 55 percent of the 1,010 firms
listed on the first section of the Tokyo stock exchange
reported profits through what the Japanese call 'money
games, ' a record high. Such a shift will stunt produc-
tive investment and innovation. 21
Bill Emmott, former Tokyo bureau chief of The Economist
,
has written that "the idea of Japan as a superpower is based
primarily on the country's huge exports of capital and on its
111
sudden emergence as the world's largest net creditor."
This capital surplus in Japan has been generated by "...three
forces: high savings, low domestic demand for those savings,
and an excess of exports over imports. These three are not
iii
independent." 6 And when these factors are given closer
scrutiny than is usually afforded, it becomes apparent that
Japan has just about reached an economic plateau and that the
Japanese sun has already begun to set. Emmott contends that:
1. there is a emergence in Japan of a growing "consumer"
class, which means that "new values and desires are
seeping in through the younger generation in ways that
are relevant for patterns of consumption and savings and
that reflect other changes in the Japanese economy;" 324
321 Ibid., 709.
22Bill Emmott, The Sun Also Sets: The Limits to Japan's Economic
Power (New York: Random House, 1989), 18.
323Ibid., 244.
324Emmott, 38. On the next page, Emmott says that "some of this can
be measured in figures. For instance, a basic Japanese value used to be
that it was bad to borrow. Better to balance your books; better still to
save. In 1983, there were only 40 million credit cards outstanding in
Japan, or one for every three Japanese. By 1987 that had grown to 110 mil-
lion, or nearly one each; that is well below buy-now-pay-later America and
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2. the development of a "wealthy" class in Japan means
that "the old, austere homogeneity of Japanese life is
breaking down;"
3. there is an increasing worry in Japan that the future
aging of Japan's population "might sap the will to
work," with younger Japanese workers "...coughing up
more and more of their pay to social security premiums
to support pensioners and other nonworking social
security recipients;" 326 and
4. there has been a big difference in "...Japanese finance
in recent years...," and that is the appearance of
"...vast quantities] of money looking for things to buy
and invest. . . .
"
Britain, but is roughly in line with West Germany and is still growing.
Consumers have begun to borrow."
325Ibid., 73. Emmott says that "to an economist, this arrival of a
new class is important because it implies not only a change in consumption
habits but alos a widening gap between rich and poor. Gradually, Japan's
egalitarian, meritocratic society has become less equal and less based
purely on merit because of the high cost of education: The more you pay
even for a kindergarten, the more likely your child is to get into the
right schools and hence the best jobs."
Ibid., 86. See in Naohiro Yashiro, 20-21, where Yashiro points out
some of the other ramifications of this: "Japan's population is aging at
a faster pace than that of any other industrial nation. This trend has
sweeping ramifications inasmuch as job assignments, income levels, and
social status are all closely linked with age in Japan. People aged 65 or
over made up only 9% of the population in 1980, but that figure is ex-
pected to swell to 15% by the year 2000. Over the same period the share of
workers aged 25 or under will shrink from 13% to 10% of the population.
The graying process will feature an increasing percentage of older workers
in the 1990s and a growing number of pension beneficiaries in the early
decades of the twenty-first century."
•JOT
J6 Ibid., 94. Here the problem is that "...unless there is a corres-
pondingly large or expanding supply of investable assets, is that prices
rise. Demand rise faster than supply of things to buy. This is what
happened in the Tokyo property and stock markets." This also explains the
statistics in recent years which have shown the Japanese to hold such a
commanding position in many areas of finance. As Emmott observes, however,
"in both markets, a speculative bubble has developed, where people and
institutions buy land, buildings, or stock well beyond what they believe
is these objects' basic value."
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This last item has resulted in significant problems in the
real estate and financial markets as well. Real estate values
have been one of the most important props upon which Japan's
economic miracle has been built. Although difficult to
believe, "all the land--excluding buildings--in Japan, which
is roughly the size of Montana, is said to be worth $20
trillion, or more than double the value of all the land in
10
North America." This clearly shows a market which has been
inflated beyond any reasonable hope of maintaining its current
sky-high value. "It's only natural that this bubble at some
point goes bust," says Kazuo Nukazawa, managing director of
Keidanren, Japan's most powerful trade association. "There
have been bubbles in other places at other times, in property
and in stocks, and they've always gone bust. So will this
one." 329
This potential weakness in the real estate market could
have explosive consequences for Japanese banks as well. Many
Japanese banks have a substantial stake in the real estate
market and any large decline in real estate values could be
catastrophic for them. The Japanese are beginning to realize
128J60Lewis M. Simons, "Japanese fear the Big One— the big real estate
crash," San Jose Mercury News , 28 October 1990, 1A.
100
Ibid., 1A. Simons comments, for example, that "commercial property
in the glittering Ginza business district goes for $33,777 per square
foot. Even in the peak of the late 1980s, prime commercial real estate in
San Francisco was priced at only have that rate."
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that "bad real estate loans could devastate some Japanese
banks and secondary financial institutions in the 1990s just
as they did American banks and savings and loans in the
1980s.
"
33 An example would be Sumitomo Bank, the world's
third largest bank, which has 460 billion in property loans
just in Japan--about 40 percent of its total domestic loans.
Moody's Investor Services Inc. recently lowered its credit
ratings on several prominent Japanese banks--including Dai-
111Ichi Kangyo, the largest in the world, because it was
concerned about the level of exposure that banks like Sumitomo
have in this inflated real estate market.
But the shaky real estate market is only one of the
problems currently facing Japanese banks. Because of differ-
ences in banking regulations, Japanese banks, unlike their
American counterparts, are allowed to invest in the stock
market. During a soaring market, the amount of paper profit
that can be realized is tremendous, and the sky-rocketing
Japanese market of the 1980s generated billions of dollars in
capital for Japanese banks, paper capital which in turn
greatly boosted the banks' lending capacity." As the
Japanese stock market collapse in 1990 showed, however, this
James J. Mitchell, "Japan bank's squeeze play," San Jose Mercury




can quickly change the amount of capital available to banks in
a negative manner as well. And, ultimately, it is only money
is that defines Japan's current power.
C. TRANSLATING ECONOMIC POWER INTO LEADERSHIP
The Wall Street Journal has given a generalized view of
how Japan became the economic powerhouse it is today:
The Japanese miracle is well known. A country that only
a generation ago was disparaged as a producer of tinny
transistor radios has turned itself into one of the
wealthiest and most technologically advanced nations on
earth, a transformation accomplished through sheer hard
work and a social organization so cohesive and centrally
managed that an Italian journalist here laughingly calls
Japan "the only communist nation that works."
Unburdened by defense spending [italics mine] or, until
recently, a consumer culture, Japanese saved and invested in
industry. With methodical precision and market perceptivity,
Japan began industry by industry to take leadership, moving
rapidly from heavy industries on to high technology. Now,
finally, the yen has replaced the dollar as the symbol of
financial strength, enabling Japan to go on an unprecedented
global buying binge.
But, is this the beginnings of a "Japanese century,"? And
does Japan threaten American national security with its new
economic power? It would certainly seem that the Japanese are
well placed to play a commanding role in a world in which
economic power is beginning to eclipse the importance of
military power. Despite its weak handling of the Gulf crisis,
333Karen Elliott House, "The '90s & Beyond: For All Its Difficulties,
U.S. Stands to Retain Its Global Leadership," Wall Street Journal 23
January 1989, sec. Al, p. 6.
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there is little doubt in many corners that Japan will seek to
take on an expanded role within the international community
sometime in the future. The real question to consider though,
is just how much of an expanded role will the Japanese be
able, or willing, to take on. As Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu,
in his April 30, 1990 address to the Indian Parliament, said:
"Japan can and must play a positive role by putting to effec-
tive use its economic and technological capabilities and its
past experience." 3^ But that may prove difficult for Japan.
Yoichi Shinkai seems to echo Paul Kennedy's thesis when he
writes the following, but he comes to a different conclusion
about the relationship between economic power and hegemony:
In the hegemonies of Britain and the United States, economic
leadership was buttressed by unquestioned dominance in tech-
nology and the supply of capital. Technology holds the key
to military and export potential, and capital can influence
other nations' growth. Britain's long-term investments
powered the growth of the United States and held the British
Commonwealth together: America's capital funded the Marshall
Plan, putting Western Europe back on its feet after World
War II. The same correlations between hegemony and economic
power will not necessarily continue to hold [italics mine] .
In view of this past experience, however, other countries
are understandably nervous about the implications of Japan's
money and technology....
A recent series of articles in the Wall Street Journal
examined the prospects for Japan (among others) assuming a
world leadership role. The Journal undertook a survey of
33




several hundred leaders and laymen in the United States,
Japan, Europe, China, and the Soviet Union in order to frame
a clear picture of world leadership in the next century. As
Karen Elliot House writes: "the picture that emerges is clear,
if surprising: whether America relishes the role or not, it is
the preeminent power in the world today and will remain so for
at least into the next generation--and probably longer. °
A preliminary perusal of the world's economic balance
sheet would certainly give pause to such a prognosis, because
it appears that Japan is increasing its national wealth in
both absolute and relative terms. Japanese trade surpluses
remain huge, its financial clout seems to be immense, and its
technological edge in many fields of research and manufactur-
ing is growing. It seems to many Americans that Herman Kahn
was amazingly prescient: Japan's ascendancy to Great Power
status seems assured. But, House supports her contention that
the US will remain preeminent with this pungent analysis:
Power is not simply money, market size, might or masses.
Power--the elements that enable a nation to influence events
in a fashion favorable to its own interests—derives from a
combination of military, political, economic and cultural
clout, including the intangibles that make a nation admired
and respected. A close look at America's mix of strengths
compared with those of other pretenders to power [like
Japan] indicates why America should have little competition
for pre-eminence in the 1990s and beyond. "We have a winning
336House, "The '90s & Beyond: For All Its Difficulties, U.S. Stands
to Retain Its Global Leadership," 6. House's analysis was done before the
Gulf crisis but sounds remarkably similar to Krauthammer's contention that
the US has entered the "unipolar moment."
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hand," says Former Secretary of State George Shultz. "We
just have to play it." 337
And there are many who believe we will play it. The United
States remains the world's largest producer of goods, and a
recent study cited in the Wall Street Journal projected that
America's share of total global output will rise to nearly 30%
by 2010 and remain about twice the size of Japan's total
output. Human resources are a critical element of economic
strength, and it is here too that the long-term advantage lies
with the United States. America is being constantly replen-
ished by large new waves of immigrants—bring with them fresh
energy and new talents-- just those characteristics needed to
maintain national vitality and productivity. Japan, meanwhile,
severely restricts immigration in order to preserve its racial
purity. This restriction on immigration, coupled with Japan's
rapidly aging population, means that the labor pool in Japan
is shrinking even as its elderly population increases.
Even the large concern over America's budget deficit needs
to be put into some kind of perspective. House writes that
"the budget deficit is twice as large as it ever was in the
Ford or Carter years. Yet the U.S. economy has grown so much
that as a percentage of GNP, the deficit is roughly equivalent
337House, "The '90s & Beyond: For All Its Difficulties, U.S. Stands
to Retain Its Global Leadership," 6.
338Ibid., 6.
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to the 2.8% in Mr. Carter's last year, and is half the 1983
peak. A nation, like an individual, can afford more debt if
no
its wealth is growing."" 7 There are some skeptics though who
continue to insist that the important point to consider is
that the American economy has been shrinking relative to the
Japanese economy. Once again the statistics can be deceiving.
Japan's economy did grow tremendously fast relative to the
US throughout the 1960s and 1970s; but, in the 1980s, as the
Japanese economy matured, its blistering pace of expansion
slowed dramatically. During the last decade, Japan's growth
rate was about the same as that of the American economy, as
both economies expanded at the similar rate of about 3-4
percent a year. Masaru Tamamoto argues that even though Japan
is industrially and financially powerful:
...as important as such measures of international power may
be, more important still is how a nation thinks about itself
and about its place in the world. What has been underplayed
in American speculations about the impending rise of Japan
(except, of course, by those who want to deny American
decline) is the question of Japan's political will. Although
it eludes precise measurement, political will is an essen-
tial ingredient in the making of a great power, for it marks
the limits of a nation's power. And in postwar Japan, the
political will to international power has been noticeably
absent [italics mine]
.
This critical analysis of Japanese political will would
seem to be fundamentally correct as events in the Gulf have
339Ibid., A8.
340Masaru Tamamoto, "Japan's Search For a World Role," World Policy
Journal 7, (Summer 1990): 494.
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proved. In its abdication of any role beyond financial
support, Japan only reinforced the perception held by the rest
of the world that:
Japan stands for no political ideal beyond its own economic
self-interest. It can export Mazdas, microchips and even
management techniques, but none of this amounts to leader
ship. 141
Clearly, the Japanese are not the invincible economic
power many Americans think they are, and there are just as
many corresponding American strengths as there are Japanese
weaknesses. One critical area, however, where they might
become a threat to American national security is in their
pursuit of high-technology dominance.
341House, "The '90s & Beyond: Though Rich, Japan Is Poor in Many
Elements Of Global Leadership," 1.
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V. THE REAL "WAR" BETWEEN THE US AND JAPAN: THE BATTLE FOR
TECHNOLOGY
The White House's 1990 policy statement, National Security
Strategy of the United States , contains a section entitled
"Relating Means to Ends: Our Economic Agenda." In this
section, there is a short paragraph that relates the critical
importance of technology to the United States--it reads, in
part
:
Our economic and military strength rests on our tech-
nological superiority, not sheer manufacturing might. The
United States remains in the forefront in the development
of new technologies, but American enterprises must respond
more quickly in their exploitation of new technologies if
they are to maintain their competitiveness in both domes-
tic and foreign markets. The loss of advanced production
capabilities in key industries could place our manufactur-
ing base in jeopardy.
This loss of advanced production capability is already
occurring, and with it, there is not only a declining ability
to compete internationally in certain advanced technological
fields, there is also an increased threat to American defense.
The report issued by The Commission On Integrated Long-Term
Strategy, entitled Discriminate Deterrence , and often referred
to as the Ikle and Wohlstetter Report, stated that "although
U.S. strategy has depended heavily on our technological
superiority since World War II, American technology is less
^ 2The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States ,
March 1990, 22.
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superior than it used to be," 343 a rather euphemistic way of
saying that America's lead is declining. Further on in the
report, the authors, in a slightly more direct manner, write
that "the 'rusting' of the technology base in the past couple
of decades is a deeply disturbing trend. The United States
badly needs an aggressive effort, informed by a long-term
strategy, to strengthen science and technology programs." 344
These statements make it very clear that the United States
must concern itself with not only maintaining its technologi-
cal strength, but also addressing any further threats to it.
The development and control of high technology is not only
a critical factor in spurring economic development, it is also
a strategic element of maintaining national security. A US
Department of Commerce Report in 1983 perceived a dual role
for the United States, one in which the US acted "...both as
the principal guarantor of Western security and as a leading
defender of the economic system of the free world. In this
context, U.S. technological preeminence and high technology
industries take on a strategic importance, and the maintenance
and protection of a broad technological base is a vital
343
The Commission On Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Discriminate
Deterrence , January 1988: 45.
344Ibid., 55.
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element of national security policy." 3" In line with this
thinking, the United States took a "...variety of initiatives
to protect and to control the outflow of high technology"
during the Cold War "...in order to stop Soviet acquisition of
advanced Western technology which supposedly was helping the
USSR to overtake the West militarily." 346
Now that the Cold War is over, the United States must not
forget the inherent danger in falling behind other nations in
the development of new technologies. While the international
"battlefield" may be shifting from that of military confronta-
tion to one of international economic competitiveness, the
underlying fact remains that American national security still
demands a firm underpinning of high-technology in both the
defense and civilian sectors. As Hanns-D. Jacobsen has pointed
out, "advanced technology--and this is mostly technology which
can have both civilian and military applications--plays a more
and more increasing role in the foreign economic relations of
the industrialized countries and has already become a decisive
147factor in their international competitiveness." In fact,
U.S. Department of Commerce, An Assessment of U.S. Competitiveness
in High Technology Industries (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing
Office, 1983), 4.
34
°Hanns-D. Jacobsen, "Security Implications of High Technology
Cooperation Between the U.S.A. and the Other Industrialized Countries," in
Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, ed., Economic and Strategic Issues in U.S.
Foreign Policy (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1989), 195.
347 Ibid., 199
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even before the Soviet threat was effectively removed, the
United States found itself already engaged in fierce techno-
logical competition with its Cold War ally, Japan.
Noted Japan expert, Edward Olsen, in his well-reasoned
book U.S. -Japan Strategic Reciprocity , acknowledges that there
is a "...tremendously competitive high-technology struggle
being waged between the United States and Japan," and that
"Americans should be concerned about this challenge for
110
economic reasons." ° He goes on to remark that "more signifi-
cantly, because of the importance of high-technology indus-
tries to U.S. defense capabilities, there are profound
strategic reasons for concern." While the Japanese are
currently American allies, and are likely to remain so into
the near future, this high-tech struggle is still a potential
threat to American interests.
It is a high-tech challenge which has developed primarily
over the last decade, for while the United States waged the
final phases of the Cold War, it "...skew[ed] its R&D
resources towards defense projects and basic research," while
nations like Japan devoted its research and development
148Edward A. Olsen, U.S. -Japan Strategic Reciprocity: A Neo-Interna-
tionalist View (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), 68.
349Ibid., 69.
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efforts almost exclusively to the commercial sector.^"
Rachel McCulloch says "these funding patterns help to explain
why the United States has been able to maintain its lead in
most areas of military technology and basic science, but has
lost ground toother nations, especially Japan, in translating
U.S. scientific advances into commercial gains." These
patterns also illustrate the fundamental dislocation that can
occur in national security when defense spending on research
and development results in lost opportunities for commercial-
izing other emerging technologies--for on one hand, national
defense is enhanced by the high-technology weapons developed,
but on the other hand, the economic strength of the economy it
defends becomes increasingly weaker as a result of those
missed commercial opportunities. As Pat Choate observes:
"America's declining economic position is intimately tied to
its loss of leadership in commercial high-technology products
and processes [italics mine]." 352
This economic shortcoming could have drastic effects for
American high-technology industries in the coming decades as
Rachel McCulloch, "U.S. International Competitiveness in a
Changing Global Economy," in Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, ed., Economic and
Starteqic Issues in U.S. Foreign Policy (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1989),
9-10.
351Ibid., 10.
352Pat Choate, The High-Flex Society: Shaping America's Economic
Future (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988), 185.
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Japanese firms feverously expand their current technological
advantages and begin to make serious inroads into areas of
traditional American dominance. The tremendous effort put into
defense-related research and development is simply not enough
in itself to ensure American national security. America needs
to be competitive in all the high-technologies of tomorrow if
it is to retain its vibrant and growing economy— an absolute
necessity for true security, as the Japanese themselves have
acknowledged. The emphasis on purely defense-related technolo-
gy helped the US defeat the Soviet Union, but that same
emphasis could lead to defeat in the new "war" between the US
and Japan--a war which is actually a fierce commercial
struggle for technological dominance. It is a commplace
observation that the two OECD countries with relatively small
military budgets, Japan and Germany, are the most successful
industrial economies. A study quoted in The Cuomo Commission
Report observed that "just as the Pentagon is contracting with
American manufacturers to pursue the technological break-
throughs necessary to produce such exotic armaments as stealth
bombers and laser beam defense shields, other nation's
manufacturers are aggressively pursuing the same breakthroughs
with commercial applications specifically in mind." This
J3JJay Stowsky, Beating Our Plowshares into Doubled-Edqed Svords: The
Impact of Pentagon Policies on the Commercialization of Advanced
Technologies , Working Paper 17, Berkeley Roundtable on the International
Economy, April 1986, p. 2, as quoted in Lewis B. Kaden, Chairman of The
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is where the really important battles of the future will be
fought--all along the high-technology frontier where the very
nature of national competitiveness will be at stake.
A. TECHNOLOGY AS A DRIVING FACTOR FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH
Franklin Root, an economics professor at the University of
Pennsylvania, has defined technology "...as the accumulated
know-ledge, skills, and techniques that are applied to the
production of goods and services."' It is a rather dry
academic definition, but one which is perfectly servicable for
our purposes. When technology is viewed in this rather
generalized way, it becomes clear that it has been an impor-
tant factor in American economic progress; in fact, "through-
out [U.S.] history, technological progress has been the
driving force behind most of the productivity gains made in
this country. JJ Productivity is what ultimately determines
a nation's standard of living, so if technology improves
productivity, it follows that the American standard of living
is dependent upon the judicious application of new technology
to industry. Supporting this view, Alfred Kahn remarks that
Cuomo Commission on Trade and Competitiveness, The Cuomo Commission Report
(New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1988), 120.
^Franklin R. Root, International Trade and Investment (Cincinnati:
South-Western Publishing Co., 1990), 118.
355Steven Schlossstein, The End of the American Century (New York:
Congdon & Weed, Inc., 1989), 92.
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"the most powerful engine of productivity advance is techno-
logical progress, generated in large measure by expenditures
on research and development and embodied in improved capital
goods and managerial techniques....""
The causal relationship between the careful application of
a new technology and the resulting increase in productivity is
inescapable. During the 1980s for example, "technology .. .help-
ed boost labor productivity in high-tech industries almost six
1 en
times faster than in [American] business as a whole.
"
J3
Recognizing this enormous potential, George A. Keyworth II,
President Reagan's science advisor, began declaring in 1982
that "basic research is America's ace-in-the-hole, " and urged
Congress to support proposed increases in US research
ICO
budgets. These research budgets, with their "...emphasis
on the physical sciences and engineering... [were thought
necessary because of the results] .
.
.of a year-long study in
the White House of 'the competitiveness of those industries
that either produce high technology products or depend on high
technology for manufacture....'" 359 The result of this study
Steven E. Rhoads, The Economist's View of the World: Government,
Markets, and Public Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985),
93.
357Choate, The High-Flex Society , 106.
"ICO




and many others showed that "although no one can give precise
figures, it is now generally accepted that research and
development in general--and basic research in particular--make
a fundamental contribution to the expansion of capital, in
particular by being used to produce new products and as the
basis of new production processes.'
Economists like Edwin Mansfield have "...demonstrated how
those U.S. industries that spend relatively high amounts of
money on research and development are also the leading
industries in manufactured exports, foreign direct investment,
and licensing....' This correlation between technology and
economic growth is sometimes difficult to rigorously quantify
though, and, as David Dickson, a journalist for Science
magazine, explains:
[Although] economists [have] differed substantially on the
precise size of the contribution of technical change--and
hence indirectly of R&D spending--to productivity
growth .... there [has been] little disagreement that the
most dynamic sectors of the U.S. economy [in the 1970s and
1980s] were those, such as microelectronics and pharmaceu
ticals, in which spending on research had been relatively
high. Two economists with Data Resources Inc. have esti
mated that in the. . .postwar decades, high technology
industries produced a compound growth of 6.7 percent,
compared with a 2.6 percent expansion in the low tech-
nology industries. Other statistics demonstrate how




in maintaining a competitive position for the U.S. in
international trade.
The Japanese have long understood the importance of
integrating technology into their industrial economy, and in
their bid to gain a competitive edge, they "...scan the world
for important technologies, learn them, know the patent
literature, know the technical literature ... turn over every
stone." They also buy it in large quantities. Technology
transfer from the US to Japan is big business: in 1989 alone,
"U.S. companies took in $2.5 billion selling technology to the
Japanese...." 364 This preoccupation with accumulating foreign
technology fits in very well with the Japanese concept of
"comprehensive national security," for as Robert Barnett
points out, the Japanese fervently believe that knowledge is
power. He writes that:
An underlying assumption in Japanese thinking about na-
tional Interest and effectiveness is that the possession
of voluminous, accurate, and usable information is a
paramount strategic asset. Japan's educational system, the
sophistication of its knowledgeable business community,
Japan's intense attention to potentials of technology and
to scrupulous quality control, and Japan's avid interest-
in cultural and technological borrowings worldwide--start
362Ibid., 32.
3 ° 3William Taylor, "The Business of Innovation: An Interview with
Paul Cook," Harvard Business Review (March-April 1990): 99.
3
°*Susan Moffat, "Picking Japan's Research Brains," Fortune 123,
(March 25, 1991): 88.
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ing with China over a thousand years ago--conf irm com
mitment to the idea that knowledge is power.
This point of view is supported very strongly by Barbara
Buell, a Business Week reporter, who remarks that the Japanese
have always been alert to the advantages of turning technical
knowledge into commercial success, and that:
At the heart of [Japan's] stunning [economic] success is a
voracious appetite for research and technology from
overseas— the same strategy America used when Europe was
preeminent early in this century. Japan's scientists
religiously attend academic conferences in the U.S. and
meticulously study and translate research papers. Others
tour U.S. laboratories, factories, and semiconductor
plants to glean the best ideas. And with increasing
frequency, the Japanese are setting up labs in the U.S.
and sponsoring university research.
Because of their pursuit of American technology, the
Japanese have often been denigrated as a nation of "copycats."
Even many Japanese themselves think this sobriquet accurate.
Molecular biologist Itaru Watanabe, professor emeritus at Keio
University, remarks that most Japanese companies have yet to
create anything new, and that many Japanese companies would be
"...helpless without a steady stream of technical papers from
the U.S."-56 ' But that is really beside the point, for as
365Barnett, 10-11
•^Barbara Buell, Neil Gross, Larry Armstrong and Gary McWilliams,
"A Shopping Spree In The U.S.," Business Week (Innovation 1990): 86.
367Ibid., 86.
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Gerald Meier points out:
The central issue of technological development ... is not
acquiring the capability to invent products and proces-
sess. It is acquiring the ability to use existing tech-
nology—to produce more efficiently, to establish better
production facilities, and to use the experience gained in
production and investment to adapt and improve the tech-
nology in use. The main way of doing this is to build on
what can be obtained from abroad while developing local
capabilities in areas where it makes the most sense.
While the United States was the undisputed world leader in
technological innovation after the Second World War, this
began to change as early as the 1960s, when the Japanese began
to enter the US market with improved Japanese-produced
consumer goods based directly the achievements of American
science and technology. For decades, "...Japan has come to the
U.S., bought or borrowed the best of America's technology, and
ICQ
sold it back to the U.S. as finished products. 07 Root
points out that "technical advances in production are a major
170
source of growth in contemporary economics," and, as many
American industries have belatedly found out:
Technological leadership is constantly threatened. . .by
innovations elsewhere; nations must run hard to avoid
falling behind. In the nineteenth century, comparative
advantages changed slowly over a generation or more; in
our time, a country may enjoy a comparative advantage in a
product for only a few years before technical diffusion
Gerald M. Meier, Leading Issues in Economic Development (New York:




and Imitation or new technical discoveries wipe it
out. 371
This contention is strongly supported by Robert Gilpin,
who remarks that "in the modern world the centers of
technological innovation have experienced several significant
mutations, although innovation, on the whole, is a continuous
and incremental process, key innovations in industrial methods
and technological products 'tend to cluster in time and
space'...." This has significant implications for the
United States, for the Japanese are already formidable
competitors, and the structure of their society and economy
seems well-suited for developing and nurturing the high-
technology industries of the future. Michael Porter makes the
argument that "one competitive industry helps to create
another in a mutually reinforcing process." His theory that
nations develop competitive clusters of industries based on
certain determinants of national competitive advantage clearly
shows the interlocking relationships of high-technology
industries. When he examined why "...certain companies based
in certain nations [are] capable of consistent innovation," he
came up with "... four broad attributes of a nation, attributes
371Ibid., 122.
372Robert Gilpin, War & Change in World Politics (Cambridge
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 181.
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that individually and as a system constitute the diamond of
national advantage, the playing field that each nation estab-
lishes and operates for its industries
.
" JJ These four key
attributes that he lists are:
1. Factor Conditions. The nation's position in factors of
production, such as skilled labor or infrastructure,
necessary to compete in a given industry;
2. Demand Conditions. The nature of home-market demand for the
industry's product or service;
3. Related and Supporting Industries. The presence or absence
in the nation of supplier industries and other related
industries that are internationally competitive; and
4. Firm Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry. The conditions in the
nation governing how companies are created, organized, and
managed, as well as the nature of domestic rivalry.
These are all factors which are very prevalent in Japan within
the existing high-technology industries. The keiretsu , with their
tightly interlocking relationships among diverse companies within
their groups, are well-placed to take advantage of this competitive
diamond. Their workforce comes from a "nation of engineers," and
their kaisha ferociously compete in a domestic market that is
admittedly "technology-crazy." In addition, MITI "...prods com-
panies into investing in various R&D programs by organizing
research consortia, providing funding, and engaging in discussions
171
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with the [high-technology] companies." 3 ' 5 Truly, this is fertile
ground for establishing high-tech competitive clusters, and it is
very likely that "Japan's preoccupation with manufacturing quality
can only become more significant as science and technology
coalesce." 376
The influence of MITI is significant in this process. Porter
also examines how state intervention affects these competitive
factors, and he maintains that a "government's proper role is as a
catalyst and challenger; it is to encourage—or even push--
companies to raise their asperations and move to higher levels of
competitive performance, even though this process may be inher-
177
ently unpleasant and difficult." He then goes on to say that
"...Japan's government , at its best, understands this role better
than a/3yo/7e--including the point that nations pass through stages
of competitive development and that government's appropriate role
17R
shifts as the economy progresses [italics mine].' This is of
major importance because "...by stimulating early demand for
advanced products, confronting industries with the need to pioneer
frontier technology through symbolic cooperative projects,
17S
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establishing prizes that reward quality, and pursuing other poli-
cies that magnify the forces of the diamond, the Japanese govern-
merit accelerates the pace of innovation."
Porter gives an excellent example of how this reinforcing
process works within the high-technology industries of Japan. He
points out that:
Japan's strength in consumer electronics, for example, drove
its success in semiconductors toward the memory chips and
integrated circuits these products use. Japanese strength in
laptop computers, which contrasts to limited success in other
segments, reflects the base of strength in other compact,
portable products and leading expertise in liquid-crystal
display gained in the calculator and watch industries. Once a
cluster forms, the whole group of industries becomes mutually
supporting. Benefits flow forward, backward, and horizontally.
Aggressive rivalry in one industry spreads to others in the
cluster, through spin-offs, through the exercise of bargaining
power, and through diversification by established companies.
Entry from other industries within the cluster spurs upgrading
by stimulating diversity in R&D approaches and facilitating the
introduction of new strategies and skills. Through the conduits
of suppliers or customers who have contact with multiple
competitors, information flows freely and innovations diffuse
rapidly. Interconnections within the cluster, often unantici-
pated, lead to perceptions of new ways of competing and new
opportunites. The cluster becomes a vehicle for maintaining a
diversity and overcoming the inward focus, inertia, inflex-
ibility, and accomodation among rivals that slows or blocks
competitive upgrading and new entry.
This is not just an academic economic theory that is
interesting for how it explains current competitiveness, because
"the tendency for the loci of technological innovations to shift




porary scholarship, a concern stimulated by the relative decline in
American innovation....' The discovery and application of
advanced technologies will help determine which national economies
will be competitive in the 21st century. Maintaining international
competitiveness is a crucial factor in determining the health of
the American economy, and if a healthy economy is the foundation of
national security, it then becomes apparent that this battle over
technology is a critical one. The United States faces a formidable
challenge from Japan already, and if it allows its lead in high-
technology to continue to fade, it runs the very real risk of being
shut out of the advanced technologies of the future—technologies
that will be clustered in Japan.
B. THE MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF TECHNOLOGY
The recent war in the Gulf demonstrated with startling effect
the efficacy of high-tech weaponry. For many Americans, it was
their first exposure to those "...deadly sleek appliances resting
in what General Colin Powell calls his 'toolbox' of war imple-
ments—machines capable of astonishing feats, bearing equally
astonishing pricetags.' 2 As CNN broadcast live pictures of the
Gulf War back to the United States, the America public suddenly
".
. .discovered its arsenal--the damnedest array of stealthy, micro-
381Gilpin, 182.
382John Huey and Nancy J. Perry, "The Future of Arms," Fortune 123,
(February 25, 1991) : 34.
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processed, laser-guided, thermal-imaged, electromagnetically
jamming, satellite-vectored weaponry ever imagined
.
" J0J Americans,
and indeed the entire world, marveled at the sight of Tomahawk
missiles cruising at a hundred feet above the streets of Baghdad,
leisurely banking at selected street corners as they proceeded
through the city on their way to strategic targets. Stunning
cockpit films of precision-guided bombs smashing their way through
the skylights of selected Iraqi government buildings only added to
the very correct perception that this war was technologically
different from the ones that had proceeded it. When the war was
finally over, it was clear that America's multi-billion dollar
investment in high-tech weaponry over the past decades had paid
handsome dividends, for the Iraqi military had been smashed without
the need for American ground troops to engage in the same sort of
grinding combat that had distinguished the low-tech battles of the
long and bloody Iran-Iraq War. The spectacular success of such
high-tech systems as the the E-3 AWACS, the Patriot air-defense
batteries, and stand-off weapons like the Tomahawk and Hellfire
missiles, explosively pointed out the revolution in warfare that
can occur as the result of technological advances.
Herman Kahn, writing in 1960, stated that the United States was
even at that time fully "...three technological revolutions away
383Ibid., 34
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from World War II." 384 He further stated that "any attempts to
apply the concepts and rules of common sense derived from that
experience run the grave risk of being outmoded as some American
Civil War concepts would have been in World War II." " As Kahn
recognized, the pace of technology has increased significantly
since the end of the Second World War, and there are few American
policy-makers who would disagree "...that the Soviets are correct
in their assessment that the advent of new technologies will
revolutionize war, and not merely make current forces marginally
better at what they do. ° Indeed, it is clear today that "the
accelerated rate of military technological developments makes each
succeeding war in many ways radically different from the previous
ones. This historical fact points out the importance of
attempting to understand what impact future technological advances
will have on current weapons and strategy; for there is little
doubt that "no dimension of warfare has escaped the influence of
'10
technological development." The exact nature of that influence
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is often debated, but most military analysts generally believe that
in combat "...technological innovations can... have an overwhelming
effect in two circumstances: When radically different technologies
are pitted against one another, and when one-on-one duels reveals
the slight but decisive advantages of similar technologies."-589 The
distinction expressed between the two circumstances is only one of
approach however, not of validity, for either of these tech-
nological deficiencies ultimately results in defeat during war,
illustrating very dramatically the dangers of entering into any
conflict with a technological disadvantage vis-a-vis the enemy. In
order to maintain that very necessary technological lead, American
military funding of R&D falls into two distinct categories: one
which stresses 'incremental' changes of existing weapons systems
and a second which introduces totally different, ' nontraditional
'
weapons. The first category fits:
...within the current paradigm of the so-called 'military-
industrial complex;' that is, within the institutions, organ-
izations, force structures, historical equipment, military
tactics, and industrial R&D and production facilities. These
technological advances usually are aimed at the previously
stated 'mission needs,' or can be easily used to justify new
,„„
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mission needs because they fit within the existing paradigm.
The second category emphasizes radical change and is by far the
389Steven Canby, "Can High Tech Save NATO," in Chapter V.
Implications of New Weapons Technologies in Shai Feldman, ed., Technology
and Strategy: Future Trends (Jersusalem: The Jeruselam Post, 1989), 66.
190Jacques Gansler, "The US Technology Base: Problems And Prospects,"
in Franklin D. Margiotta and Ralph Sanders, eds., Technology, Strategy and
National Security (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press,
1985), 109-110.
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more significant of the two. It is the strategic opportunity found
within:
...the ' nontraditional ' change introduced by some totally new
type of weapon system that advanced technology offers--but
which breaks down some part of the traditional paradigm of the
military-industrial complex. In this case, advanced technology
is defining possible new military strategies, equipment, appli-
cations, or institutional structures.
The revolutionary impact that "nontraditional" technology can
have on warfare presents the possibility of some new and very
frightening weapons making their appearance on the battlefield
sometime in the near future: weapons made even more frightening
when one contemplates their exclusive possession by an enemy
hostile to the United States. John Garnett comments that "already
there is speculation about the possibility of new infrasonic
weapons, which are based on certain sound frequencies, ethnic
weapons, which distinguish between targets on the basis of their
racial or genetic makeup, psychotropic weapons, which are based on
drugs calculated to produce hallucinatory effects and other mental
disturbances, and high-energy laser weapons." For those who
question the feasibility of those types of weapons ever being
developed and fielded, one only has to consider that in the span of
391 Ibid., 110.
392John Garnett, "Technology and Strategy," Contemporary Strategy
Vol. I, Theories and Concepts , eds., John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett
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little more than eighty years the world has gone from "horse-drawn
guns to space-based lasers." 393
With the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
by President Reagan early in his first term, high-technology weapon
development has focused increasingly upon space-borne weaponry and
sensors. Barry Smirnoff of the National Defense University has
pointed out that:
Infrared and radar ocean/air surveillance satellites that may
become operational by the early 1990s could place Soviet [or
other] surface ships and (high altitude) aircraft at risk from
missiles and other long-range weapons. First generation space
laser weapon systems that might become available somewhat
later, but probably before the end of the century, could place
many types of missiles and aircraft (not to say spacecraft) at
risk. Together, these advanced sensors and weapons could pro-
duce the kind of of space superiority which would restore naval
and air superiority to the United States in a manner that ex-
ploits traditional American advantages, but without spending
tens of billions of dollars on ever-smaller numbers of expen-
sive, complex, and vulnerable ships and aircraft.
Cold War competition with the Soviet Union seemed to demand
that Soviet quantitative superiority in men and material be off-set
not only by a corresponding American qualitative superiority in
those same areas, but also with the introduction of totally new
weapons technology like space-based defense and the F-117A stealth
fighter. The US strategy has been to "...exploit technology to
equip its forces with weapons that outperform their Soviet
393Ibid., 95.
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counterparts . " J ' J This strategy followed the school of thought that
"...technology has brought a new qualitative dimension to
conventional warfare. As the quality of technology increases (e.g.,
the fire-power, precision, range, 'lethality'), quantitative
superiority becomes less critical; modern war [thus becomes] less
labor-intensive and more capital-intensive .
"
J7
° And because high-
tech weaponry is so very expensive to design and produce, the US
was able to engage the Soviets in high-tech "competitive
strategies" like the Strategic Defense Initiative, which eventually
helped to bankrupt the Soviet Union as it focused its dwindling
resources into a futile attempt to keep up with the United States
and the continuing revolution in military technology.
Despite the cost of these new high-tech weapons, technology has
become the (controversial) touchstone of American defense policy.
In fact, "a simple count of the defense issues that have occupied
the Congress since World War II would indicate that most defense
197issues relate in some way to technology." But, even though there
is often much heated debate among American policy-makers over the
projected cost-benefits ratio of certain high-tech systems, it is
still generally recognized that "technology now plays a critical
Franklin D. Margiotta and Ralph Sanders, eds., Technology,
Strategy and National Security (Washington, D.C.: National Defense
University Press, 1985), 7.
396Handel, 27. Handel further comments that "this trend in
conventional war is likely to accelerate in the future."
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role in assisting the United States to meet its security needs."
There is a clear understanding among American defense planners
that
:
Differences over weapons selection can influence all other
components of military power: strategy, military operations,
manpower, training, and logistics. Above all, knowledgeable
people understand that the research and development (R&D)
decisions of today help to shape the fighting forces of
tomorrow, including alterations in existing roles, missions,
and budgets of the military services.
The high-technology of yesterday helped to create the American
armed forces of today, and their performance in the Gulf War proved
reassuring to those advocates of costly high-tech weaponry. In
fact, the startling effectiveness of many of the US military's
highly controversial high-tech weapons systems has given even many
former skeptics of this high-tech emphasis in American defense
planning good reason for pause. Prewar arguments against investing
in high-technology had concentrated on the supposition that complex
weaponry would offer no significant advantages in actual combat
because the weapons are hard to maintain (with resulting low-
availability rates) , and because American forces faced the
possibility of being overwhelmed by "...superior numbers of simpler
enemy weapons in the confusion of large-scale battles." 400 While
398Ibid., 4.
399Ibid., 4.
400Walter Kross, "High/Low Technology, Tactical Air Forces, and
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there were problems that developed within the "Clausewitzian"
friction of war, these fears about the danger of relying so heavily
upon high-tech weaponry proved to be largely ungrounded. Reflecting
a growing consensus among American policy-makers, John Warner, the
ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, stated
during the Gulf War that "I think you'll find the members of
Congress voicing much less criticism with respect to high-tech
weapons. The investment in these systems has paid off. 1
But even though there has been extensive disagreement on this
subject, a fundamental belief in the strategic advantage of high
technology has been repeatedly expressed in American policy docu-
ments. For instance, the Future Environment Working Group chaired
by Andrew Marshall and Charles Wolf, in its report entitled The
Future Security Environment given to the Commission on Integrated
Long-Term Strategy, made the fairly typical statement heard in
defense-planning circles that "over the next 20 years, probable
revolutionary improvements in several families of military tech-
40?
nology could fundamentally change the nature of warfare." The
Working Group's ealier report, entitled Sources of Change in the
Future Security Environment , listed some of these military tech-
nologies as including "...directed energy weapons (including high-
powered micro-wave), autonomous smart weapons, new families of
401Huey and Perry, 34.
* 02The Future Security Environment , 26.
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explosives, earth-pentrating sensors and weapons, new biological
agents, brilliant information processing, and advanced
robotics." 403
Colin S. Gray, a former director of the Hudson Institute's
national-security studies, has observed that "specialized though it
often is, military technology is related very firmly to tech-
nological development in general." Maintaining a technological
society that is on the cutting edge of research and development all
along the technological frontier therefore becomes of prime
importance to national security. Stefan Possony and J.E. Pournelle
give this chain of casual events as an example of that importance.
As they put it:
Technology is interdependent: advances in one sector of
technology soon influence areas which might naively have been
believed unrelated. For example, the development of molecular
chemistry techniques led to the art of microminiaturization,
which allows development of computer technology beyond the
expectations of only a few years ago. The revolution in
computer sciences has made possible the development of on-board
computers for missile guidance, and thus of accuracies not
previously predicted. Increased accuracy has made possible the
destruction of missile silos with much greater ease and smaller
warheads, and has led to the development of Multiple Indepen-
dently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRV) , each one of which
uses on-board guidance computers. The increased kill capability
stimulated research into silo hardening techniques, which led
directly to the present hard rock silo designs.
Report of the Working Group on the Future Security Environment
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Since the advent of nuclear weapons, it is almost an axiom in
today's world that "technological innovation is probably the most
significant driving force behind contemporary strategic thought. No
strategist can afford to ignore the application of science to
warfare.' It is for that compelling reason alone that "no ser-
ious student of military affairs can afford to remain ignorant of
the technological innovations that revolutionize our military
arsenals." The United States has understood this pronouncement
better than most, because if a nation stakes its military
effectiveness on the fielding of small numbers of high technology
weapons, it becomes extremely vulnerable to emerging technologies
that threaten to make its existing arsenal obsolete. In his
analysis of this problem of technological competition between
nations, Colin Gray notes that:
It is only common sense to assume technological change, to plan
to exploit ripening technological plums, and to plan to offset
predictable technological trends which could have a strongly
negative net effect upon long-preferred national military
capabilities. For example, military technologies threatening to
the survival of surface ships are particularly troubling to
a United States which must exercise, rather than simply deny,
i ft
command at sea.
But understanding the potential military importance of any
406Garnett, 91.
< 07Ibid., 91.
408Gray, 192. Gray offers another example: "military technologies
threatening to tank forces are uniquely prospectively damaging to a Soviet
Union who traditional military instrument of excellence has been its
army. . ."
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particular technology can sometimes be very difficult, for as John
Garnett points out:
The genesis of a weapons system is extraordinarily complicated.
It begins with a piece of theoretical science, the implications
of which are imponderable even to those who are engaged in it.
Even the most innocent scientific investigation may yield
results with military implications beyond the wildest dreams of
those who discover them. In the 1920s, no scientist Working in
the field of quantum physics could possibly have forseen that
his or her work would ultimately make possible the atomic and
hydrogen bombs. Similarly, no modern scientist can foretell or
control the consequences of his or her work. Even the purest
research may lead to a new weapon.
This relationship has been underscored by Martin van Creveld,
who says that "if it is true that every part of war is touched by
technology, it is no less true that every part of technology
affects war." 410 Garnett goes even further and gives this example
of how disparate scientific disciplines can combine to create
unexpected advances in weaponry. His assumption follows the line of
reasoning that:
Science... is the starting point of all modern weapons. But a
single breakthrough, however important, may not be sufficient
to create a new weapon. Other scientific developments, some-
times in quite disparate fields, may have to take place before
an idea can be turned into a weapon. Frequently, the relevance
of whole series of innovations in unconnected areas has to be
perceived before a new weapon system can be brought into
existence. Take the cruise missile, for example. What made
cruise missiles possible were parallel, but largely uncon-
nected, developments in propulsion units, high-energy fuels,
409Ibid., 92-93. Garnett points out "for example, [that] an
investigation into how trees know when to drop their leaves may lead
directly to the development of defoliants for use in counterinsurgency
warfare."
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minaturized electronics, and warhead design. In particular, it
was the development of small gas turbine engines and light-
weight computers that made cruise missiles a realistic possi-
bility. By the 1970s the cruise missile was a "weapon whose
time had come
.
This type of technological synergism (like the cruise missile)
holds the key to US defense efforts simply because the American
concept of war is based on having technological superiority in any
future conflict. The recent Gulf War illustrated that principle par
excellance. Traditionally, the United States has been much more
willing to spend dollars instead of American lives in its attempt
to win a conflict, and the emphasis that the US military puts on
high-tech weaponry simply supports that approach. By using very
costly smart weapons for example, US forces were able to "standoff"
from their targets in the Gulf, a combat situation which
dramatically enhanced the "survivability" of those launching
platforms and the men who manned them. To this end, the US military
employed incredibly expensive stealth, night vision and all-weather
navigation, precision guidance, electronic warfare, and real-time
warning and control technology to achieve its military victory in
the Gulf at a small cost in American lives. But history has shown
that "the cycle of modern weapons, measures and counter-measures,
has shifted the advantage from the defense to the offense, and
back, a number of times since the start of the technological
revolution. Such changes are not always perceived before the
411Garnett, 93
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outbreak of war."^ 12 American military technology was up to the
task in this latest conflict, but the danger always remains that
other nations could catch up and surpass it.
Making the chauvinistic assumption that American military
technology will continue always to surpass that of any military
technology capable of being fielded by any potential adversaries
could have disasterous consequences. Echoing that theme, Irving
Holley points out that "it is exceedingly dangerous to let
nationalistic bias creep into. . .assessments of technology and hence
into. .. strategic thinking." The United States must always be
alert to the military possibilities of foreign developed high-
technology, regardless of whether it comes from a hostile state
(like the Soviet Union during the Cold War) or an allied nation
like Japan. Congressman Craig Hosmer warned in 1970, that "there is
no halting the stream of technology; but this does not mean that
the United States will automatically be first in the Technological
41
2
,i6Handel, 73. The author points out "for example, despite numerous
indications from the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War, in which the
growing advantage of defensive over offensive weapons was clearly
demonstrated, most European armies before the First World War emphasized
the development of exclusively offensive doctrines; similarly, the Israeli
army before the 1973 war misread the technological trends favoring the
defense in anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons and consequently relied on
an exclusively offensive doctrine. Conversely the French, before the
Second World War, learned the lessons of the First World War so well that
they overestimated the power of defense."
41
1
, JIrving B. Holley, "Technology and Strategy: A Historical Review,"
in Franklin D. Margiotta and Ralph Sanders, eds., Technology, Strategy and
National Security (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press,
1985), 20.
189
War> 1.414 tj^j- statement is as true today as it was some twenty
years ago.
C. JAPANESE EFFORTS TO DOMINATE THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES
The Japanese have long recognized the importance of tech-nology
as a critical economic factor. Even in the capital-intensive
industries of the 1960s, like steel and shipbuilding, there was
"...a deliberate national policy aimed at rapidly adopting state-
of-the-art technology." In his analysis of this national policy,
Don Kash states that "MITI assured the nation of low-cost access to
state-of-the-art technologies by keeping individual Japanese
companies from competing with each other for the right to use those
technologies." 416 Today, that same cooperative effort is seen as
the Japanese are "...mounting campaigns, jointly funded and
coordinated by industry and government, to fill the chinks in their
industrial armor ... .They aim to preserve their traditional
strengths, while matching America's flair for seminal science and
prolific invention." 1
Possony and Pournelle, xx.
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The real danger from Japan doesn't come from its dominance in
some of the industries of today, it comes from its increasing
predominance in the emerging advanced technologies of tomorrow. As
business analyst Otis Port writes, there is an "...epic struggle
rag[ing] on—over economic leadership. ... Its weapons are invention,
innovation, and ingenuity ... .And after being out-classed for half
a century, the rest of the world is now fast closing in on the
U.S." 418 While the United States still holds a lead in most fields
of research, this lead is rapidly disappearing in many areas of
traditional American dominance. As Dr. Francis Narin, president of
CHI Research, Inc., says: "It's scary. The Japanese are continuing
to expand in virtually every area of technology. Anybody who
believes that the Japanese increase is just in autos and elec-
tronics is totally oblivious of the facts. Their performance is
impressive across the board, in virtually every field. 17 In fact,
"with an economy little more than half as large, [Japan] took the
world lead in technology-intensive exports back in 1986. " 42
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Masanori Moritani, formerly a deputy director of the Nomura
Research Institute, points out why this occurred:
Among the countries that lead in advanced technology, military
or space-related R&D is usually prominent if not dominant--
especially in the share of R&D funding they receive. A notable
exception is Japan, which is fast building its industrial power
and capabilities in advanced technologies by focusing almost
entirely on nonmilitary products. Again and again, Japanese
industry has been the first to apply a new technology to an
existing consumer product, transforming it into an item of
strong appeal to the public and creating a booming market.
Soaring sales finance still further development of the tech-
nology involved--of ten to a level surpassing that in countries
where the same technology has been applied mainly to high-cost,
low-volume military or space-related goods, thus cutting out
consumer-market revenues and stunting further progress in that
field of technology.
The Japanese strategy in the past has been to take American
inventions like the automobile, the color TV, and the VCR, and
develop low-cost, high-quality ways to manufacture them; this in
itself was not harmful to the American economy because it served
the interests of the consumer—besides that, everyone knew
that "Americans remained the world's best inventors. That was our
economic weapon: creating new technology." The United States
could always take comfort in the fact that even as Japanese firms
caught up in manufacturing techniques, American firms were still
far ahead in research and development. But, "the success of
American science often leads Americans to exaggerate their com-
petitive position. After all, [they say] more Nobel prizes are won
421Masanori Moritani, "Japan Surges Ahead In Nonmilitary
Technologies," Japan Update 15, (Spring 1990): 4.
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by Americans than any other nationality. True, but success in pure
science does not correlate well with economic success." '
But this American complacency has been shattered in recent
years, because the Japanese have begun entering a new and more
dangerous stage in their competitive strategy: they are now chal-
lenging the United States all along the technological frontier, and
not just in the innovation and marketing of American ideas. Ira
Magaziner and Mark Patinkin write that:
Despite having only half our population, Japan graduates more
engineers and scientists than we do. In the past decade, the
Japanese have marshalled that brainpower to organize an
extraordinary research drive, facing off against us over the
industries of the next century. There are many battlegrounds--
micro-electronics , fifth-generation computers, advanced
ceramics, bio-technology, superconductors. Many won't lead to
high-volume products for ten to twenty years, much too long for
most companies to keep up expensive R&D. Japan's bureaucracy
understands that. That's why it's helping companies pioneer new
commercial technologies— far more than our government is
helping our own. That's why Japan has begun to match us not
just in manufacturing, but inventing as well.
At risk is the economy of the United States, because these new
technologies will be the prime determinants of economic growth in
* 23Lester C. Thurow, The Zero-Sum Solution: Building a World Class
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the 21st century. According to a new report released by the Council
on Competitiveness, the United States "...still leads or matches
its foreign counterparts in two thirds of critical technologies,
including biotechnology and computer software. But U.S. industry
has fallen drastically behind in a third of technologies, like
electronics, deemed crucial to commercial might and economic
40c
growth." The stakes involved are enormous, because:
Advanced ceramics has the promise of being the steel of the
next century, replacing metals in car engines and airplanes.
High-speed computers may well make those we have today
obsolete. Biotechnology is likely to dominate the pharma-
ceutical industry. Advanced telecommunications and robots could
each generate tens of billions a year in sales within a decade
or two. Japan has targeted all those as even greater priorities
than solar [photovoltaics] . Hundreds of Japanese companies have
invested in each field, many spurred on by government incen-
tives. It's happening in a half-dozen other fields as well:
opto-electronics , information technology, super-conductors--
industries that could mean as much to our children as com-
puters do to us.
The Japanese fully intend to dominate these technologies: they
are not only working to surpass American scientific efforts to
develop these new technologies, but are also attempting to
politically derail any potential competition through the sustained
efforts of the Japanese lobby. In a recent effort, the Japanese
lobby attempted to frustrate efforts to develop an American high-
definition television (HDTV) industry. As John Judis describes this
425Susan Dentzer, "Staying ahead in high tech: The U.S. leads in key






The Japanese also use a traditional front group strategy to get
their point across. Japanese subsidiaries now play a signifi-
cant role in the Electronics Industry Association, but in
debates with the American Electronics Association, the EIA
presents itself as merely a rival American trade association.
The EIA first opposed any government HDTV funding whatsoever
and then, when that position appeared impolitic, insisted that
foreign subsidiaries enjoy the fruits of any government inter-
vention. The EIA's position was not without merit intellec-
tually—its position paper was ably drafted by the Berkeley
Roundtable on International Economics—but it lacked candor.
What appeared to be a plea for free market principles was also
part of a strategy for foreign domination of the American HDTV
market. 27
Why do the Japanese want control of this market? The answer is
given by the American Electronics Association (AEA) , which declares
that "the new television system is 'a once-in-a-lifetime gateway
for U.S. reentry into consumer electronics'." 42 Both the AEA and
the Japanese also understand that "the technology embodies a host
of cutting-edge technologies that apply to a wide range of other
industries, from chip production (HDTV will expand the memory
capabilities of chips) to defense (information displays on military
aircraft, for example) . "™ 7 Currently the Japanese have the lead
in the race to produce a HDTV system; they have already "invested
427
Judis, "The Japanese Megaphone," 24-25. Judis also says that "in
fighting against government funding of American HDTV efforts, the Japanese
have been able to rely on companies like Ampex that now get an important
part of their profits from selling Japanese technology. "We've got to the
point where we can say, "We've met the enemy and he is us,' says Bill
Reinsch, an aid to [former] Pennsylvania Senator John Heinz."
428Edmund L. Andrews, "Translated, HDTV Means 'Beat Japan'," Business
Month (June 1990) : 67.
429Ibid., 67.
195
nearly $1 billion in HDTV research and this year [1990] plan to
launch the first regular programming, to be broadcast from
satellite to individual Japanese receivers.' How important is
this lead? Well, in a study done for the AEA, the Boston Consulting
Group (BCG) "...forecasts sales of high-definition receivers, VCRs,
and broadcast equipment of as much as $45 billion between 1993 and
2005. By another estimate, annual sales for just receivers and VCRs
will hit $11 billion in 2010.
"
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Another method the Japanese use in their attempts to gain
control of critical technologies is to either acquire a minority
position within the American companies which are developing these
technologies, or to simply to buy them outright. This has proven to
be a very effective way of stifling US competition, and the numbers
are quite impressive, for "Japan's minority investments in U.S.
companies grew from from 40 deals in 1988 worth $166 million to
some 60 deals [in 1989] worth an estimated $350 million...," 4 and
during 1987 alone for example, the "Japanese bought an incredible
20 times as many U.S. high-tech firms as Americans bought in
Japan." And if they're unable to purchase an American firm






some field in which they're interested, the Japanese will attempt
then to set up some sort of joint venture, which then allows them
to acquire the technology through the backdoor. It is a disturbing
trend, for "at leading research labs in the U.S., such as SRI
International, PA Consulting Group, and Battelle Memorial
Institute, most research is now funded by overseas companies,
mostly Japanese.'
The capital-rich Japanese are in a favored position in most of
these joint venture relationships, and what is "...particularly
worrisome is the growing reliance of American high-tech start-up
companies on foreign partners [like Japan] for cash and
manufacturing expertise," because the " ... quid pro quo is usually
a transfer of new technologies to the foreign investors, creating
future industrial competitors." But, for small, cash-poor
American companies which are on the cutting edge of various new
technologies, there is often little choice but to accept Japanese
capital even when they already know that there is a good chance
that the Japanese will then eventually squeeze them out of the
manufacturing of that new technology. It is generally acknow-
ledged that:
Most Japanese multinationals have not transferred technology or
allowed local control to the degree that American and West
European corporations have for decades. Japanese firms have




other high-tech areas with the apparent aim of transporting
advanced research to Japan. As a result, American companies
lose development and manufacturing experience and are drained
of their research findings.
An excellent example of how the Japanese are using these joint
ventures to eventually dominate the technologies involved:
...is that of Japan's Kubota, a tractor company that is
now making mini-supercomputers after investing in five Silicon
Valley firms. The design, chips, and software all came from
cash-hungry American firms in which Kubota staked money in
exchange for minority shares and the transfer of technology.
For a $75 million investment, Kubota is gaining expertise to
make a computer on its own in a few years .... [This case] illus-
trated] a dangerous trend: U.S. companies, acting on short-
term needs, are selling off the very technologies that have
given them land the economy) long-term competitive
advantages .
^
The Japanese are using almost the same approach in their
attempt to "...overtake American dominance in still another major
(IB
[high-tech] industry—civilian aircraft," except this time
they're picking the brains of giant American defense firms for
their technology acquisition under the guise of strengthening the
military alliance. The commercial-aircraft market is currently one
of the few remaining markets still dominated by American firms, and
the sales figures involved are huge. In 1990 alone, the United
States "...trade surplus in aircraft and parts totalled about $23
billion," with "...about 85 percent of the world's 9,800 airline
436Ibid., 135.
4370mestad, 135-36.
* 38James Fallows, "Civilian Aircraft is the Next Industry on Japan's
Agenda," Business Month 134, (July 1989): 22.
198
jets (excluding those in the Soviet Union) [having been] made in
America, mostly by Boeing and McDonnell Douglas.""' 7 It will be a
critical market for the United States in the future as well, for
"...between 1990 and 2008, worldwide sales of commercial jets are
expected to total roughly 11,500, worth about $600 billion in
today's dollars." With the United States already facing
substantial competition from the heavily-subsidized European Airbus
consortium, the prospect of having the Japanese enter this market
selling commerical-aircraf t which have been designed and manu-
factured with the help of American high-technology transferred to
Japan within the U. S . -Japanese bilateral security framework is
disheartening to many.
Before the joint venture for co-development of the Japanese FSX
new-generation fighter was finalized between General Dynamics
Corporation and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Limited in 1989, there
was an acrimonious debate in the United States over the advisa-
bility of transferring American advanced aviation technology to the
Japanese. James Fallows points out that "in order to provide work
for its factories and, more importantly, to acquire know-how in
areas where its technology has lagged, Japan has tried to build
American weapons under license rather than import them. The FSX was




in fact a perfect illustration of Japan's preferences." 441 By using
advanced American technology gained from joint ventures like the
FSX and the licensed production of existing military aircraft like
the F-15, the Japanese hope to be able to transfer that knowledge
into the production of civilian aircraft. This is a conscious
effort on the part of the Japanese government to gain American
technology, while at the same time seeming to comply with
persistent US requests that Japan bolster its part of the military
alliance between the two nations.
The Japanese cleverly have attempted to "...harness two
nation's military budgets— its own and America ' s--to increase [its
high-tech] industrial production." Through this method, it has
managed to begin turning its "...military budget to economic
advantage." If the Japanese truly had been concerned about
either saving money or simply improving the force structure of its
Air Self-Defense Force, they would not continue to push for
licensed production of combat aircraft in Japan, because figures
show that Japanese-produced F-15 Eagles not only take longer to
enter their military inventory, but "...cost twice as much as those
441 Ibid., 24.




produced in America...." 44 As for the FSX, it is still behind
schedule and way over budget.
But saving money and strengthening the ASDF is not the primary
concern of the Japanese. They are looking for the advanced aviation
technology--and they're getting it. After co-production of the F-15
had begun, "the General Accounting Office concluded that a massive
transfer of technology had greatly strengthened Japan's aircraft
manufacturers, both military and commercial, as well as its
electronics industry." 44 It is increasingly clear that the
Japanese hope "...to combine military and commercial industries in
a unique way. ... [through] the value of spin-offs, particularly from
military projects such as the FSX and Japan's ambitious space-
rocket program." 446 The Japanese are once again taking advantage
of a "...40-year behavior pattern in which the United States has
sacrificed its economic interests for what it regarded as military
imperatives . " 44 '
Even though Japan is still behind in advanced aviation tech-
nology, Japanese advances in other technological fields are pro-
ceeding apace and are reflected in large part by the number and
quality of patents granted to Japanese companies over the last few
'"ibid., 24.
44S
Harrison and Prestowitz, 58.
445Fallows, "Civilian Aircraft is the Next Industry on Japan's
Agenda," 25.
i in
"'Harrison and Prestowitz, 58.
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years. During the 1960s, American companies routinely filed the
largest number of patents, but have been steadily losing ground
ever since. Even though the United States still holds on to a slim
lead in US patents issued, the long-term trend has been
discouraging. The foreign share of US patents has grown from 18.6
percent in 1963 to 47.3 percent in 1988. Last year, four Japanese
companies led in the number of US patents granted while only four
American firms even made it into the top ten list. In 1990,
Americans received just 53.3 percent of the 96,727 US patents
* 449issued.
William Broad, in his analysis of Japan's strong challenge for
technological dominance, states that:
High-quality patents are seen by many experts as potent
indicators of a nation's future prosperity because they signal
the emergence of important new technologies that will be under
the patent holder's exclusive control for many years. Superior
scientific papers are considered important to a nation's indus-
trial health because inventors increasingly rely on basic
research to compete effectively in the international race for
commercial innovations.
American research has traditionally been extremely strong at
^"Laurent Belsie, "US Patent Numbers Raise Hope of Inventive
Resurgence," The Christian Science Monitor 83, (March 13, 1991): 7. These
four US companies were General Electric, Eastman Kodak, International
Business Machines, and North American Philips.
Ibid., 7. This is exactly the same percentage as in 1989.
450 Ibid., B5. Broad says that "the detailed analysis of citations to
patents and scientific papers, though laden with limitations and sometimes
faulted as experimental, is seen as having attained a new level of
maturity and respectability in recent years. The Federal Government has
increasingly used the method to study technical trends."
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the level of basic science, but citation analysis of American
scientific papers by the Institute for Scientific Information has
shown that even though the quality of American research has
steadily grown over the last ten years, most of the scientific
advances have been reflected in academic fields like earth science
and environmental studies. Sharp declines were noted in the
technologies which are critical for industrial competition--
including computer science, communications, electronics,
engineering, robotics and instrumentation. Meanwhile, between 1983
and 1989, the Japanese have pulled up almost even in total tech-
nological strength as measured by these types of studies. These
findings reveal some disturbing trends in the industrial compe-
tition between Japan and the United States; in 1985, for example,
Hitachi surpassed IBM in overall technical strength, and it is
continuing to widen the gap. *
These trends can be partially explained by looking at the
amount of money being spent on research & development by each of
the two countries. In 1981, Japanese firms spent about $19.8
billion on R&D compared to $35.9 billion for American companies, or
roughly 55 percent of the US total. By 1986, Japanese spending had
changed that ratio in their favor to about 71 percent as they
invested $41.6 billion in research compared to the US total of
$58.2 billion. Estimates are that the Japanese are now funding
451 Ibid., B8.
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their R&D programs at about 90 percent of the US level, even though
their economy is only half as large. 52 The trend in U.S. R&D
investment is also worrisome, considering that in 1989,
"...7 of the top 10 foreign R&D spenders [were] Japanese corn-
elpanies. Business Week research into this trend has shown that:
R&D spending by U.S. companies in 1989 totaled $65.2 billion,
up 10% from 1988 in current dollars, but only 5.6% when
adjusted for inflation. That compares with an 11% nominal, 6.6%
real gain registered in 1988, and it means that the downward
drift in R&D continues. From the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s,
U.S. industrial R&D spending annually surged as much as eight
points ahead of inflation, reflecting robust investments in
exciting new technologies. But in the late '80s, as companies
reacted to cost pressures and a more sober business climate,
R&D suffered.m
How those dwindling funds are spent is equally important.
Traditionally, the US has concentrated much of its technological
research into three basic sectors: defense, medicine, and
agriculture. Large research organizations in each of these sectors
dominate the funds spent on the search for new technologies or
" 2Magaziner and Patinkin, 357-358. See too in Michael Porter, The
Competitive Advantage of Nations
, p. 398, where he writes that "as
technological capability has grown in Japan, companies have increased the
rate of spending on more and more basic research. Today, Japanese
government statistics show that Japan is a net exporter of technology
measured in terms of new research contracts or agreements. The overall
level of R&D spending in Japan has risen from 1.9 percent of GNP in 1971
to 2.8 percent in 1987, along with Germany and Sweden the highest of any
advanced nation. Virtually all Japanese R&D is in areas other than
defense. Government funds a modest 21 percent of national R&D (compared to
47 percent in the United States) and more than 80 percent of Japanese
government-funded R&D is in general science and energy..."
453Emily Smith and James B. Treece, "Glimpsing The Future In The
Numbers," Business Week (Innovation 1990): 195.
454 Ibid., 194.
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improvements in existing ones. In fact, these three sectors
"...employ well over half the nation's scientists and engineers,
spend over 80 percent of federal research and devlopment (R&D)
funds (or nearly 90 percent if NASA's R&D is included), and
accounted in 1985 for 25 percent of the Gross National Product
(GNP) . This poses a problem for the US because "...given the
continuous pattern of innovation and the size and entrenched
character of the special-interest policy systems in defense,
medicine, and agriculture, it is difficult to focus the nation's
innovative capabilities on other sectors."" 6
There are some policy analyst like Don Kash, a Research Fellow
in the Science and Public Policy Program, who feel that this
"...inability to reallocate the resources necessary for tech-
nological innovation [is] closely linked to [the] most urgent
problem facing the nation: we have no broad-based, well-developed
organizational capacity to innovate continuously technologies that
are competitive in the international marketplace." Even so, Kash
notes, "the erosion of the nation's competitiveness in commercial
high-tech products is not so much a result of any decline of
capabilities in the United States as it is a reflection of rapidly





in Japanese research which is attempting to "...sculpt ever smaller
devices in semiconductor materials--and to concoct new materials
from combinations of atoms that Mother Nature didn't try--Japanese
engineers are testing the limits of scientific theory."^ 8 As Genya
Chiba, vice-president of Japan Research Development Corp., says,
"one can no longer make a clear distinction between science and
technology.
The Japanese government's own investment in research and
development has been relatively small, in large part because the
Japanese have been very successful in the past exploiting, at very
little cost to themselves, basic research done in the United States
and Europe. Much more important than the money it spends on R&D
though, are the methods by which the Japanese government helps to
promote commercialization of new technologies by aggressively
subsidizing prototype markets for new products. This is usually
accomplished through direct purchase of products (such as solar-
power generation plants, or superconductive train systems), by
458Gross, 75.
< 59Ibid., 75.
460 Ibid., 363. The authors state that "the U.S. government spends far
more on R&D than the Japanese government, about $59 billion in 1986,
compared to about $12 billion in Japan. But this is misleading. About 70
percent of the U.S. government funds are spend on defense R&D, an addi-
tional 12 percent on basic health-care research, and 16 percent for space
exploration. The remaining $7 billion provides support for basic research
primarily in areas as diverse as the environment, housing, and energy.
Very little goes to support potentially commercial ventures. In Japan,
about 80 per-cent of the R&D funding, or about $9 billion, goes to re-
search and development in commercial areas."
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using tax incentives to stimulate private purchases, and through
special leasing schemes, as it has done with computers. 61
But there is another aspect to the technological race and that
is how technology is accepted and used at the individual worker
level. Here too, the Japanese have an advantage, for innovation is
continually pushed by all levels of the business hierarchy in
Japan. Professor Ken-ichi of Hitotsubashi University describes this
Japanese penchant for taking the latest technology and carrying out
"...continuous incremental innovations aimed at delivering both
higher quality and lower cost":
Japanese as individuals and as members of firms are very aware
of the importance of technology, and there is a widespread
grass roots basis supporting the spread and development of new
and better ways of doing things. This is one part of the
accumulation of small innovations for which Japanese firms are
renowned.
There are many American industry leaders like Andrew Grove,
president of Intel Corp. , who adamently believe that if trade was
the Japanese economic weapon of the 1970s and 1980s, then "...in
the 1990s, it's going to be investment-cum-technology-
transfer..."" 3 Until Americans begin to understand that Japan has
mlbid., 258.
462Kash, 191. See too in Robert C. Christopher, Second To None:
American Companies in Japan (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1986), p.
24, where Christopher says that "among the many admirable characteristics
of Japanese workers and plant managers is their habit of continually
making small changes in the machinery and manufacturing process used by
their company—changes which, incrementally, often add up to major
improvements in both worker productivity and product quality."
463Buell, 87
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been conducting an assault not only upon American markets but also
upon the technological underpinnings of US national security, it is
going to continue to hold an immense advantage over the US in the
economic arena. The Japanese view economic security as a 'zero-sum'
game: if US industry is ahead in any significant tech-nological
field, the Japanese feel threatened. As the Japanese themselves
have stated about this aspect of their industrial policy: "When the
technology concerned is critical to the security of a nation's
economy, the government of that country will be forced to take the
necessary measures to develop the industry concerned so that its
firms can become competitive and assure the security of the
country's economy."
^Ibid., 125. These comments were quoted from talks between MITI
officials and US trade negotiators in 1983 and 1984 held pursuant to
complaints of unfair trade by the US machine tool industry. For a more
recent example see in Kevin L. Kearns, "Flat-panel case acts as paradigm:
U.S. needs to save critical industry," San Jose Mercury News (February 25,
1991): 3D, where Kearns, a former State Department official and now a
fellow at the Economic Strategy Institute in Washington, D.C., comments on
a recent finding by the Department of Commerce that says the Japanese are
dumping flat-panel screens in order to drive US competitors out of this
critical technological field. As Kearns states: "The stakes in this
struggle are immense. The market for flat-panel displays is expected to
grow from $1.8 billion yearly in 1988 to $8.5 billion a year by 1996 and
then expand even faster. The firms that win the race will realize untold
billions in profits and wield vast economic and technological power." The
article goes on to say that Japanese tactics for dominance in the field
were laid out bluntly in the December 1989 Japan Economic Journal .
Explaining why Toshiba was willingness to make such heavy investments in
flat-panel production capacity at an early stage of the market, Executive
Vice President Tsuyoshi Kawanishi said: "We are prepared to accept red ink
for the first five or six years. From the experience of our semiconductor
industry, we have learned that one has to take a long-term perspective."
As Kearns comments: " To those in Washington and Silicon Valley who
witnessed the Japanese "targeting" and near destruction of the U.S.
semiconductor industry, this statement spelled the end of the U.S. flat -
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This policy is one which will very likely put Japan on a
collision course with the United States, for "increasing compe-
tition between the United States and Japan in the emerging high-
technology industries will continue to cause tension, with Japan
investing more to establish a competitive advantage in this [high-
technology] sector as its older industries decline." Leonard
Silk, in an editorial in The New York Times , points out the real
danger of allowing the Japanese to pursue their policy of targeting
these high-technology markets:
The Japanese strategy, according to Richard J. Elkus Jr.,
chairman of the Prometrix Corporation, a California-based
manufacturer of semiconductor equipment, is based on the
concept that products and markets become more and more
interrelated during development. "Every technology becomes the
stepping stone for the next," he said. "Every product becomes
the basis for another. And the resulting efficiencies of scale
are enormous." The heart of the Japanese strategy, he contends,
is that capturing product markets is the key to technological
supremacy. "One often hears how we must improve our techno-
logical base," Mr. Elkus told a. . .conference of the Center for
Strategic and Industrial Studies in Williamsburg, Va
.
, adding:
"Technology follows markets, not the other way around. If you




466Leonard Silk, "Can U.S. Recover In Electronics?," The New York
Times (May 4, 1990): C2. Elkus also relates that he was part of the team
that developed the videocassette recorder at Ampex in the postwar years.
As Silk explains: "In 1970 Ampex was involved, through a joint venture
partner, Toshiba, in discussions with other Japanese companies, including
Sony and Matsushita, to develop a VCR standard. But Ampex, lacking
adequate financial resources and seeking quicker returns elsewhere,
decided not to pursue the VCR market, which was picked up by the Japanese.
With that loss, Mr. Elkus said, went not only most of the video recording
but also a major share of support technologies, including the design and
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The consequences of losing both the markets and the technology
would be grave, for American national security depends upon tech-
nological innovation creating not only a strong economy, but a
strong defense as well. As Jacques Gansler, a former Defense
Department official, observes: "Because technological superiority
is a significant part of our military and economic national
strategy--some say it is our national strategy in both areas--it is
critically important to maintain our leadership position."" If
nations like Japan are determined to control critical areas of
emerging technologies and shut out US industries, American secur-
ity interests could be severely damaged in the coming decades.
Technology transfers between allied nations like Japan and the US
should strengthen all concerned; but, if the Japanese decide that
they must exercise sole control over critical technologies, they
are forcing an eventual confrontation, because the United States
cannot allow itself to be put in a situation where it is held
hostage by foreign developers and manufacturers of critical
technological components necessary for its industry and armed
forces. This is why Americans have become increasingly concerned
about the prospects of vital technology being controlled by




D. SHINTARO ISHIHARA AND THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF JAPANESE
DOMINATION OF CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES
There are a number of Japanese opinion-makers who openly
declare that Japan does have an economic agenda which may at times
run counter to the interests of American national security. These
declarations are usually made in conjunction with strong statements
stressing the imperative of Japan's growing economic strength and
emphasizing the view that a declining and racist America is no
longer worthy of respect. This viewpoint that Japan is growing
stronger, and, by inference, more powerful in world affairs, has
been underscored recently by the publication in Japan of an
extremely popular book called No to ieru Nihon . Translated as The
Japan That Can Say No , it was written by Akio Morita, co-founder
and chairman of Sony Corporation, and Shintaro Ishihara, a
right-wing Japanese politician who some say has an outside chance
of someday becoming Japan's prime minister. When the book was
first published in Japan, it was "...assumed that it would be just
for home consumption." 40 Instead, it created a firestorm of
""When the book was eventually published in the United States Morita
withdrew his co-authorship, apparently fearing that his connection with
the book could lead to a possible loss of sales for Sony.
Acq
"This work is a form of round-table discussion ( zandankai ) commonly
used by Japanese commentators to reflect on current affairs. Viewpoints
expressed often represent the latest thinking on the subject and are used
to work out a future agenda on particular issues.
*'°Amy Borrus and Paul Magnusson, "The Book That's Creating A
Firestorm," Business Week 3130, (October 23, 1989): 78.
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controversy between the United States and Japan, as influential
Americans throughout industry and government were shocked by the
arch (Japanese) nationalism and the implied threats to US national
security expressed in the book. A top Bush Administration trade
official stated the wide-spread view in Washington that the book
"...could become a symbol of [dangerous] Japanese arrogance." 4 ' 1
One of the main points stressed by Shintaro Ishihara in the
book (and a point that sent shivers down the spines of military
planners in the Pentagon) , is that "Japanese technology, parti-
cularly semiconductors, gives Japan the opportunity to play power
politics with the United States and the Soviet Union." 472 DARPA
(Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) was concerned enough
about the contents of the book to circulate an unauthorized
translation within Congress and the Pentagon long before the book
was actually published in the United States in revised form. As an
unnamed Pentagon source stated: "The book had deleterious
implications not only for our economic but for our military
future." Some of the more inflammatory points taken from the book
that the Pentagon considered relevant to national security were:
1. Whether it be midrange nuclear weapons or intercontinental
ballistic missiles, what ensures the accuracy of weapons is
none other than compact, high-precision computers [that rely
on computer chips]... If Japan stopped selling chips [to the
U.S.], there would be nothing more [the U.S.] could do.
471Ibid., 78.
472David MacEachron, "America: Don't Take 'No' for an Answer,"
Harvard Business Reviev (March-April 1990): 178.
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If... Japan sold chips to the Soviet Union and stopped sel-
ling them to the U.S., this would upset the entire military
balance;
2. The American nuclear umbrella is just an illusion as far as
the Japanese people are concerned. The time has come for
Japan to tell the U.S. that we do not need American [mili-
tary] protection. Japan will protect itself with its own
power and wisdom;
3. America wants to steal Japanese know-how. They cannot manu-
facture the most technologically advanced fighters without
advanced ceramic and carbon fiber technology from Japan-
's. Japanese technology has advanced so much that America gets
hysterical, an indication of the tremendous value of that
card--perhaps our ace; and
5. When the time comes that Japan does say no decisively on a
particular issue, there may be a dramatic reaction ... Should
America behave unreasonably toward Japan, Japan must open
channels to deal with the rest of the world from a different
standpoint
.
Ishihara is an outspoken and provocative Japanese politician,
whose writings are certainly not the official views of the Liberal
Democratic Party (to which he belongs) or the Japanese government,
but the fact that the book has sold over a million copies in Japan
seems to prove that his views have hit a sympathetic chord in the
minds of many Japanese. ' Some analysts believe that Ishihara has
revived an extreme form of Japanese nationalism that began in the
Shintaro Ishihara, "Playboy Interview: Shintaro Ishihara,"
interview by David Sheff, Playboy
,
(october 1990): 59.
474See in David Sheff, "Playboy Interview: Shintaro Ishihara," p. 60,
where Sheff says that Ishihara "is at once Japan's most respected and most
loathed politician. One young businessman said, 'He is a very bad man.'
But far more people.
.
.feel that his is the voice they have been waiting
for." Sheff also quotes a Japanese companion as saying that Ishihara "is
the only Japanese who bravely speaks out to the world for us. And what he
speaks is the truth."
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late 19th century and was used to justify Japanese expansion in the
1930s and 1940s. John Stern, head of the Japan office of the
American electronics industry association, has described the book
as "...a manifesto of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity
47c
Sphere." Other Japan-watchers say that:
The most charitable interpretation sees this renewed
nationalism [as expressed in Ishihara's views] as a belated
recognition that meekness on the world stage is no longer
appropriate for Japan. It sees Ishihara merely as voicing
dissatisfaction with an outmoded relationship between Japan and
the United States. Seen thus, the book serves three purposes.
First, it serves as a cri de coeur, stripping away the reserve
of official statements and enabling foreigners to glimpse some
deeply felt Japanese concerns. Second, as a criticism of the
United States, the book points to domestic problems that need
to be resolved if the United States is to achieve economic
growth. Finally, The Japan That Can Say No should spur
Americans to reassess what is, clearly, an outmoded inter-
national relationship. .. .A less charitable view of this book
sees in its nationalism the resurrection of an unreconstructed
arrogance. At the moment this interpretation appears more
compelling, for Ishihara's remarks fit with other statements by
leading Japanese figures.
An example being Ryutaro Hashimoto, the former Finance
Minister, who remarked that in future relations with the United
States "...we'll be expressing ourselves more forcefully and
477
clearly. '"" Recent writings by a number of other Japanese have
tended to echo these same sentiments--Yoichi Shinkai, an Osaka
University economics professor, for instance, has expressed the
47S
Andrew Goble and James C. Carlson, "Japan's America-Bashers,"
Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs 34, (Winter 1990): 85.
* 76Ibid., 85-86.
477Borrus and Magnusson, 78.
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increasingly held view among many Japanese that "...to some extent
the disputes [between the US and Japan] are the predictable
backlashes that occur when a newly rising power starts to shoulder
inn
the old powers aside." A more extreme example can be found in
the (representative) best-seller written by a former Bank of Japan
official, Osamu Shimomura, titled Japan Is Not At Fault: America
Is. As Kenneth Pyle comments with some alarm, Shimomura ' s book
"...pandered to the pervasive but still formless nationalist mood
47 q
of Japan in the late 1980s. In the book, Shimomura angrily
wrote, for instance, that:
The United States cannot bear to be the loser, and so it
concludes that free trade means arranging things so it cannot
lose. Doubtless this attitude reflects the belief in excel-
lence—its own excellence. America believes that by rights it
ought to be stronger than Japan; since it cannot be, it tries
to hold Japan back. 480
This view that the United States is trying to hold back Japan
is a pervasive one among Japanese, and it is often related to the
idea that the racist Americans "...are basically frustrated because
478Yoichi Shinkai, "Japan's Positive Role as the World's Banker,"
Economic Eye: A Quarterly Digest of Views from Japan 2, (Summer 1990): 25.
4
^Kenneth B. Pyle, "The Burden of Japanese History and Politics of
Burden Sharing," from Makin and Hellman, eds., Sharing World Leadership? ,
71.
itri
Osamu Shimomura, Nippon va varukunai: varui no was Amerika da
(Japan Is Not At Fault: America Is) (Tokyo: Bungei shunju, 1987, as quoted
in Kenneth B. Pyle, "The Burden of Japanese History and Politics of Burden
Sharing," from Makin and Hellman, eds., Sharing World Leadership?
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the non-white Japanese are doing so well."*" This type of thinking
reveals a disturbing trend, and one which could cause future
problems, "...for in the face of growing differences with America
over economic and political matters, the shame of World War II will
inevitably give way to a more natural, and more fierce, national
sensibility. This will particularly be the case should Japan
experience a decline in its economic miracle and blame the United
States for that decline." 482
With this possibility in mind, the changing attitudes of
younger Japanese leaders towards the United States is becoming an
important concern, because there is "...a small but increasingly
noisy minority of mostly younger technocrats and politicans [who]
agree with Ishihara's central point--that the U.S. is a fading
power without grounds to lecture Japan on trade and other issues
[italics mine]." Technology transfer and American reliance upon
Japanese high-tech components for its weapons systems are two of
q81Jiro Koitabashi, "Shintaro Ishihara Interviewed on New Book,"
FBIS-EAS-90-122-S, (25 June 1990), 16.
Friedman and Lebard, 13.
^Borrus and Magnusson, 78. See too in Richard Nixon, In The Arena:
A Memoir of Victory, Defeat and Renewal (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1990), p. 56, where Nixon says that "while Japan has begun to take on a
wider global role, its ultimate shape remains undetermined. Although
Japan's and America's interests would best be served by a collaborative
relationship, the prevalence of Japan-bashing in the United States and
America-bashing in Japan casts a dark cloud on the future of our
relationship. With the rise of as new generation of Japanese leaders--many
of whom have no personal memories of the U.S. postwar reconstruction of
Japan— the danger exists that our trans-Pacific ties will fray or even
snap."
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the most important of these "other issues." George Friedman and
Meredith Lebard tred on explosive ground in their new book The
Coming War With Japan , when they contend that "the real issue [is]
almost never mentioned in the [technology transfer] controversy:
the future of the U. S . -Japanese alliance after the Cold War," and
even more importantly, "...the possibility of trade wars turning
into something more direct, more military, [is] also never
discussed." 4 Their contention that there is a coming war with
Japan is almost certainly wrong, but it is foolish to totally
ignore the possibility of a less friendly Japan confronting the
United States in other ways. That is why Ishihara's views have to
be taken into account when Americans consider the strategic
implications of Japan coming to dominate many of the advanced
technologies of the future. As the Japanese continue to surge ahead
in many high-tech fields and gradually gain control their produc-
tion, US defense planners are forced to take note when someone like
Ishihara gloats that:
The U.S. can make all the 256K chips it wants to, but the chips
that will determine the future—essentially the ones required
for fifth-generation computers with a capacity of one and two
megabits, which are key in targeting ICBMs--are not made in
America, at least not with consistent quality. Japan is five
years ahead of America in semiconductor technology and the gap
is widening. The gap is even wider for four- and five-megabit
chips and larger memory chips. The more sophisticated the
chips, the greater Japan's dominance. It is a fact: The U.S. is




This is unfortunately true. In 1987, the Defense Department's
Defense Science Board had already declared the situation unaccep-
table that "U.S. defense will soon depend on foreign sources for
state-of-the-art technology in semiconductors." 486 In fact, the
report "...found that America is dependent on Japanese suppliers
for eight electronic devices crucial to U.S. weapons systems." 48
This is a situation that is making American defense planners
increasingly nervous, especially when they consider the possible
implications of having a Japan which is no longer a reliable ally.
Ishihara has stated, for example, that:
America is very seriously concerned about losing power of any
kind to Japan. Some Americans have been raising their voices in
advocation of an increased Japanese defense capacity. This may
be a worthwhile suggestion. We should overhaul our current
defense system, although I am not advocating an abrupt cutting
of ties with the U.S. We have accepted this absurd defense
formula consisting of three defense forces. This system must be
completely over-hauled to suit present realities, including a
much greater deterrent capacity, exploiting our high technology
to the maximum. We should develop the most persuasive and
demonstrable deterrent formula which would, without any doubt,
show our adversaries that any attack on Japan will end with
unbearable damage to the aggressor from both a strategic and a
tactical viewpoint.
There seems to be little doubt among many analysts that Japan
will translate its economic power into global (military) power.
486Philip H. Trezise, "Japan, the Enemy?," The Brookings Review
(Winter 1989/90): 12.
4(17
Borrus and Magnusson, 78.
488Akio Morita and Shintaro Ishihara, The Japan That Can Say "No" ,
as excerpted from the Congressional Record, (Washington, D.C.: The
Jefferson Educational Foundation, 1990), 98-99.
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Fred Ikle and Terumasu Nakanishi take that view, and have written
that
:
Tokyo has pursued global economic policies for years by
participating in international financial organizations and
economic assistance programs and by guiding the far-flung
investments of large Japanese corporations. But the Japanese
body politic may be inclined to resist commensurate expan-
sion of the nation' s security horizon. Japanese public sen-
timent reflects a reluctance to become engaged in issues of
foreign policy and defense [italics mine]. Over time, how-
ever, the disparity between the global horizon of Japan's
economic policies and the regional horizon of its security
strategy cannot persist. A nation with the economic and
technological strength of Japan is unlikely to remain a
purely regional power in the 21st century.
Ishihara's earlier statement about changing the alliance to
suit "present realities" seems to ominously echo Lord Palmerston's
political adage that nations [like Japan] have neither permanent
friends nor permanent enemies, only permanent interests; and, if
the Japanese do become more than simply a regional power in the
future, it is also a political philosophy which the United States
ignores at its own peril. Ishihara obliquely makes the point that
Japan's interests could run counter to the needs of American
national security, when he "...urges 'reform' of the U.S. -Japan
Security Treaty so that Japan can launch a major military buildup
independent of U.S. policies [italics mine]." 490 If politicians of
Isihara's ilk ever gain any significant power in Japan, this kind
of independence could signal the possibility of other inopportune
'"Fred Charles Ikle and Terumasu Nakanishi, "Japan's Grand
Strategy," Foreign Affairs 69, (Summer 1990): 81-82.
490Borrus and Magnusson, 78.
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political weather-changes in Japan as well--like the sudden
withdrawal, for instance, of Japanese support for any future
American military engagements, an action, which during a moment of
global crisis could suddenly place in doubt the reliability of
American imports of critical defense technology or components from
Japan. This is actually not that far-fetched a scenario, for this
type of political behavior has been demonstrated already by the
Japanese to a certain extent in the Gulf War (which most Japanese
did not support), when the Diet stipulated that any monies given to
the United States not be used for military procurement.
Ishihara is not the only Japanese to forcefully advocate this
type of independent action either, for there are many others, like
Yasunori Abe, Chief of the Washington bureau of the Japanese
newspaper Sankei , who have "...pointed out the possibility that too
much pressure on Japan by the United States on trade matters could
backfire, and when reassessment of relations with the United States
came it might be quite sudden and quite extreme." 491 These views
are perhaps not too surprising when one realizes that Sankei is the
most conservative (some say right-wing promilitary) newspaper among
the mainstream Japanese press when it comes to foreign policy
issues, but it is disconcerting to note however, that Abe remarked
that there "...was a special quality in the Japanese character, a
propensity for sudden swings of emotional overcommitment," and that
491Barnett, 23.
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the "...Japanese as a group, on short notice, could go to great
extremes." Abe also observes, in a remarkably frank statement,
that ". . .large-scale remilitarization of Japan could easily include
a decision to produce a sophisticated nuclear weapon
capability." 493
When statements like Abe's are placed into a realpolitik geo-
political context, they demonstrate very markedly the possible
danger of becoming overly reliant upon Japan for critical high-tech
components of US defense. Ishihara pulls no punches when he says
that "Japan's leading edge technology [is] superior to that of the
U.S. so much that Americans [have] become nervous concerning the
magnitude of Japan's superiority in that area." In some
respects, he's absolutely right, and it illustrates a strategic
problem that the United States is going to have to deal with,
because "it has long been recognized that national security for a
great power can be compromised by a war economy unduly dependent
upon overseas supply of raw materials, of critical manufactured
components, or of finished products."
492Ibid., 22.
Ibid., 23. The author quotes Abe further on the same page as
saying that "support of that view on paper might not be easy to find.
Nuclear weaponry was a taboo subject. If there was Japanese advocacy of
production, possession, or use in certain quarters it was likely to be




If what some American analysts maintain is true, and
"Washington's strategic policy toward Japan is drifting toward
greater United States dependency on Japan because of Japan's
regional political importance, its economic importance to the
Western world, and its growing ability to develop and produce the
advanced high- technology components required for U.S. weapons
systems [italics mine]," then there is cause to worry if poli-
ticians like Ishihara ever get the upper hand in Japanese
politics. Because, if that did happen, there are many who argue
that there could very quickly be less emphasis on fukoku (rich
country) and more on kyohei (strong military) , with potentially
disasterous effects on the balance of military power in the world.
This disasterous effect could be achieved by the Japanese through
the withholding of advanced technology from the United States, the
sale of high-tech (and potentially more advanced) weaponry to
regimes unfriendly to the United States, or simply by eventually
threatening American military dominance with its own rebuilt
military force.
49601sen, 121. See too in Kondracke, "Trade Gales," 13, where
Kondracke quotes a peeved American negotiator talking about the
difficulties of even dealing with a "friendly" Japan, much less one
controlled by arch-nationalists like Ishihara: "The Japanese are very
shrewd. They know that in a crisis the United States always does what it
has to do to get its act together. So for years they've been trying to
give us just enough to avoid the crisis. If they delay it long enough,
they'll have a stranglehold on our economy. We won't be able to do without
their computer chips or defense components and won't be able to afford a
crisis."
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American policy-makers must realize that the Japanese are
different in their geopolitical outlook, and their goals are bound
to deviate at times from American goals. The US must develop,
therefore, a strategy for dealing with a Japan which might not be
as accommodating in the future as it has been in the past; and,
therefore, their race for technological dominance could endanger US
security interests. Americans must not be misled into thinking that
this is not one of the most pressing challenges facing the United
States in the post-Cold War environment.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The United States finds itself at the end of the Cold War
the strongest military power on earth. It also remains the
world's largest economy. Its diplomatic and political influ-
ence seems to have increased dramatically as a consequence of
the Gulf War, and, this influence continues to remain high
throughout most regions of the world—there is a general sense
that America is riding high once again. There are many policy
analysts, like Charles Krauthammer of The Washington Post , who
believe that the United States has emerged from the Cold War
as the only remaining superpower. As Krauthammer unabashedly
puts it: "The most striking feature of the post-Cold War world
497is its unipolarity
.
In his calculated view, this "unipo-
larity" has the United States (along with its Western allies)
as the critical axis around which the rest of the world will
revolve
.
In support of this "unipolar" view, Krauthammer contends
(quite correctly) that the Soviet Union is in full geopolit-
ical retreat with its military and political influence rapidly
* 97Charles Krauthammer "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs 70, 23.
See also on page 24 where the author states quite boldly that an analysis
of the old conventional wisdom that Germany and Japan would be America's
chief rivals in a new multipolar world "leaves us with the true geo-
political structure of the post-Cold War world, brought sharply into focus
by the gulf crisis: a single pole of world power that consists of the
United States at the apex of the industrial West."
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declining as its economy staggers towards total collapse;
Germany and Japan, nations which have always been highly
touted as the new rivals in any emerging multipolar world,
have shown themselves during the recent Middle East crisis to
be unable, or perhaps unwilling, to translate their tremendous
economic clout into the necessary elements of influence essen-
tial for effective world leadership. In his analysis there are
currently no real competitors able to vie with the United
States for global preeminence; and, furthermore, Krauthammer
contends that this American preeminence in world affairs will
continue for at least three or four more decades, but, with
the carefully stated caveat that for this to happen the Ameri-
can economy must reinvigorate itself and avoid any further
economic decline. This, of course, is the important point, and
the question then becomes whether or not Japan's growing
economic strength contributes significantly to this perceived
decline in the American economy. The answer is a "qualified"
no--"qualif ied" in the sense that if Japanese efforts to
dominate the advanced technologies succeed in monopolizing
large segments of high-technology production in the future (as
those outlined in the last chapter) , that new situation could
result in reduced American competitiveness and increased de-
fense vulnerabilities. In that sense there is a possible
threat to US national security, but Japanese economic competi
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tion as it is now constituted, does not endanger the United
States, regardless of the contentions of the "Japan-bashers."
It is true that Japanese economic might is huge and still
expanding, and for those who predict the future by extrapolat-
ing the past, the trend would seem to show that Japan could
pose a real danger to American economic interests in the
coming years. This is an approach fraught with error however,
for as recent history has shown, one must be extremely wary of
assuming that strength today automatically translates into
strength tomorrow. Take, for example, the erroneous predic-
tions made about the economic dominance of various nations
just since the end of the Second World War: initially, it was
thought that American dominance of the world's economy in the
late-1940s would continue unabated; then, there was the fear-
ful assumption that the rapid industrial and technological
growth of the Soviet Union in the 1950s heralded a new econ-
omic challenge; this was quickly followed with resurgent
European fears of American domination in the 1960s; a fear
rapidly replaced after the oil-embargoes in the 1970s, and the
subsequent dramatic rise in the wealth and power of the Arab
OPEC members; and, now, followed with new fears arising in the
1980s of the emergence of an financially powerful Japan.
Little attention was paid to the underlying weaknesses of
those emerging international positions; and, consequently,
predictions about their duration and sustainability were
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dramatically overstated. For instance, with this current fear
about Japanese economic domination, when American strengths
are considered in the same breath as Japanese weaknesses , it
becomes apparent that "...economic competition from Japan does
not threaten America's national security.' The disloca-
tions in American industry caused by Japanese economic com-
petition were much more the fault of short-sighted US policies
and practices in both government and business, than of Japan-
ese competition itself. The Japanese sun is due to set in
many areas of its economy, and it is only in its push for
high-technology dominance that it will continue to be a fierce
competitor of the United States. Even critics of Japan admit
that:
Japan... has been admirably clearheaded about its economic
interests. The purpose of our arguments [these critics say]
is to encourage similar deliberation in the rest of the
world. Other countries should decide, as Japan has, what
their economic interests really are. If having particular
industries, such as supercomputers, is as important to the
U.S. as having an aircraft industry has been, then America
should take steps to ensure their vitality, rather than
badger Japan to abandon its own efforts. If the U.S. relies
498Trezise, 3.
^ 9Thurow, The Zero Sum Solution , 360-361. Thurow contends that
"Americans have to take much of the blame for the trade deficit with
Japan. American firms have refused to design products explicitly for the
Japanese market, have been shoddy in their quality control, have refused
to learn the Japanese language and customs, have demanded instant success,
and have often acted as if it is a duty of Japan to run its economy
precisely as the U.S. economy is run."
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too heavily on foreign capital, it should correct the habits
that have made it so dependent.
As the United States confronts this challenge to correct
its own short-comings, rather than blaming Japan for its
economic problems, the real issue is "...whether the American
economy has the dynamism to maintain or raise the American
standard of living, or whether the nation will slowly lose
ground in relative terms." 501 While the Japanese may threaten
to challenge the United States all along the high-technology
frontier, it can only do so successfully if American "defen-
siveness and loss of confidence have crept into American
so?industry and government." According to Michael Porter, the
United States is at an economic crossroads, and:
American firms and the American government have important
choices to make. The nation is teetering between a renewed
commitment to traditional American values and
r
a retreat to
consolidation, protection, and def ensiveness
.
The assertion that the United States "...will remain a
great power is not in doubt, because of its sheer size, re-
sources, and strengths...." 504 But the future of America's
economic strength and competitiveness lies with the future
500Fallows, et. al., "Beyond Japan-bashing," 55.
Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations , 724
502Ibid., 733.
503 Ibid., 724.
50 Torter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations , 724
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public policies of the United States, along with the individu-
al actions of American citizens who have have to respond to,
and work within, those policies. That is why strengthening the
American economy can only be achieved through the strengthen-
ing of American society and culture. James Fallows points out
that "...the United States is not an ordinary society,"
and, as he goes on to explain:
The differences between American and other cultures run deep
and matter profoundly. They are differences of kind, not
just degree. Of course people are essentially the same any-
where on earth, but cultures are not. America is unusual
because of its fundamental idea of how a society holds
itself together. 05
The importance of this comes to the fore when one considers
how American and Japanese cultures ultimately affect the
performance of their respective economies. It has already been
pointed out that Japanese industrial policy addresses itself
to much more than just the price-competitiveness of Japanese
companies, for its main approach has been to influence
Japanese culture, and thereby increase the underlying effi-
ciency of the Japanese people themselves. Japanese society has
a "...nationalism that... is founded not on enlightened self-
interest but... on a deeply ingrained sense of shared heritage
50
«James Fallows, More Like Us: Making America Great Again (Boston:




and national destiny." The truth seems to be that "a
society that is true to its own culture will usually have a
healthy economy. It will have found the right way to elicit
its people's best efforts. " JU0 That is an approach which can
work with the American people as well.
As Robert Reich explains, in the past, "individual [Ameri-
can] citizens supported education, roads, and other civic
improvements, even when the individual was likely to enjoy but
a fraction of what was paid out in the short term, because it
was assumed that such sacrifices would be amply rewarded even-
tually. Civic boosterism, public investment, and economic co-
operation were consistent with Tocqueville ' s principle of
'self-interest rightly understood.'"" 9 Consequently:
As our fellow citizens grew wealthier and more productive,
we benefited by their ability to give us more in exchange
for what we offered them. And we resisted opportunistic
behavior, so did they, with the result that we benefited all
the more. The resulting networks of economic interdependence
induced the habits of citizenship.
Robert B. Reich, The Work Of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for
21st-century Capitalism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 304-305. Reich
points out, however, that "nationalism can be a hazardous sentiment. The
same 'we're all in it together' attitude that elicits mutual sacrifice
within a nation can easily degenerate into jingoistic contempt for all
things foreign."




Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan has said that "the central
conservative truth is that it is culture, not politics, that
determines the success of a society. The central liberal truth
is that politics can change a culture and save it from
itself. ""' With that liberal truth in mind, proposals for an
American agenda can be suggested, so that the American people
can begin to move forward into this post-Cold War era with a
renewed sense of purpose and dedication. Because Americans are
a diverse lot, it is always difficult to bring them together
in any national effort short of war. That is why any list of
proposals must start with some basic foundations with which
almost all Americans can agree.
There are the places from which to start, for there are
certain national interests which have always made up the
cornerstones of American public policy. As Paul Nitze and the
other framers of NSC-68 discovered, the best expression of
those broad national interests is reflected in the Preamble to
the Constitution of the United States, which states that:
We the people of the United States, in order to form a more
perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquil
ity, provide for the common defense, promote the general
welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves
and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution
for the United States of America.
This is the fundamental expression of why we exist as a
nation. American national security policy must always be
511Fallows, More Like Us, 17
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cognizant of this constitutional framework, and any national
objective formulated must have as its raison d'etre the
protection or strengthening of these listed principles.
Policy-makers have a responsibility to fashion American goals
in light of American interests, and in the global environment,
where there are often many conflicting tugs at the nation's
attention, the first order of business must always be to
preserve the Republic. To this end, the United States must
develop objectives which:
1. ensure its survival as a free and independent nation,
with its institutions and people secure and its values
intact;
2. promote an expanding, fundamentally sound economy which
continues to ensure equal opportunity for individual
prosperity;
3. maintain a firm resource base for national endeavors at
home and abroad;
4. work for a stable international structure which fosters
political freedom, democratic institutions, and human
rights;
5. foster cooperative and friendly relations with allies
and other friendly nations; and
6. preserve and repair the ecology of the planet.
These then, must be the cornerstones used to build
American objectives and govern the general conduct of its
policy. But, in order to protect and advance these seminal
national interests, policy-makers need to formulate national
security policy objectives which clearly support the American
constitutional framework. These objectives must be broad
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enough to encompass the areas of concern and specific enough
for implementation. Through the next two decades, as the
redefines its new role within this drastically changed
international system, some of its basic objectives must be to:
1. maintain a formidable and flexible military establish-
ment (both nuclear and conventional forces) capable of
deterring any aggressive military actions against U.S.
interests, and, if deterrence fails capable of defeating
a military attack and ending the conflict on terms
favorable to the United States and its allies;
2. continue to foster an American identity through the
promotion of English as the common language. This, per-
haps more than any other aspect of American culture,
must be an integral part of the American identity. It is
that identity which is "...America's greatest potential
strength. Something about American values has enabled
ordinary people, assembled haphazardly from around the
world, to build the largest, richest, and freest economy
in history, and to do so mainly through voluntary ac-
tions rather than state direction." Without a common
language, we risk becoming Balkanized and losing the
cohesive glue which binds so many different ethnic
groups into the American Nation;
3. build the best educational system in the world in order
to ensure that America remains competitive in all areas
of science and industry. "America cannot regain preemi-
nence in innovation without human resources at least on
par with those in other advanced nations. While there is
great strength at the highest educational levels, the
average quality of human resources is lagging behing
that of other advanced nations. As competition has
internationalized and become increasingly based on
knowledge, workers without skills are finding their
livelihoods more and more threatened by the lower wages
in developing countries. A fundamental commitment to
upgrading human resources [through education] is neces-
sary." 513 This process is also vitally important for
the health of the democratic process itself. The Ameri-
512Fallows, More Like Us , 49.
Ml1JPorter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations , 725.
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can public must be able to understand the complex issues
which they face, and actively participate in the order-
ing of national priorities and objectives;
4. balance the federal budget. The United States cannot
continue to increase the federal deficit without
eventually squandering its economic strength. There must
develop the political will to cut spending and raise
taxes. Many analyst maintain that this "the most urgent
economic problem facing [the United States] is reducing
the dificit in the federal budget. This is crucial for
stabilizing financial markets throughout the world and
setting the United States on a course for regaining
equilibrium in its external trade and payments and
thereby reducing its heavy and growing dependence on
foreign borrowing." One way of dealing with this
problem is to "...combine increased taxes on consump-
tion, such as a tax on gasoline and a value-added tax,
with cuts in the major areas of expenditure--def ense and
entitlements." Fiscal security of the nation is a
critically important aspect of national defense and
security;
5. increase American productivity in all sectors of the
economy. Many economists believe that "...'[while] our
productivity growth rate does require careful attention,
there is no basis for the fear that the nation has
entered a period of permanent and disasterous decline.'
But to remain ahead, the United States will have to
improve its productivity ... .Among other things, this
will require increased savings and investment, better
use of human resources, improved industrial practices,
and new technology."
6. develop a long-range, comprehensive budgeting process
for defense which supports a national military strategy
rather than attempting to drive it. Within certain con-
straints, the international threat to the United States
must always be the driving determinant of defense
requirements. Sufficient monies must be appropriated by
Congress to ensure that adequate force levels and wea-
'
14Edward K. Hamilton, ed., America's Global Interests: A New Agenda




pons systems are available to allow the military to
confidently carry out that national defense strategy;
7. generate an integrated strategy for power projection
around the world commensurate with the United States'
emerging role as the fulcrum actor in what will even-
tually be a balance of power structure. This would place
increasing emphasis on the use of certain components of
the military, like carrier battle groups, Special
Forces, and the rapid-deployment ground forces like the
Marine Corps;
8. promote a free and open international economic system
which ensures equal access to foreign markets in both
trade and investment, the reduction of tariffs and other
barriers to trade, the creation of free-market econo-
mies, and "America must also move aggressively, by
national action under [such devices as] the Omnibus
Trade Act and through multilateral action under GATT, to
induce other governments to remove trade barriers that
unfairly impede the expansion of American exports of
goods and services;"
9. maintain a sound national economy with a strong and
vibrant technological base which can support a formida-
ble military establishment and compete successfully
against foreign economic competition. This is particu-
larly important in regards to protection of techno-
logical components of U.S. weapons systems; applying
"...selective investment tax credits for purchases of
advanced factory and office automation equipment, and
rapid regulatory approval of new products, are just two
of the approaches employed elsewhere that hold promise"
in this area.
10. ensure that research and development in American science
and industry are at the "cutting edge" of their fields.
This would require that the national government massive-
ly support and invest in both military and commercial
R&D efforts through liberal grants and tax-relief; "The
United States has an unequalled university system and a
substantial public investment in R&D. The problem is not
so much the size of public investment or the quality of
the institutions, but the direction, rate, and priori-
517Hamilton, 324.
KIDJi0Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, 726
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ties of U.S. activity. While the United States spends
heavily on research, it cannot rely on defense R&D as
the engine of research and development in the United
States More emphasis is needed on stimulating demand
for innovative new products in addition to efforts to
encourage greater R&D in firms. As experience in other
nations has demonstrated, providing domestic buyers with
incentives to purchase advanced goods is a powerful
stimulus to innovation in the industries that supply
them." 519
11. selectively use American influence and power throughout
the world to counter threats to peace and stability, and
to promote the continued establishment within the inter-
national system of free and democratic institutions;
12. restructure American alliances and treaty obligations to
better reflect the United States' s current interests
around the globe now that the Cold War is over--rela
tionships built during the era of bipolar confrontation
were often based on nothing more substantial than a
mutual concern over Communism. That can no longer be the
guiding criterion for commitment of American support or
prestige. "Cohesion of the alliance among the Western
democracies endures as a primary American interest for
the foreseeable future. The alliance is not only a vital
instrument in itself, but also a bulwark of economic, as
well as political, cooperation in dealing with issues in
other parts of the world [like the Gulf]." 520 But, in
order to better position itself as the "fulcrum actor,"
the United States needs to reevaluate the degree of
mutual interest it holds with all nations, regardless of
prior political or ideological orientation, and then
gradually construct new alliances based on those shared
interests. As Lord Palmerston stated so eloquently,
nations have no permanent friends and no permanent
enemies, only permanent interests.
These broad objectives, in order to be effective in furthering
American interests, must be incorporated into a long-term
national vision which enjoys the wide-spread support and
519Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations , 726
520Hamilton, 327.
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understanding of a majority of the American people. They must
also be related to the means for achieving them, and these
means usually come down to dollars. Without monetary support
provided through the federal budget, many national objectives
risk becoming nothing more than platitudes. A nation shows its
real priorities by how it spends its money; therefore, the
United States must design a great part of its national
strategy through the budgetary process, because it is through
the actual allocation of resources that American objectives
are prioritized and pursued. A commitment of funds is critical
for the accomplishment of any American objective, whether its
is defense of the homeland or improving worker productivity.
The United States can generate the funds for these objectives
through a variety of ways. A sampling of these are listed
below:
1. Balance the budget and reduce the Federal debt; this
will not only reduce that significant percentage of the
budget going to service that debt, it will also lower
interest rates and raise the rate of investment, while
significantly decreasing U.S. dependence upon foreign
capital to finance the government bond market;
2. Significantly raise the gasoline tax; this will raise a
tremendous amount of revenue, while at the same time
cutting consumption. This will decrease American reli-
ance on foreign oil imports, thereby helping to reduce
the U.S. trade deficit, and it will pay an additional
dividend in reduced pollution;
3. Restructure and reduce the Armed Forces as planned; this
can realize multi-billion dollar savings, particularly
in the area of strategic nuclear deterrence. The U.S.
should scrap the overly redundant structure of the Triad
and move towards a reduced strategic force, which has as
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its two primary components, an increased fleet of Ohio-
class SSBNs and a fully funded Strategic Defense
Initiative
;
4. Dramatically increase taxes on industrial polluters;
this will raise funds necessary for environmental
cleanup and drive industry towards production techniques
and procedures which reduce pollution. The United States
should also have a Federally mandated recycling program
which penalizes individual waste;
5. Increase Federal income taxes and increase incentives
for increasing the national savings rate; Americans
cannot have the finest infrastructure and institutions
in the world if they aren't willing to pay for them, and
that requires federal expenditures as well as increasing
the pool of private investment funds. A modest increase
in the rate schedule could produce billions of dollars
in additional Federal income; and, in addition, through
"...tax policy (such as further limiting the deduct
ibility of interest debt, raising margin requirements on
credit purchases, and providing tax incentives for long-
term forms of saving) . . . . " the national savings rate can
be boosted. 21
6. Increase general tax revenues; this can be accomplished
through a combination of various devices, such as tax
code revision, increased manpower for the IRS, and "user
fees." Probably only a few additional billions of dol-
lars, but as Senator Everett Dirkson once said: "...a
million here and a million there, and pretty soon you're
talking real money."
These are simply some macro-approaches designed to enhance
the American position both domestically and worldwide, and
thereby ensuring US economic strength and national security.
As Joseph Nye, Jr. confidently remarks:
The United States retains leadership in many high-technology
products as well as in number of multinational corporations.
It has a strong science and technology base, a deep-rooted
entrepreneurial tradition, and well-developed capital
markets. Capital is attracted to the United States because
521Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations , 727-728.
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the markets are safe and profitable, And, contrary to con-
ventional wisdom, the American work ethic remains stronger
than in many industrialized democracies, with a majority [of
Americans] reporting 'an inner need to do the best job pos-
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